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New, good quality affordable housing near the interface on Limestone Road, Belfast.
Preface
4
This report is about how to use planning in Northern 
Ireland as a key instrument for the creation of a more 
shared and reconciled society. But, it argues the need 
for a global rather than parochial perspective on this 
difficult challenge. Divisions within and between 
societies, about sovereignty, identity, and borders, 
abound in the contemporary world. There is much 
that Northern Ireland can learn from other examples.
Currently, the most obvious manifestation of this 
kind of conflict is to be found in the tragedy of people 
forced to seek refuge in Europe, particularly from the 
turmoil in parts of the Middle East and North Africa. 
Interestingly, the pace and volume of this people 
movement is said by some to threaten the Schengen 
Agreement, which allows for open, passport-free 
travel across many parts of Europe, a continent 
beset with myriad contests over the centuries about 
territory and sovereignty. Showing solidarity with 
distraught peoples from nearby countries is seen, 
in these terms, to threaten the hard-won solidarity 
within Europe itself, particularly in an era of austerity 
economics. Alongside this immediate convulsion, 
Iraq’s accentuating sectarian division between Sunni 
and Shia and ethnic division between Kurd and Arab, 
together with Libya’s disturbances and dislocations, 
continue their distressing fallout. 
In this context, the principle of ‘open borders’ 
within Europe is steadily being eroded. Germany 
is set to tighten border controls along its frontier 
with Austria. Hungary is imposing its own closure 
with razor-wire fencing. Such ‘protectionism’ is not 
restricted to southern and central Europe. Contrary 
to its reputation for liberal political culture, northern 
Europe is being impacted. Sweden and Denmark 
are embroiled in a dispute about whether the 
latter is permitting refugees to move to the former 
without proper processing of documentation. In the 
Netherlands, populist Freedom Party Leader, Wilders, 
is interpreting this migration as an ‘Islamic invasion’ 
that endangers culture, identity, and prosperity, 
echoing xenophobic sentiment from the Northern 
League in Italy, the Front National in France, and 
the neo-fascist Jobbik movement in Hungary. In this 
way, the spill-over of clashes about sovereignty, 
fundamentalism, and democracy in areas like the 
Middle East is re-awakening border quarrels in 
supposedly stable and territorially integrated Europe. 
Apart from its own humanitarian obligation in this 
crisis, Northern Ireland can find resonance and 
relevance in this unfolding catastrophe:
(1) it shows clearly that when it comes to conflicts 
complicated by a toxic mix of rival nationalism and 
religion, Northern Ireland is not ‘a place apart’;
(2) across the planet, migration is literally on the 
march. Since this pattern is spreading diversity, Babel 
is likely coming in time to a neighbourhood near 
you. In many European countries accustomed to 
homogeneous race and religion, learning to live with 
difference is going to come high up the curriculum 
of social life. In the last year alone over 1 million 
migrants arrived in Europe. So, the ‘Northern Ireland 
problem’ is no longer akin to just a few areas like 
Cyprus, the Balkans, and Israel/Palestine. Aspects 
of its ethno-nationalist character are set to emerge 
in Europe itself. So, there is an increasing European 
dimension to this, beyond the parochial remit of the 
Peace programmes; and
(3)  the scale and extent of the disruption and anguish 
evident in these conflicts put the Northern Ireland 
problem into a more proportionate perspective. In 
this society, we are overall very fortunate to inhabit 
this favoured part of the planet. Yet, our indulgence 
and self-obsession can make it appear that we expect 
special attention and donation from the UK Exchequer, 
Europe, and the United States. In this regard, we have 
to ‘get over ourselves’, and desist from the delusion 
that, as a society ‘emerging from conflict’, we are due 
exceptional largesse. For how many more years can 
this tired tune be credibly played?  
This is not to underplay the real hurt and grief 
experienced by the bereaved and injured in Northern 
Ireland in the course of over three decades of 
sustained violence.
   1.   Preface
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All this political turbulence has association with other 
conflicts that come in and out of view. For instance, 
separatist pressure in the Ukraine could see Donetsk 
annexed by Russia, following the experience of 
Crimea, leading in time to a quasi-autonomous East 
Ukraine, associated with Russia, and a West Ukraine 
veering closer to Europe and NATO. As in Egypt and 
Syria, at least nominally democratic governments 
seemed to be viewed as expendable by the West when 
they no longer align with western interests, whereas 
governments like Saudi Arabia’s, with long traditions 
of autocratic rule, are considered allies. Such geo-
political configurations raise questions about the 
values of democracy itself; about how ‘terrorism’ is 
defined; and what moral authority such positioning 
leaves the West in general, and the US in particular, 
when berating paramilitarism here.   
At the same time, democracy itself is stirring across the 
world, often expressed in angry resistance to political 
orthodoxy, and challenge to conventional wisdom, in 
forms that confound pundits and polls. This is evident 
in the Occupy Movement in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, but also in the student-led mass protest 
in Hong Kong, dubbed the ‘Umbrella Movement’. 
These shifts can be fickle and fluid, reflecting the very 
volatility that derives from the social fragmentations 
underpinning them. In the West itself, this can assume 
remarkable and maverick display: the prominence of 
Trump in the current republican contest in the US; 
the shock of the SNP’s insurgence in Scotland; the 
rapid emergence of Syriza in Greece and Podemos 
in Spain; together with the growing electoral profile 
of UKIP in England, Sweden Democrats, and Front 
National in France. In Britain’s Labour Party, the serial 
rebel, Jeremy Corbyn, achieves landslide victory in the 
recent leadership election. Of course, all such tumult 
cannot be explained by any single cause. 
But, in the mix, there is some sense that democracy 
isn’t working for many people; that the world of 
big business, high finance, distant government, 
‘spinning’ media, unregulated markets, trimmed 
social protection, digital divides, and greater people 
migration, is one that leaves sizeable populations 
voiceless on the margins. In turn, this can produce 
revolt against conventional politics in a surge for a 
more authentic and representative form. Equally, it 
can produce disaffection, apathy, and fatalism. But 
beyond any such disenchantment, there is a basic 
political dilemma in Western democracy. In many 
countries, the long-standing choice between social 
democracy and conservatism has been replaced by 
forms of semi-permanent managerialist technocracy, 
which is not meeting many people’s aspirations. 
Thus, in reflecting on a new politics of peace and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland that goes beyond 
‘deal-making’, the re-think has to be contextualised 
within this wider global shake-up in how we do politics. 
In particular, there is need to accept the complexity, 
turbulence and rate of change of this globalised world, 
from which Northern Ireland cannot be insulated. This 
circumstance includes: an interconnected economy, 
perhaps as crisis-prone as Marx suggested, though 
not terminally, but certainly characterised by extreme 
inequalities, rapid change and major dislocations of 
the work environment; multi-sided conflicts around 
race, ethnicity, culture and religion; and, closer to 
home, the fractionalising of British politics, and even 
threat to the UK’s territorial integrity from other than 
Northern Ireland Republicans. The project group hold 
many uncertainties (and disagreements) in addressing 




• First, there is crucial need for proportionality in understanding the problems faced 
by Northern Ireland. The endless pre-occupation with Troubles legacy issues needs to 
recognise that the scale, ferocity and wider impact of contemporary conflicts make ours 
seem relatively modest. This is not to deny the awful hurts inflicted in a conflict whose 
brutality was only matched by its futility. Rather, it is to suggest a simple recognition that 
nobody in that convoluted, multi-sided 30 year trauma held monopoly on victimhood, 
grievance or blame. In addition, how do we address an economy that, on any measure, 
falls behind major competitors on competitiveness, labour market participation rates, 
and economic inactivity, or a society characterised by long-standing inequalities and 
long-term disadvantage of many communities. Either, we will be dragged by the past or 
pulled by the future. Without vision of a competitive, inclusive and cohesive Northern 
Ireland, we will remain on the same merry-go-round, while citizens become ever more 
disillusioned about devolution, and the way that the ‘peace process’ can be abused to 
protect dishonest politics;  
• Second, some of the authors have been around a long time and have seen the same 
ideas for urban regeneration repackaged in a novel language, almost without any 
institutional memory of what has gone before. This is not to say that the ‘wheel has to be 
re-invented’ on every new policy occasion. Certain key ideas retain force and resonance, 
even decades after they were launched. Social and political problems are clearly ‘multi-
dimensional’ and require integrated intervention, but posing mantras like ‘Joined-Up 
Government’ or ‘Partnership’, without serious intent to tackle the bureaucratic inertia, 
even resistance, to change, that prevent their development in practice demonstrates 
lack of seriousness. It should come as no surprise that multiple evaluations of urban 
programmes fail to find evidence of significant convergence between the poorest 
and more affluent areas, or indeed, that such assessments themselves employ facile 
methods to measure impact on community cohesion; 
• Third, while there are simple solutions to complex problems, they are invariably 
wrong. Any new approach has to engage with the complexities, within and without 
Northern Ireland, while admitting no ‘blueprint’ solution. The imperative is to be clear 
about the principles that underpin any intervention and to set out a methodology for 
a way forward, rather than a list of recommendations. Hopefully, the report content 
reflects that commitment.
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The ‘peace-wall’ in Alexandra Park, Belfast.
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The project has aimed to identify how regeneration 
and reconciliation can be better twinned than at 
present, and, in particular, how the new approaches 
to planning under local Councils can be harnessed to 
promote good relations and a more shared society in 
Northern Ireland. In this central objective, the project 
has been rooted in a transformative rather than 
managerialist perspective on conflict resolution.
The research captured in this report is based on a range 
of inputs and sources, not least of which, includes 
the extensive experience of the authors. Some of the 
authors have been involved for decades as activists 
dating back to the late 1960s and 1970s, in campaigns 
around the housing and transport strategies for Belfast; 
anti-poverty programmes in Belfast and Craigavon; 
as an official working on development schemes and 
the Belfast Action Team initiative; as government 
advisors about Making Belfast Work; Belfast and 
Derry/Londonderry Vision Strategy; Regional Strategic 
Framework; Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan; Crumlin 
Road Prison Development Strategy; Good Relations 
Policy; the Belfast Local Strategy Partnership; 
supporting local communities in Belfast with the 
development of neighbourhood plans, etc. In other 
words, they bring to this contemporary research, a 
substantial background in engaged research related 
to these planning and policy issues. Such long-term 
involvement with planning and policy, for over 45 
years, has informed their appraisal of these matters 
in this report. As engaged academics, the authors are 
interested in understanding the dynamics of change 
in the city, in exploring potential for innovative 
transformation, and setting out a feasible framework 
for policy development.
This involved engaging diverse constituencies around 
issues of conflict, segregation, and cultural difference 
based on sectarian and ethnic identity. In turn, such 
engagement demanded analysis of: lack of shared 
space and services; divided housing and labour 
markets that inhibit development; the prevalence 
of sectarian emblems that mark territory; and the 
physical demarcations that characterise interfaces and 
routes of contentious parades.  Moreover, it included 
exploration of how a different approach to planning 
could contribute to a more integrated, connected, 
and inclusive place-making. Essential to such progress 
is the effective participation of those disadvantaged 
citizens most afflicted by the conflict in terms of: 
marginalization and isolation linked to segregation; 
dereliction and under-development associated with 
the legacy of unrest; and on-going sectarian/ racial 
tension and harassment. 
More specifically, the team has followed an interactive 
methodological process that was underpinned by 
desk-based research such as policy document analysis, 
statistical studies, literature reviews and mapping. 
Engagement with policy makers, local communities, 
professionals, voluntary groups, academics and 
others was undertaken through seminars, workshops, 
focus groups and interviews. This ongoing interactive 
approach allowed the team to present empirical 
evidence to contributors in order to deepen the 
discussions and draw out potential policy responses.
The project team has examined issues of division and 
reconciliation relating to the sectarian geographies 
of a segregated society, while exploring the 
potential of new approaches such as spatial and 
    2.   Introduction
Designed as an action-research initiative to explore improved planning practice in 
a deeply contested society, the project was funded by the PEACE 3 Programme, 
and operated in partnership with the Department of the Environment (NI), the 
government body most responsible for both changing the nature of future planning, 
and for the transference of many of its statutory duties to local government.
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community planning for proactive and civically-
inclusive forms of peace-building. Specifically, it has 
identified the socio-spatial context of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, paying regard to such features 
as changing demography; patterns of segregation 
and deprivation and their relationship to sectarian 
tension and violence; typologies of space; and the 
legacy of previous interventions around planning 
and policy. Moreover, it has specified the problems 
and confusions associated with key concepts in this 
arena, such as need, rights, and equality, essentially 
arguing that such important considerations need 
to be balanced with other factors, such as assets, 
opportunity, responsibility, and rule of law, if prospect 
of creating a cohesive and pluralist society is to be 
advanced. 
While its analysis has been on both rural and 
urban, its main focus has been on Belfast, with a 
complementary report on a case study of North 
Belfast, an area noted for its intractable divisions. In 
testing capacity for innovative planning responses to 
division, it was considered useful to learn from good 
and bad practice in multi-ethnic and conflict-ridden 
societies in Britain, the Balkans, Middle East, and the 
USA, through comparative research in cities such as 
Chicago, Nicosia, Mostar and Jerusalem.
For the first time in human history, just over half of 
the earth’s people live in cities.  While the global is 
urbanising in this way, the urban is globalising with 
patterns of migration across the world.  Major cities 
of the world are becoming much more diverse.  Thus, 
the issue of how we live with difference is becoming 
a major development problem across the world.  The 
island of Ireland has a troubled history of having to 
cope with this challenge.  In the case of Northern 
Ireland, the region has gone through nearly two 
decades of a ‘peace process’, marked most obviously 
by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, with many 
people now assuming that we have progressed to a 
post-conflict society.  
Of course, in recent times, people have been reminded 
that that optimism is premature. Ireland is not yet a 
post-conflict society. Rather, its people mostly live in a 
post-violent conflict society. But discord itself remains 
deep and ever present - particularly in Northern 
Ireland and along the border.
Northern Ireland’s conflict is centrally about territory, 
sovereignty, and identity. Planning is about the social 
shaping of space. Therefore, planning is not only 
relevant, but crucial, to the resolution of that conflict. 
Importantly, we are at the dawn of a new planning. 
Two aspects, in particular, are set to change. First, 
planning itself is going to be about more than zoning 
land for different physical uses, such as buildings and 
infrastructure. Rather, it is going to be about linking 
the wide-ranging issues of responsible place-making 
in ways that are visionary, comprehensive, integrated, 
inclusive, and proactive. 
Second, the duty to deliver this new planning is 
returning to newly re-organised local government 
in Northern Ireland, alongside some related powers 
in housing, regeneration, and local economic 
development. This combination of new planning, 
new ways of doing planning, and new democratic 
structures for its delivery and accountability, offers 
unique opportunity for imaginative approaches to 
how we make good places, even in bad circumstances. 
Introduction
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  Alongside the usual data survey employed traditionally 
by planners -- such as demographic change, and policy 
scrutiny -- the new planning in Northern Ireland will 
demand appreciation of the basis and implication of 
the conflict. But, in such analysis, explanation should 
not be confused with legitimation. Violent actions 
of the past four decades may be  ingrained in the 
historical narrative, but, from our perspective, never 
can be viewed as excusable or beneficial. 
Visible legacies of our conflict, such as wall murals 
glorifying, even sanctifying, paramilitaries, and the 
‘romance’ of the gun; commemoration sites saluting 
respective ‘war’ dead as heroes; painted kerb-stones 
marking tribal turf; confrontational flag-waving; and 
other symbols of aggressive  partisanship, bigotry, 
and hatred, scar the landscapes of many towns and 
cities. In effect, demarcating exclusive ethnic terrains 
that are hostile and ‘no go’ to all outsiders, they can 
be intensely intimidating. Highly questionable is the 
extent to which these depictions are truly the voice 
and choice of local people as distinct from the stance 
of militia organisations. 
This display of one-sided narrative is incompatible not 
only with an open democratic city, but also with widely-
accepted tenets of good planning, intended to foster: 
equitable diversity; safe space; mixed use; public 
accessibility; hospitable place; and connectedness. As 
such, it invites challenge from civic agencies, including 
planners, with the support of appropriate legislation 
that more clearly defines ‘hate crime’ and sectarian 
harassment. 
In the case of Belfast, the city faces an intriguing and 
contradictory trajectory: relative to the rest of the 
region, a vibrant urban centre, experiencing significant 
investment; gross value added (GVA) per head far 
exceeding the rest of Northern Ireland; and a re-
invigorated night life -- all contrasted with its intense 
communal territorial disputes; growth of hate crime; 
and capacity of local conflicts like the ‘flags protest’ to 
ignite into pervasive regional impact. 
In part, these persistent clashes are related to the 
flawed architecture of the ‘peace process’. But in 
part, they are due to the propensity of deep-rooted 
conflicts to readily reproduce themselves, even with 
the slightest trigger. To explore the fine grain of how 
this plays out on the ground, the report pays particular 
attention to North Belfast, a part of the city most 
characterised by small, contesting sectarian spaces, 
exemplified by on-going stand-off in Ardoyne/Twadell. 
The project has produced three main reports: (1) the Post-Project Evaluation; (2) this report, 
as its main study; and (3) a case study of North Belfast. The latter two reports will be publicly 
available in electronic and hard-copy format. Over the next year, the project team, in continued 
partnership with DoE (NI), will be engaged in disseminating to, and engaging with, the relevant 
stakeholders, around the agenda laid out in these two reports, with an emphasis on their 
practical delivery.
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Children’s play facilities overshadowed by a ‘peace-wall’ in Whitewell, Belfast.
Why is Planning Crucial to a Shared Society?
Introduction
12
For the purpose of this report and indeed to reflect 
the research undertaken, planning is defined in broad 
terms. Mainstream planning refers to the statutory 
planning functions such as development planning 
and development management. However, over the 
last 40-50 years, we have had a series of government 
interventions and programmes, which were area-
based. These include, for example, initiatives such 
as ‘areas of need’ and more recently neighbourhood 
renewal areas. In addition, there has been a wide 
range of area-based regeneration initiatives. Most, if 
not all of these, have not been connected to what we 
call mainstream planning. And yet, all these represent 
a form of planning, constituting spatially focused 
interventions by government to achieve ‘specific’ 
ends.           
Yet, for too long, planning has kept out of the 
conflict, as though the issue was too contentious, and 
beyond its concern and capacity. That detachment 
is regrettable. Rather, planning -- alongside related 
strategic instruments, such as urban design, housing, 
and regeneration -- are fundamental to conflict 
resolution in Northern Ireland.
At the same time, planning is too important to be left 
only to planners. Creating living places and mediating 
contested spaces are complex processes, demanding 
holistic perspective, involving housing, education, 
environment, economic development, health, and 
such like. 
As a discipline and practice, planning demands critical 
thinking about the making of place and mediating 
of space. At its core, it concerns social uses and 
ordering of space. Space lies at the heart of ‘ethno-
nationalist’ conflicts, such as that in Northern Ireland, 
a society fixated on issues of contested territory 
and sovereignty. Indeed, marking terrain with flags, 
emblems, and murals is an enduring expression of 
the conflict at street level. Pervasive and persistent 
sectarian geographies ‘cantonise’ large tracts of 
society in ways that feed further ‘single identity’ 
responses to housing, schooling, culture, and such like. 
Moreover, the close link between areas of greatest 
deprivation and those that have been beset with the 
worst of violent disturbance, suggests that plausible 
processes of reconciliation have to be twinned with 
strategic programmes of regeneration. Thereby, a 
more synchronised planning can play a pivotal part 
in resolving the division. Just as it is no coincidence 
that planning issues, such as housing allocation, 
triggered the onset of the ‘Troubles’ nearly fifty years 
ago, planning today can become a tool for equitable 
mutuality.
For this to take effect, planning needs to operate 
with multidisciplinary teams, also comprising urban 
designers, architects, educationalists, community 
and economic developers, and similar expertise. Also, 
it assumes inclusive engagement with the various 
publics that make up our diverse citizenry. This 
means bringing the range of stakeholders into the 
process of plan-making at a formative stage, rather 
than consulting them at the latter phases of the 
development process, when so often so much of the 
decisions seem already settled.
While the report offers analysis and recommendations relevant for the whole of Northern 
Ireland, it has chosen to focus extensively on Belfast, given its acute experience of the violent 
conflict and its high share of spatial deprivation and segregation. Nevertheless, the proposed 
principles and practice offered have potential application across the region. 
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New civic space replacing a road connection in central Belfast.
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    3.   Key Arguments
Planning involves the power to shape 
the environment. In that sense, it is essentially 
political. Politics in this society is essentially sectarian. 
Thus, there is ever-present danger that development 
will be influenced by sectarian electoral arithmetic 
-- how decisions impact on core partisan votes in an 
ethno-nationally divided society.
Alternative approaches lie in democratic 
pluralism. But, there are limits to pluralism. 
Resource distribution based on accommodation of 
myriad vested interests, linked to ‘group rights’, risks 
social fragmentation and wasteful duplication. In 
the case of the former, there is consequent loss of 
common belonging and social cohesion. In the case of 
the latter, its extensive presence can be seen in our 
multiple education systems and segregated schools. 
Also, it is evident in the other big public spending 
item -- health. Current debate about proliferation of 
health amenities at the expense of quality care tends 
to invite political agreement about urgent necessity 
for rationalisation -- until it comes to specific hospital 
or specialist closures, which inevitably marshal 
protectionist responses, based on narrow constituency 
interest rather than strategic need.
Long-standing precepts of good planning 
and design can play a significant role 
in embedding reconciliation in the 
development process. A necessary, though 
insufficient, approach to redressing the divisions in 
a deeply contested society lies in the basic principles 
of good planning: intentional connectivity; search for 
synergies; coherent design; public access; balanced 
development that minimises duplication; and 
avoidance of physical infrastructures that can dissect 
a city more markedly than ‘peace-walls’.
Mention of the latter term prompts concern about 
the way fuzzy language can impede candid 
democratic debate about development. 
The concept of ‘peace-walls’ is a palatable euphemism 
for ‘segregation walls’. In similar vein, the ‘peace 
process’ is a catch-all term that can be manipulated by 
adversaries to cast legitimate disagreement in terms 
of their opponents being pro or anti peace, thereby 
curtailing discussion. So it is with the term ‘shared 
space’. It suggests that plans need to give this explicit 
spatial expression in places dominated by ethnic space, 
often sectioned by natural environment, infrastructure, 
and other features of the built environment that serve 
as barriers. Using a typology of spaces: ethnic; neutral; 
dead; shared; and cosmopolitan -- the project’s focus 
is on how to amplify the presence and influence of the 
latter two types over the other three. The concept of 
a shared future can be understood in its most obvious 
meaning - a significant increase in integrated living 
and collaborative working across the divide, rooted 
in principles of inclusion, respect for diversity, equity, 
and inter-dependence.
Policies of inclusion and cohesion can 
operate inadvertently at odds with each 
other. Programmes for compensatory regeneration 
that seek redress of under-development and those 
that address inter-communal reconciliation have to 
be entwined. Yet, the re-distributive goals of social 
inclusion can increase inter-communal dispute about 
the relative share of new resources allocated to 
each side of a divided society. Thereby, regeneration 
initiatives can inadvertently accentuate rather than 
ameliorate conflict, confounding reconciliation 
initiatives designed to build cohesion. On this basis, 
the project interrogates frequently-used terms in 
the conflict: need; equality; inclusion, etc in attempt 
to liberate them from partisan use. These important 
considerations need to be balanced with other 
dimensions, such as assets, opportunity, responsibility, 
and rule of law, if the prospect of creating a cohesive 
and pluralist society is to be advanced.
Planning for Spatial Reconciliation
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A truly shared city cannot neglect the 
issue of socio-spatial segregation. 
This obligation confronts a perennial problem in 
regeneration of how spatial concentrations of poverty 
can give way to more socially mixed communities, 
while avoiding or minimising negative externalities 
associated with gentrification. Planning and policy 
cannot operate in an apolitical way, with no explicit 
appreciation of the spatial impact of a conflict centred 
around territory and identity;
‘Local community’ is an inappropriate 
spatial unit of analysis and intervention 
in the context of sectarian geographies. 
A civic rather than ethnic perspective is a prerequisite 
for moving beyond tribal enclaves. Community 
development has been typically more proficient at 
obstructing unwelcome proposals than in achieving 
transformative alternatives. While the sector can 
propose, it has been largely up to state and market 
to dispose, and this skewed socio-economic geometry 
means that it can be often seen as the poor relation in 
a partnership, and mostly in reactive than proactive 
mode. The main study report details the capacities 
needed by planners and policy-makers for this 
‘border-crossing’ role that can demonstrate ‘win-win’ 
rather than zero-sum outcomes. Importantly, this 
shift implies a re-drawing of administrative units for 
housing, regeneration, and other local interventions. 
Designed to ensure an economy of scale and scope, 
these bigger geographies can embody socially and 
religiously mixed communities that are encouraged to 
pay regard to assets and opportunities as well as to 
need.
There is tendency to not distinguish 
between development in a place, and 
development of a place. The former tends 
to focus on physical-led development, while the 
latter concentrates on people-centred development, 
enhancing the skills and capacities of the residents. 
Both are needed. But, the latter is the more difficult 
and long-term. Anybody can put up a building. But, 
building community is much tougher. Nurturing 
neighbourliness, friendships, trust, respect, and 
resilience -- this is the ‘soft infrastructure’ that is the 
indispensible scaffolding of sustainable place. A classic 
example of this flawed thinking is found in the recently 
built ‘community hub’  in the highly contentious space, 
known as Girdwood, long before there is any prospect 
of a mixed community.
Quality public space, including streets, plays a pivotal 
role in congregating diverse publics under a common 
civic entitlement and responsibility. Scant concern 
has been paid to quality. Targeting has its virtues. 
But, one of the problems with the culture of targeting 
is that it tends to focus on the easily measurable, 
thereby reducing most appraisals to tick-box audits. 
Quality can be neglected. There may be quality 
design invested in the central core, but, whatever 
quality consideration is so invested, it is not rolled 
out to city neighbourhoods. A key component of new 
planning and urban design centres on reconnection. 
Disconnected neighbourhoods reinforce local 
insularities and undermine the development of civic 
space.
Evidence is an indispensable component 
of engagement. The urban prospectus is not 
underpinned by robust analysis. What is happening 
to the contemporary city derives from substantial 
structural and cultural changes over the last half 
century, including: economic re-structuring; related 
urban-rural shifts; growing social inequality, also 
reflected spatially in greater social segregation; the 
re-configuration of ‘community’ in the context of 
changing family formations and household structures, 
wider social networking, decline of religious 
observance, immigration, etc. These and other 
societal processes make for new urban complexities 
that are not reducible to old-style planning, based on 
‘predict and provide’. Moreover, policies tend to be 
based on very flimsy evaluation. They move from one 
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programme to another, without really testing what 
worked and what didn’t in the previous programme, 
or indeed programmes from elsewhere. In this 
circuitous policy route, the underpinning concepts 
vary over time, giving a delusionary impression of 
innovation and progress: participation becomes 
partnership; poverty becomes social exclusion; 
multiple deprivation becomes multi-dimensionality; 
linkage becomes connectedness; etc. It is almost as if 
because we cannot change the problems, we change 
the names instead. As civil servants come and go, 
institutional amnesia takes hold, and thereby wheels 
are inadvertently re-invented, because no basis exists 
for learning from the past.
Planning can unintentionally accentuate 
rather than ameliorate contested space. 
All this demands that we define planning differently 
in a much more interdisciplinary, interdepartmental 
way; that we re-think the role of analysis and 
‘evidence’, appreciating how evidence can be filtered 
through particular ideological lenses; that we define 
‘need’ in terms of bigger geographies, such as city-
wide frameworks; that we understand how too 
much focus on ‘community’ can prompt sectarian 
competition for resources and unhelpful duplication 
of services; that citizen responsibility is an important 
companion to individual or group rights; and that we 
avoid ambiguity and ambivalence as much as possible, 
in part by highlighting clear principles for progress in a 
deeply divided society. 
The orthodox technical and professional 
competencies of planning are insufficient 
to redress the delicate issue of contested 
space. Some see a shared future implying a shift from 
managing to transforming the division, a step-change 
to a deeper pluralism with less insular communities 
anchored in exclusivist ethno-nationalist affiliation. 
A structural change in agencies like planning that 
underpins the fostering of a cultural shift in society 
toward a more cosmopolitan, open, hybrid, globally-
focussed future is needed.
A new planning model that can better address 
contested space is one that is proactive rather 
than reactive; has capacity to both make place and 
mediate space; goes beyond land-use planning and 
specific site development to a more integrated and 
comprehensive approach; embeds good relations as 
a central objective in its practice; operates in a multi-
disciplinary way; involves from a formative stage of 
plan-making a range of agencies across private, public, 
and voluntary sectors; challenges forthrightly any form 
of sectarian gate-keeping in the development process; 
and in linking community and spatial planning, builds 
in delivery, and impact evaluation from the start. 
All too often development is geared to opportunity sites 
and individual site proposals, with scant consideration 
of wider impact and connection. Take the current 
case of expanding student rental accommodation in 
Belfast. Largely, each new application is assessed on 
its particular merit, with insufficient concern about 
what would be the ‘tipping point’ of such lodging 
to put it at odds with an over-riding goal of creating 
mixed residential and mixed tenure housing in the 
central city. In other words, development is mostly 
rooted in tactical rather than strategic deliberation. 
Without a statutory-based development plan that 
takes a comprehensive and integrated look at city 
regeneration, this disjointed and piecemeal approach 
prevails.
A new more integrated model of 
community and spatial planning can 
help to simplify, streamline, and give a 
new relevance to the planning process. 
In acknowledging the prospect of this change, it is 
evident that there is still great confusion about what 
‘community planning’ involves, and this bewilderment 
is apparent in both the general public and some 
policy-makers. Certainly there is need for a more 
multi-disciplinary approach that crosses sectors and 
specialisms to lead and co-ordinate the planning 
processes in a more creative rather than mainly 
regulatory way. Such new ways of working can cross-
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pollinate knowledge-sets and practices. In turn, this 
new model demands re-think about the very scope 
and reach of planning and design. Also, it requires 
a very different approach from other partners, such 
as the community sector. Evidence from the project 
shows that planning and related policies are not 
prioritised always by all parts of the community sector 
for many reasons. As well as this, leadership is central 
when it comes to implementing a planning system 
that transcends sectarian politics. The move towards a 
‘Planning and Place’ task team by Belfast City Council 
may serve as a significant exemplar of how a new 
development vision can be developed and delivered 
in a way that moves beyond division.
Given this perspective, this report is unusual for a 
planning document in its examination of political 
context; its application of multi-disciplinary 
scholarship that embraces urban sociology, political 
philosophy, conflict resolution, education, economic 
development, governance, etc; and its attempt to link 
this integrated analysis to a comprehensive approach 
to making place and mediating space.
Ultimately, the vision is for places at 
ease with multiple identity, variety, and 
hybridity in a new globalising world, 
where assortment is becoming more pervasive, 
even in towns and cities once comfort-zoned by the 
similar and familiar. In this regard, four main strategic 
pathways present themselves to citizens in deeply 
divided societies: 
a. retreat into ghettoes stained by sectarian exclusivity 
and absolutism, thereby bolstering segregated living  
and rivalry; 
b. adopt a toleration ‘live and let live’ approach, 
involving courteous indifference to difference, 
managing co-habitation of place by way of people  
living apart in ‘parallel universes’, with insubstantial 
dialogue across traditional divides; 
c. promote a democratic politics of identity and 
belonging, whereby ethno-nationalist disputes 
assume  permanent  presence,  but  are mediated 
through regular arbitration and conciliation, involving 
dialogue that will be sometimes strident and 
unsettling; and 
d. cultivate a more generous appreciation that no one 
single culture or belief-system has total grip on the 
intricacies and horizons of humanity, but that inter-
cultural engagement among adversaries can add value 
to each for mutual enrichment. 
To move in the direction of the latter two choices, 
the role of planning is significant. Thus, to underpin 
the proposed new planning model, the project has 
identified a set of universal principles of development 
in a contested society. From these, it has recommended 
criteria that can be of practical use to planners in 
assessing whether specific plans and development 
schemes are in compliance with the central goal of a 
shared and equitable society (see opposite page).
In terms of its structure, the report proceeds to first examine the nature of the problem facing 
Northern Ireland, in its politics, violence, inequality, segregations, planning legacies, and such 
like. Second, it explores the traditional forms of intervention to address these matters, and the 
limitations and contradictions that have beset them; and, finally, it proposes an alternative 
way of planning and policy, designed to transform rather than manage the key features of a 
divided and under-developed society.   
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1. No one has a right to claim any territory on behalf of a communal identity. All of the city   
 should  be considered as shared space.
2. Since the city as a whole is every resident’s neighbourhood, urban policy and planning should  
 be concerned to create a pluralist city for a pluralist people -- open, connected, and inter- 
 dependent.  
3. Civic values of equity, diversity, mutuality, and social cohesion should take precedence over  
 those ethnic or community values, rooted in tribal partisanship. 
4. Capacity for such interlocking networks and good relations should be cultivated as a central  
 mark of genuine community development.
5. Initiatives concerning peace-lines and contested spaces should be considered within the   
 regeneration of their wider environments.  
6. Development of disadvantaged areas requires a collaborative and co-ordinated    
 approach involving cross-community local groups working with multi-agency teams to achieve  
 deliverable outcomes, reviewed by an informed external body. 
7. Poor physical connectivity among neighbourhoods, and from those neighbourhoods to sites  
 of employment, services and education, should be addressed as a priority. Road engineers  
 need to acknowledge the role that they should play in helping to stitch the fragmented city  
 back together again.
8. New housing developments need to avoid the replication of single identity social and/or   
 religious communities and should aim to create mixed neighbourhoods, well-linked to wider  
 city opportunities.
9. Such mixed developments, designed to create high-quality diverse communities, should   
 become the model to help break down the social and sectarian divisions of existing city   
 neighbourhoods.  
10. Location of key public services is crucial to their accessibility. Public services should be sited in  
 areas that are securely accessible to all communities.
    4.   Shared Space Planning Principles
Planning for Spatial Reconciliation
19
Uneven urban development on different sides of the Cupar Way ‘peace-wall’ in Belfast.
The Problem
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After three decades of ongoing political violence and 
political impasse, the foundations for a ‘post-violent conflict’ 
society in Northern Ireland were finally laid in the mid-
1990s. The ongoing ‘peace process’ has been complicated 
with interruptions to the political settlement, ongoing 
disputes about responsibility and blame and outbreaks of 
intercommunal or political violence. The continuity of the 
process has been a testament not only to the stamina of 
internal actors, but to the substantial commitment (and 
significant financial investment) of the British and Irish 
governments, the US and the EU.
The different state of the region is best exemplified by 
the contrast between the levels of lethal political violence 
before and after 1998 (Figure 1).
Thus, the annual average of fatalities in the 1970s was 
roughly twice the total number since 1998, while only those 
of pension age can really remember that most lethal decade. 
Even in the decade before 1999, the number of fatalities was 
more than five times greater than the total since.
5.   The Problem
Northern Ireland’s Challenging Peace
At the same time, political violence has not been eliminated 
– between 1999 and 2014, there were over 2,000 shooting 
incidents and around 1,600 bombing devices used; though 
still around a tenth of the numbers of the 1970s (PSNI, op. 
cit.). Elsewhere (Morrissey & Gaffikin, 2006), we argued 
that the significantly greater decline in fatal incidents 
compared to political violence generally represented a shift 
from ‘organised-strategic’ to ‘disorganised-opportunistic’ 
political violence and were cautiously optimistic that such 
were the residual effects of the complicated transition to 
peace.
It would be unrealistic to assume that conflicts a long time 
in the making would smoothly disappear. Nevertheless, 
New Forms of Violence
Figure 1:  Deaths resulting from Security-Related Violence 1969-2014.                                                                
Data Source: www.psni.police.uk
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the persistence of security-related violence and, indeed, 
the growth of other kinds of community-based violence 
challenge the notion that problems of this kind will simply 
disappear over time. For example, while PSNI data on 
hate crime have only been collected relatively recently, 
recorded racist incidents multiplied by more than a factor 
of three between 2002/03 and 2004/05 (not unconnected 
with the arrival of migrants from new EU member states) 
and then almost doubled again by 2014/15 to reach 1,356. 
Similarly, only 35 homophobic incidents were recorded 
in 2002/03, compared to 335 in 2014/15. Indeed, the 
clearance rate of racist and homophobic crimes (as 
opposed to incidents) is less than one in five. At the same 
time, the number of recorded sectarian incidents grew 
only marginally – around 12% – though remaining the 
single largest category (PSNI, op.cit.). The usual cautions 
should be expressed about different reporting rates (e.g. 
more victims of such crime are prepared to come forward) 
and definitional refinement, but such data point to the 
persistent (and consistent growth) of low-level, diverse 
forms of communal violence.
The Peace Process and Community Relations
Northern Irish society has witnessed significant changes in 
community relations over the 20 year time period since the 
announcement of the first ceasefire in 1994.  The end of 
major campaigns of violence provided the stability required 
to support a developing cross community dialogue.  During 
periods of uncertainty these relationships are tested. 
However, over time, the will and desire for the creation of 
a shared society have become more apparent. 
All political parties claim the goal of a ‘shared society’. 
But, there is evidence that Northern Ireland residents see 
less progress than implied by the political rhetoric. The 
Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey (www.ark.ac.uk/
NILT) has contained a Community Relations module since 
1998, in which the same set of questions has been asked. 
Figure 2 records answers to a question about progress in 
community relations.
Figure 2:  Response to community relations 1998 - 2013
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More than a third of respondents of each religion saw no 
change (‘about the same’) over the period. Those recorded 
as Catholics saw a fall of ten percentage points in the 
percentage claiming better relations between 1998 and 
2013, while, for Protestants, the figures rose to a small 
majority in 2005, only to fall back to the same figure as 
1998 in 2013. Again, there are difficulties in obtaining 
valid and reliable answers even to the same question over 
such a long period and particular years may be affected by 
particular events (the Flags Protest, the Ardoyne stand-
off). But, NILT utilises a properly randomised sample and 
the questionnaires are rigorously administered. It would 
be foolish to ignore the finding that the percentages 
answering ‘worse’ (albeit still small) either doubled or 
tripled over the period.
Yet, the work required to create, maintain and develop 
these relations is substantial. Multiple community groups 
in Northern Ireland have fostering cross community 
relations at their core. ‘Together: Building a United 
Community’ published in 2013, sets out to be reflective 
of  government’s aim for improved relations and a more 
‘shared society’, outlining its vision as:
a united community, based on equality of 
opportunity, the desirability of good relations and 
reconciliation – one which is strengthened by its 
diversity, where cultural expression is celebrated 
and embraced and where everyone can live, learn, 
work and socialise together, free from prejudice, 
hate and intolerance.  (ibid., 2013, p3)
Significantly, the report highlights the importance of space 
development to nurture and improve inter-community 
relations.  The central aim to create shared and safe 
places highlights the move from ‘contested space to 
shared space’ (ibid., 2013, p. 27) as an important step in 
establishing an open and accessible environment, where 
all individuals feel safe, an ambition echoed in reports 
previous to this. However, physically translating the goal 
of open and accessible ‘shared space’ into the urban 
environment has proved to be an ongoing challenge. Some 
of the fundamental concepts are still lacking a robust, clear 
and (importantly) agreed definition. Clarity on idealistic 
common phrases such as ‘shared society’, ‘shared living’, 
‘shared space’ is essential in order to translate ambition 
into reality.
Evidence of a ‘shared society’ is witnessed in the built 
landscape through projects aimed to deliberately 
facilitate inter-community interaction. One example of 
this is reflected in the education sector, as it has seen the 
expansion of the integrated schools models throughout 
Northern Ireland, a system which places emphasis on the 
individuality of the child, and on learning together with 
all individuals, regardless of religious background, and 
importantly working side by side in the same space. While 
demand for integrated education gained momentum over 
time, the number of 62 integrated schools is relatively low 
in comparison to single faith schools (NICIE, 2014).  While 
2014 witnessed the approval to proceed with the building 
of two new integrated primary schools, namely Drumlins 
IPS in Ballynahinch and Row Vally IPS in Limavady, this is set 
against the shared campus model, which appears to have 
more political backing, as the softer and less contentious 
route to education’s contribution to a shared society.  The 
shared campus model opts for schools remaining separate 
while sharing facilities and some learning opportunities. 
This raises a fundamental question:  by building this model, 
does this legitimise a segregated school system and thereby 
continue to institutionalise division in children’s formative 
years? 
Thus, while initiatives like A Shared Future (2005) and 
Cooperation, Sharing and Integration (2013) suggest 
that community relations have been at the heart of the 
policy agenda for over a decade, Life & Times data reflect 
considerable variation in the public’s view on  community 
relations progress. Equally, their fragility is starkly revealed 
by the way in which local incidents can take on regional 
significance – the Flags protests or ‘marching’ stand-offs.  
Over the past 20 years, devolution has produced 
a deal and trade-off arrangement rather than 
reconciliation, and this ‘deal process’ rather than 
‘peace process’ is itself reflective of the sectarian 
power blocs, further empowered by the Good Friday 
Agreement. 
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Marred with stalled ‘talks’ and inability to achieve real 
change, ineffective leadership is coupled with lack of 
governmental ‘good relations’, which at this high level 
offers little to encourage the wider population watching 
in dismay as repeated forms of sectarian stalemate 
paralyse political progress. While the move from violence 
to negotiation is important, the move from negotiation to 
stagnant ‘talks’ questions how a new ‘shared society’ can 
be nurtured. 
Reflective of outside support to foster Northern Ireland’s 
peace process and promote a new ‘shared society’ are 
the significant external funding schemes aimed to nurture 
reconciliation. The EU acts as a primary investing body 
delivering key programmes such as: 
 ● PEACE Programme:  This programme “aimed at 
reinforcing progress towards a peaceful and stable 
society... promoting cross-community relations and 
understanding in order to create a more cohesive 
society.” (SEUPB, 2014, p.1);
 ● INTERREG Programmes:  Divided into three strands: 
1. INTERREG VA (Crossborder) aims to “bring adjacent 
cross-border regions closer together through the 
development of joint projects.”
2. INTERREG VB (Transnational) aims to “aim to 
promote a higher degree of territorial integration, 
with a view to achieving sustainable, harmonious 
and balanced development across the EU and better 
territorial integration across the EU and non-EU 
Member States.”
3. INTERREG VC (Interregional Co-operation): aims 
to “to improve the implementation of regional 
development policies and Programmes, in particular 
the Programmes for Investment for Growth and Jobs 
and other ETC Programmes.”  (SEUPB, 2016b, p.1);
 ● European Social Fund Programme: The European 
Social Fund (ESF) Programme strategic aim “is to 
combat poverty and enhance social inclusion by 
reducing economic inactivity and to increase the skills 
base.” (DEL, 2015, p.1);
 ● ERDF Investment for Growth and Jobs Programme: 
This programme’s strategic objective, “is to promote 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, the 
achievement of economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and high levels of employment and 
productivity.” (DETI, 2015, p.7).
Figure 3:  PEACE Funding, Total programme value 2015-2020
Data Source:  SEUPB 2016a
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The ‘PEACE programme’ alone has invested a total of 
£1.995 billion from 1995 to 2013, with a further future 
investment of £270 million planned for 2014 to 2020 
(SEUPB, 2014a). However, despite the substantial revenue 
received to support peace, development and reconciliation 
from these primary financial streams, the deep signatures 
of division persist, and these chasms continue to block 
policy progress.
In part, the problem reflects the complicated debate about 
victimhood, grievance and blame. More, the expression of 
what is regarded as ‘legitimate’ culture and history by one 
side is seen as triumphalist assault by the other – Orange 
marches or IRA commemorations. Given that identity 
politics and culture wars have been the norm since the 
state’s foundation, Northern Ireland might be said to have 
prefigured some of the complexities of contemporary UK 
politics.
Yet, at the same time, it’s hard to ignore the extent to which 
the architecture of the Good Friday settlement has, itself, 
helped perpetuate division. The logic of the agreement has 
been straightforward:
 ● First, since the fundamental dispute has been about 
sovereignty, embed a principle of consent regarding 
the future constitutional status of the area. While 
tactically necessary, this may have been strategically 
dubious, since it established a permanent contest over 
the future of the state, albeit via votes rather than 
guns. At one point, we saw this as positive, arguing 
that, since neither side could command a permanent 
majority, it made sense to engage in ‘smart pluralism’ 
in pursuit of one’s own political goals, i.e. persuade 
Catholics that a better future lies in the UK (for which 
there is some support in Life & Times) or Protestants 
that they have nothing to fear from a United Ireland. 
Moreover, this would enable Unionists (being serious 
about their declared principle of ‘civil and religious 
liberty’) and Nationalists (to embrace their declared 
tradition of uniting Catholic, Protestant, and Dissenter) 
to each reach for a more inclusive form of politics 
beyond their sectarian comfort-zone. Such optimism 
has proved unfounded, partly to do with calculations 
about how demographic change could ultimately 
deliver a majority anyway, or fears that reaching out 
to the ‘other’ could create internal bloc divisions. 
Thus, the contest has not ‘gone away’. Instead, it is 
being conducted in different forms, which privilege 
intra-community coherence and discipline over open 
and honest inter-community engagement;
 ● Second, there has been an objective to ensure that 
minorities cannot be overwhelmed by majorities, by 
installing a set of protective procedures within the 
Assembly’s operation. Again, while necessary, this 
obviates the need to build coalitions or to persuade 
others outside your traditional fold. In effect, it freezes 
political debate, sustaining rather than undermining 
bloc politics;
 ● Finally, there has been an imperative to obtain 
maximum participation in politics (rather than the 
alternative). Hence, the very large number of assembly 
members for a very small population, the creation 
of ten (ultimately 11) departments of state, and the 
absence of an effective parliamentary opposition. In 
the midst of this complexity, political debate tends to 
be factional and partisan.
In short, policies to build a shared society are overseen by institutions, whose own architecture 
fundamentally sustains division. Evolution of a different set of political procedures and processes may 
thus be a pre-condition for tackling community division.
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The Labour Market
Meanwhile, debate about whether inter-communal 
inequalities have been resolved or, indeed reversed, 
lingers. Historically, the debate centred on labour market 
inequalities, an arena where change is evident. When the 
project began, evidence on labour market differentials 
pointed to converging trends, though still important 
differences in unemployment and economic activity rates. 
For example, the Labour Market Survey 2011 revealed that:
 ● Over the period 1992 to 2011, the numbers of those 
in employment from both communities has increased. 
The rate of this increase has been more marked among 
Roman Catholics (an increase of 123,000 or 63%) than 
Protestants (an increase of 7,000 or 2%) (p.27);
 ● Approximately one in five Protestant males of working 
age (19%) were economically inactive in 2011, 
compared to 24% of Roman Catholic males. Thirty-
five percent of Roman Catholic females of working 
age were economically inactive, compared to 32% of 
Protestant females (p.16);
 ● The proportion of economically active Protestants 
in employment increased by 2 percentage points, 
compared to an increase of 10 percentage points 
for Roman Catholics (1992-2011). Similarly, the 
proportion of economically active Protestants 
unemployed decreased by 2 percentage points, 
compared to a decrease of 10 percentage points for 
Roman Catholics (p.14);
 ● In terms of absolute numbers, the period 1990 to 2011 
saw an increase of 32,000 Protestants of working age 
(6%), an increase of 120,000 Roman Catholics (32%), 
and an increase of 80,000 other / non determined 
religion 150% (p.6). In 2011 the composition of the 
unemployed was 48% Protestant and 52% Roman 
Catholic. Comparable figures for 1992 were 45% and 
55% (p.22);
 ● Over the period 1993 to 2011, the percentage of 
Roman Catholics with no qualifications has decreased 
from 32% to 14%, and the percentage of Protestants 
with no qualifications has decreased from 30% to 
        16% (p.34); and
 ● In 2011, the Protestant median hourly wage rate was 
£8.74, compared with £9.38 for Roman Catholics. In 
1995, the wage rate differential was 0.96. In other 
words, the Roman Catholic median wage rate was 
96% that of Protestants. In 2011, the wage differential 
was 1.07 (p.31). 
Yet, by 2014, the picture had further evolved as follows: 
 ● Between 1990 and 2014, the number of Protestants 
aged 16 and over rose by 35,000, or 5%, to 678,000, 
while for Catholics this number increased by 150,000, 
or 34%, to 590,000, while those categorised as ‘other/
non-determined’ nearly trebled from 63,000 to 
170,000. Taking the 2011 Census data, there were 
618,000 Protestants aged 16 and over in Northern 
Ireland, compared to 567,000 Catholics, and 247,000 
assessed as ‘other/non-determined’, making for 
43% of those aged 16 and over as Protestant, 
40% as Catholic, and 17% denoted as ‘other/non-
determined’;
 ● Consistently over the period 1992 and 2014, Catholics 
have held higher rates of working age economic 
inactivity than Protestants. However, these rates have 
converged significantly: in 1992, 24% of working age 
Protestants were economically inactive compared 
to 34% of working age Catholics, while in 2014 the 
corresponding figures were 28% and 29% respectively;
 ● With respect to employment over this period, a higher 
share of working age Protestants has been in work 
relative to their Catholic counterparts, a gap that has 
reduced to a great degree: in 1992, 70% of working 
age Protestants and 54% of working age Catholics 
were in employment, whereas by 2014, these rates 
became 67% and 66% respectively, almost the same;
 ● Again, while over this period, Catholics have held 
higher rates of unemployment than Protestants, 
there has been a closing gap in the absolute disparity 
between unemployment rates for both communities -- 
from nine percentage points in 1992 to two percentage 
points in 2014. In 1992, the unemployment rate was 
9% for Protestants and double that for Catholics 
(18%). By 2014, these rates had fallen to 6% and 8%, 
respectively, a notable change; and
 ● Taking a similar period (1993 to 2014), the percentage 
of working age economically active Protestants with 
no qualifications has fallen from 30% to 12%, while 
the percentage of working age economically active 
Catholics with no qualifications has decreased from 





This transformation has been the result of both 
structural change and a comprehensive legal 
framework for fair employment. Claims of reverse 
discrimination are not supported by the most recent 
labour market data. Voices from the Protestant 
community complaining about the changes have to 
recognise that they only redress historic long term 
disadvantage suffered by Catholics. By the same 
token, those on the Catholic side who continue to 
complain that nothing significant has changed - have 
to recognise that they have substantially gained 
from labour market reforms over the last decade.
Simultaneously, the evidence allows one community to 
perceive it is on the wrong side of history, and that things 
have gone too far, while the other claims that equality has 
not yet been fully realised. The latter is reinforced by the 
data on spatial deprivation (www.ninis.nisra.gov.uk) where 
the Relative Poverty 2003/05 and Multiple Deprivation 
Measures 2001, 2005, 2010 suggest that the most deprived 
areas are more likely to have populations predominantly of 
Catholic, rather than Protestant, Community Background. 
The Family Resources Survey (www.dsdni.gov.uk) is used 
to generate Households Below Average Income reports 
that also provide evidence of income poverty. The 2002-
03 Report found that 22% of households with a Catholic 
head had incomes of 60% or less than the median (after 
housing costs), compared to 20% for Protestants. In the 
2012 report, the respective figures were 23% and 15%, 
implying a relative deterioration for households with 
a Catholic head. Even if the reports are not consistent 
(though both used OECD equivalence scales), the latter 
continues to provide evidence of persistent relative income 
disadvantage for Catholics, although much of this may be 
related to household structure rather than substantial 
income differentials.
Educational Performance
An issue of considerable concern of late has been 
educational under-performance of sections of the 
Protestant community, particularly young urban Protestant 
males from disadvantaged backgrounds (eligible for free 
school meals), and this has important implications for the 
equality debate. In part, this is a reflection of more 
general trends that are not exclusive to Northern Ireland 
– gender differentials in educational performance, the 
‘hollowing out’ of labour markets that eradicate certain 
traditional occupational trajectories once suited for 
male apprenticeships. However, in Northern Ireland, 
evidence points to under-achievement of this group 
compared even to their Catholic counterparts. If such 
differences are sustained and translated into systematic 
labour market disadvantage, then the perception that the 
equality ‘pendulum has swung too far’ will be dramatically 
reinforced.
Catholic pupils are generally more successful in obtaining 
a place in a Grammar school than their Protestant 
counterparts (42.8% of Catholic pupils vs 30.8% of 
Protestant, 2012/2013) which may be the decisive factor 
in accounting for differences by religion. The CRC Peace 
Monitoring Report (Nolan, CRC, 2014, p.97) breaks down 
the performance data by gender, religion, and free school 
meals entitlement outlined in Figure 4.
The implications of such differences, in a labour market 
that is increasingly divided between those with high level 
and those with no qualifications, are substantial. However, 
figures from the Department of Education on achievement 
of 5 GCSEs A-C, 2011-12 suggest a more complicated 
picture, although the comparison is not exact, since they 
cover attainment for any GCSEs A-C. Even so, when the data 
are standardised not just by gender and free school meals 
eligibility, but also by grammar/non-grammar category, the 
differences appear less stark. For example, Protestant boys 
in non-grammar schools, eligible for free school meals, 
had a 30.7% achievement rate, compared to 43.3% for 
their Catholic counterparts – a smaller difference, but one 
that still needs to be explained. The inclusion of English 
and Maths in the GCSE set seems to reveal a performance 
difference in itself. Differential distributions between 
grammar and secondary schools – Catholic boys eligible 
for free school meals seem more likely than similarly 
entitled Protestant boys to attend grammar schools – is a 
complicating factor.
Second, percentages can conceal significant differences in 
the actual numbers. Thus, the number of Protestant boys 
eligible for free school meals was considerably smaller 
than Catholic boys – 590 compared to 1251 in 2011-12 
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(13% and 22% of their respective cohorts). Moreover, 
just 62 Protestant boys eligible for free school meals 
were in grammar schools compared to 212 Catholic boys. 
The achievement rate in GCSEs for Catholic boys is thus 
influenced by their larger sample size, and the greater 
number in grammar rather than non-grammar schools. If 
one takes two samples of different sizes from two similar 
ranked distributions, the mean of the larger sample will 
be closer to the population mean. When these samples 
are differently distributed between grammar and non-
grammar schools (the real divide within the Northern 
Ireland education system), differences in achievement are 
further exacerbated.   
The relative importance of a socially, as compared to 
religiously, divided education system is emphasised 
by data released recently by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation,   showing that around 60% of boys eligible for 
free school meals (FSM) do not achieve five good GCSEs, 
in stark contrast with 30% of those ineligible -- double 
the level. While for girls, the corresponding figure for 
non-achievement is lower at 51%, the gap between their 
performance and that of girls not FSM- eligible (22% non-
achievement) is greater than that of the difference among 
boys (New Policy Institute, 2016).
Though in general, grammar school attainment levels on 
this core criterion are significantly better than those of the 
non-grammar schools, in each type, FSM-eligible pupils 
perform poorer than their ‘non-eligible’ counterparts. This 
disparity is more evident in the non-grammar sector, in 
which nearly two thirds (65%) of FSM-eligible pupils do not 
get five good GCSEs, compared with under half (47%) for 
non-eligible pupils. Yet, a deprived background still makes a 
difference even among grammar school pupils, with those 
entitled to free school meals more than twice as likely to 
lack five good GCSEs as other pupils – 10% compared with 
4%. Poverty matters in educational attainment.
Indeed, this marked distinction between grammar and 
non-grammar carries on in the pattern of post-school 
education. Close to 90% of boys and girls leaving grammar 
schools proceed to further or higher education, as against 
61 % of boys and 74% of girls from other schools. In turn, 
Figure 4: Chart showing gender and religious breakdown for school leavers entitled to free school meals achieving 5 or more GCSEs A-C 
including English and Maths (Grammar schools tend to have GCSE English Language and Maths as compulsory subjects). 
Source: Peace Monitoring Report 2014
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this different trajectory plays out further in labour market 
destination, with non-grammar school leavers being 
around twice as likely to be unemployed or in an unknown 
category – around 7% of boys and girls compared with 3% 
of corresponding grammar school pupils.
None of this suggests the absence of a problem, but 
one that is more complicated than at first sight. Quite 
simply, Catholic boys are more likely to be eligible for free 
school meals than Protestant boys – the higher benefits 
dependency of the (non-pensioner) Catholic population 
ensures that. Equally, 3.7% of Catholic boys in the free 
school meals group are in Grammar schools compared 
to 1.3% of their Protestant counterparts, and this has 
implication for the relative success rates of both.
At the same time, there seems to be little appreciation 
among Unionist leaders that the educational performance 
of Protestant pupils, a pre-requisite for their future effective 
participation in the economic system, is increasingly falling 
behind the Northern Irish average. In fact, the insistence 
of mainstream Unionism on the maintenance of the 
existing division between grammar and secondary school 
only seems to add to the relative disadvantageous socio-
economic position of their working class electorate.
In linking data on educational outcome with that on 
deprivation, circumspection regarding the complexity is 
necessary. For instance, reservation about methodology 
that uses MDM scores to select ‘deprived’ wards for study 
is warranted. MDM is heavily weighted towards working 
age benefits dependency (50%), thereby tending to ‘favour’ 
populations that are reliant on such benefits. Moreover, in 
the case of assessing impact of deprivation within each of 
the two main communities, there is a problem in applying 
this ‘one-size-fits-all’ measure to two populations with 
different demographic characteristics. If a simpler income 
measure of poverty is used, there is no relationship with 
religion for ‘non-equivalised’ households, but a systematic 
relationship for ‘equivalised’ households. In short, being in 
poverty is more dependent on household structure that 
comparative income. Arguably, Catholic and Protestant 
areas that have similar deprivation scores can be actually 
quite different. 
Another well-versed argument is that Protestant 
disadvantage is a consequence of the operation of Loyalist 
paramilitaries – inferring a particularly significant role 
for the black economy in Protestant working class areas. 
This supposes that there are much less paramilitary 
and drug dealing operations in counterpart Catholic 
areas -- a proposition for which convincing evidence 
remains deficient. Yet another explanation offered is 
that academic education has never been an ambition 
for the Protestant working class, since another route 
was available through apprenticeships for engineering 
and shipbuilding employment, a pathway now blocked 
due to deindustrialisation in such manufacturing 
sectors. By contrast, it has been suggested that Catholic 
educational motivation has been kindled by their keenness 
to circumvent job discrimination through scholarly 
achievement.  One sceptical note in this discourse stems 
from counter-narratives that people who lost such jobs 
didn’t actually become long-term unemployed, but rather 
became reabsorbed in the labour market quite quickly. 
Indeed, were it not for the extraordinary growth of the 
Northern Ireland public sector, Catholic participation in 
employment would still fall short of Protestant. It’s hard 
to surmise that these enterprising, redundant Protestant 
workers have not passed on some of that resourcefulness 
to their children.
What seems obvious, however, is the need to advance 
educational opportunity for all those communities 
suffering from high levels of deprivation. A number of 
interventions, such as the ‘sure start’ programme, have 
brought significant successes in this context. However, 
research from elsewhere, suggests that early gains need 
to be developed and sustained throughout the overall 
educational experience.
While there may be grains of truth in these familiar 
commentaries, that could benefit from deeper 
investigation, such discussion, if left at a very generalised 
level, risks a simplistic binary tale taking hold: relative 
Protestant working class educational under-performance 
attributable to ‘smart’ Catholic and ‘dumb’ Protestant 
culture, paralleling the caricature of smart republicanism 
and stupid Unionism. Thus, since the politics of the 
‘irreformable’ Northern Ireland state has had to be abated, 
since nationalists are now embedded in it, the idea may 
be insinuated of an irreformable, though sizeable, chunk 
of the Protestant working class population. Irreformability, 
in these terms, can come to mean that a section of the 
population is beyond rational redemption, a proposition 
that would be very problematic for an inclusive society.
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In summary, our data analysis in relation to educational attainment reveals three interesting things:
• Even when disaggregated by school type, there are differences in performance, but less so than  
 often suggested. But, the difference remains and needs to be explained;
• A higher proportion of Catholic boys on free school meals are actually in Grammar schools – thus, a  
 comparison that does not differentiate by school type favours Catholic boys;
• The size of the Catholic boys sample was much bigger than that of Protestant boys. If two samples  
 are taken from the bottom of two ranked distribution, it is simply a matter of arithmetic that   
 the mean of the larger sample will be closer to its population mean, thus exaggerating the degree of  
 difference. 
Sharing Poverty and Deprivation? 
In the UK, the usual measure of low income is a threshold 
set at 60% of the median household income, calculated 
after deduction of housing costs (AHC) or before (BHC). For 
policy purpose, the most widely used deprivation indicator 
has been the Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation 
Measure (MDM) (www.nisra.gov.uk), particularly in 
allocating resources across space for the Peace and 
Neighbourhood Renewal Programmes. It has been 
produced on a consistent basis since 2001, reproduced 
in 2005 and 2010. Since it offers an MDM score for small 
geographies like Super Output Areas (SOAs), it is possible 
to explore the association between MDM and the religious 
background of the same areas. With the 2005 version, 
the correlation coefficient between MDM scores and 
the percentage of the population of Religion or Religion 
Brought Up In: Catholic (2001 Census) was 0.4. For Religion 
or Religion Brought Up In: Protestant the correlation 
coefficient was -0.4.  
In short, the higher percentage of a population 
of Catholic Community Background, the higher 
the MDM score. A similar association was found 
between MDM 2010 and 2011 Census data (0.38 and 
-0.38) on religious background. Thus, the statistical 
association between religious background and MDM 
was consistent over this period, and suggested a 
likelihood of higher deprivation scores in areas with 
greater concentrations of Catholics. 
Simultaneously, the 20% of SOAs with highest deprivation 
scores had disproportionately populations of Catholic 
background – a result that hasn’t changed much over time. 
However, these findings are less straightforward than they 
appear: 
 ● A correlation coefficient of 0.4 means that one 
variable (religion) predicts about 16% of the 
variance of the other (MDM). Thus, religion explains 
a very small share of the total variance of MDM; 
 ● Second, the two domains within MDM that have 
the most weight are the Income and Employment 
domains, accounting for 50% of the total. If one 
section of a population is more benefit dependent 
than another, it will automatically appear 
more deprived on this measure. Unless benefit 
dependency is automatically associated with less 
command over resources, there may thus be a bias 
towards one section of the population. It’s difficult to 
have a rational discussion about this issue, because 
of the moral panic and stigma stirred up by sections 
of the popular press about claimants in general, 
aided and abetted by significant members of the UK 
government. However, a further piece of evidence 
throws some light on this issue. There is another 
measure (the Relative Poverty Measure 2003-
05) which has scores for the same geographies as 
MDM. This provides an estimate of the percentage 
of households with incomes less than 60% of 
the median (the most widely used EU poverty 
measure). Interestingly, it provides scores for both 
equivalised and non-equivalised households. The 
correlation coefficients for religious background for 
equivalised households mirror those of 2005 and 




Figure 5 depicts SOAs (Until April 2015 Belfast was made up 
of 150 SOAs) with populations 75% or more of a particular 
community background in three datasets: Relative Poverty 
2003-05, MDM 2005 and MDM 2010. For each, community 
background percentages have been calculated from both 
2001 and 2011 Censuses. The table refers to the 30 most 
deprived/poor and the 30 least deprived/poor SOAs in the 
city – the top and bottom quintiles.
It can be seen that SOAs with populations 75% or more of 
Catholic Community Background figure prominently in the 
most deprived/poorest quintile – being between two and 
three times more likely to be included than those with 
populations with 75% or more of Protestant Community 
Background. This is in contrast to the least deprived/poor 
quintiles, where SOAs of 75% plus of Catholic Community 
Background are fewer than those of Protestant majority 
background. In short, inter-community inequalities do 
remain a concerning feature of the deprivation landscape. 
It should be noted that the relative poverty data show a 
greater imbalance between the two communities than the 
deprivation data. 
One qualification to the above: when the highest quintile 
of the Relative Poverty (unequivalised) dataset for Belfast 
is identified, the inter-community ratios shift. For example, 
the poorest quintile had 10 SOAs of 75% or more Catholic 
Community Background and 18 of 75% or more of Protestant 
Community Background. The difference reflects the use of 
equivalence scales. Differences between those of Catholic 
and Protestant Community Background may be more to 
do with household characteristics rather than income. 
However, household characteristics remain important since 
larger households with similar incomes to smaller still have 
greater poverty risk.
Figure 5: SOAs with 75% or More of a Single Community Background in Three Deprivation Studies.  
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This suggests that the differences between 
households of different religious background 
are not simply of income, but are also to do 
with composition – more dependents make 
for higher levels of need and therefore greater 
poverty levels.
Indeed, as the 2012 Labour Force Religion Report 
notes (p.14): ‘In 2012, 18% of Catholic households had 
one dependent child, compared to 12% of Protestant 
households. Twelve percent of Catholic households had 
two dependent children compared to 11% of Protestant 
households. In addition, Catholic households were twice 
as likely to have three dependent children as Protestant 
households (6% v 3%)’. It is impossible to ignore the 
higher levels of need generated by more dependents in 
the calculation of poverty measures. But again, this may 
be unconvincing to those simply comparing their own 
incomes to others.
At Northern Ireland level, the Family Resources Survey 
(www.dsdni.gov.uk) is used to generate Households 
Below Average Income reports that provide the most 
comprehensive evidence of income poverty. The 2002-03 
Report found that 22% of households with a Catholic head 
had incomes of 60% or less than the median (after housing 
costs) compared to 20% for Protestants. In the 2012 
report, the respective figures were 23% and 15%, implying 
a relative deterioration for households with a Catholic 
head. Even if the reports are not consistent (though both 
used OECD equivalence scales), the latter continues to 
provide evidence of persistent relative disadvantage for 
Catholics. However, since the data also refer to equivalised 
households, the cautions expressed above continue to 
apply.
In short, the equality debate remains complicated. In a 
question asked in the Life & Times Survey in 2003, 56% of 
Catholics felt that Protestants were ‘better treated’, while 
41% of Protestants felt that Catholics were ‘better treated’. 
While policy makers and academics may ponder on the 
meaning of change, it is experienced by people living in 
communities and both influences, and is influenced by, 
the narratives by which they give meaning to their lives. 
The complicated interplay of political, economic and 
social forces are frequently bewildering in themselves. 
For those most affected, the result is rarely a positive 
embrace of openness, sharing or collaboration. In 1998, 
75% of Catholics and 53% of Protestants felt that relations 
between the two communities would improve in the next 
five years - in 2013, the respective figures were 46 and 35 
% (NILT, 1998, 2013).
It should also be recognised that the decade following 1998 
was one in which Northern Ireland enjoyed considerable 
economic growth and substantial increases in public 
spending, accompanied by external investment in peace. 
In short, the economic environment was favourable to 
the region. However, since 2008, that environment has 
radically changed. In 2014, GDP in England was about 10% 
higher than in 2010, in Scotland the increase was 7% – yet 
Northern Ireland experienced a three% fall in its Composite 
Economic Index (a surrogate for GDP) (www.detini.gov.uk). 
A study by the Resolution Foundation (2015) found that 
Northern Ireland suffered the biggest decline in real-terms 
median net household income between 2007 and 2014 of 
all UK regions. The full implementation of austerity during 
the current UK parliament has yet to be felt in the region, 
though the impact of the impasse over welfare reform has 
had a negative impact on other services. 
A lower spending, income-declining region is likely to 
see more competition for available resources and more 
strident claims and counter claims about equality. Despite 
these persistent disputes, Northern Ireland has undergone 
significant transformation in the past two decades – much 
of it positive. However, the problems that create political 
volatility (the Flags Protests) or indeed, intractability 
(Twaddell/Ardoyne) are more than just residual – remnants 
of a past that needs to be put behind us. They are the 
consequence of an evolving situation that creates new 
fissures and new points of contest. Some are about the 
ways in which general social change appears in particular 
forms in the region and are interpreted according to local 
peculiarities. Some are the consequences of a reformed 
political system in which, inevitably, there will be winners 
and losers. One of the factors behind continuation of 
communal strife is the perceived imbalanced distribution 
of the peace dividend among the two main communities: 
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it is especially the lower income Protestant communities 
that feel left out, when it comes to job allocation and 
socio-economic mobility. While the sources of populist 
Protestant discontent are discernible, a more equitable 
labour market is a pre-requisite of a fairer Northern Ireland. 
Yet, although change over the past two decades has led 
to very similar Catholic and Protestant unemployment 
and economic inactivity rates, Catholics have benefited 
from the majority of job opportunities – circumstances 
capable of sustaining contradictory grievances. It is in such 
a contested environment that peace-building struggles to 
prevail.
Paradoxes of Peace Building
Einstein’s famed definition of insanity involves doing the 
same thing repeatedly, while irrationally expecting that 
the next time will somehow produce different results. 
When it comes to tackling deprivation and the linked 
issue of good relations between the contending tribes in 
Northern Ireland, that’s exactly what has been happening 
for 40 years. Evidence of limited impact suggests that we 
need to stop, reassess, and try something very different. 
The intractable persistence of urban poverty, social and 
religious residential segregation, and related territorial 
contests confirm this imperative.
Peace-building confronts a set of central paradoxes in 
divided societies. On the one hand, there is need to do 
something practical and immediate. Yet, intervention 
is addressing a protracted problem that invites the 
hesitancies and uncertainties that attend complex analysis. 
Such conflicts call for risk. Indeed, how do you provoke real 
change without being really provocative? It is essential to 
‘disturb the peace’ of conventional thinking and comfort 
zones to create a sustainable and genuine peace. Yet, blunt 
words and deeds, in a highly partisan society, risk being cast 
Visual displays of ‘community’: Loyalist mural on the lower Newtownards Road, Belfast...
...and Gay Pride Festival in Belfast city centre....Republican mural off the Oldpark Road, Belfast...
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as biased. To survive such accusation, advocates of change 
and renewal need to build relationships of trust across 
the borders of division. Yet, such relationships cannot be 
purchased at the price of surrendering pluralist values in 
the face of narrow ethnic interest. So, these 3Rs of risk, 
renewal and relationship form the inescapable landscape 
of peace-building. In negotiating this tricky terrain, 
appealing to people’s needs may be more productive than 
appealing to their good nature. 
Moreover, the basic supposition of traditional anti-prejudice 
programmes is that the consonance generated through 
contact and communication across the divide can over 
time dilute the dissonance of bigotry and ‘tribal’ hostility. 
But, this faith in the power of ‘mutual understanding’ runs 
counter to evidence suggesting that the more common 
interests are proclaimed in these circumstances, the more 
significant becomes the marginal differences (Ignatieff, 
1999). It is a version of Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor 
difference’, whereby people who can share a lot in common 
by way of language, physical appearance, broadly similar 
religious narratives such as Christianity, residence of the 
same city, and similar socio-political culture can accentuate 
the relatively minor divergences between them as the 
rationale for internecine hostility. The association involved 
in extravagant group attachment becomes countered with 
dissociation from the ‘outsider’ group, who need to be kept 
at arm’s length, as the threat of the strange is juxtaposed 
with the comfort of the similar and familiar. 
In other words, paradoxically, efforts to emphasise 
close resemblance may inadvertently accentuate 
rather than ameliorate the defining division 
between protagonists, who feel more compelled 
to amplify those aspects which most place them 
apart and justify their warring tribalism. Thus, the 
plausible idea of replacing cultural distance and 
ethnic enmity with the relational empathy of a 
‘shared humanity’ underestimates this tendency to 
‘marginal difference’.
Another approach is to supplant the ‘ethnic’ nationalism 
that emphasises blood and kin, linguistic and cultural roots, 
and the mythical history that binds the collective tribe, with 
a ‘civic’ nationalism that recognises a multi-ethnic society 
built on citizenship, responsibilities, and the protection of 
individual rights and liberties. Three main arguments can 
be advanced to illustrate the difficulties of this shift:
First, while a ‘civic’ society infers institutions and governance 
constructed around shared meaning and memory among 
citizenry, from a post-modernist perspective, unitary 
and universalist concepts such as ‘common rights’ do 
not exist independent of diverse cultural interpretation 
and social contingency. From this relativist position, the 
Hate crime targeting a racial minority community.
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very assumption that divisions can be even commonly 
understood, never mind resolved, ignores the lack of 
an agreed moral compass to guide not only mediation 
and reconciliation, but also basic standards of ‘civilised’ 
behaviour. Moreover, while it is often advocated that 
contesting parties in the conflict should learn to behave 
‘reasonably’, this appeal to reason again underestimates 
a post-modernist loss of faith in rationality, alongside a 
greater respect for ‘multiple realities’ and the emotive 
impulses of the human condition. 
Second, when unitary concepts like citizenship confront 
splintered realities like contested identity and territory, 
it highlights the importance of power inequalities in 
determining the outcomes of disputed definitions. 
Thus, the notion that a civic society can be built through 
collaborative discourse between rival ethno-nationalist 
interests underestimates the paradox that such peace-
building actually invites each side to demonstrate their 
power, since ‘flexing their muscle’ can lever negotiations 
in their favour. In short, peace processes are at once 
energising and dangerous because they can elevate 
levels of both hope and harm. In addition, while progress 
out of violent conflict demands creation of safe spaces 
for democratic dialogue, that engagement itself has to 
contend with contradictions within the liberal democratic 
framework offered for such conversation: 
 ● On the one hand, it extols respect for cultural diversity 
and related special treatment of different groups, 
while on the other, it upholds universal principles 
about similar rights and equalities across the whole of 
society;
 ● Its practice of equal opportunity is compromised 
by market and other inequities that structurally 
disadvantage groups around factors such as gender, 
class, race and ethnic identity;
 ● Behind the banner of universal franchise lies the 
reality of differential power, based on these socio-
economic disparities; and
 ● Its response to ethnic violence even when based 
on a cross-community consensus can risk a self-
fulfilling cycle, whereby insurgent violence provokes 
state repression, itself prompting violent reaction 
that induces more repression, which in turn can be 
exploited to justify ever more aggressive resistance. 
Yet, if the state fails to offer appropriate security, it 
invites formation of vigilante militias in the noble 
name of ‘community defence’, and this bind between 
being both delicate and decisive in dealing with armed 
urban conflict can be manipulated by those intent on 
accentuating it.   
Third, appeals to respect diversity assume some core 
binding common identity that permits appreciation that 
those who are different from us are also in some important 
sense like us, and the concept of citizenship is often 
employed for this unifying purpose. Yet, as indicated earlier, 
it is problematic to use the idea of shared ‘citizenship’ 
in an environment (like Northern Ireland) lacking shared 
sovereignty, where the fundamental contest is not over 
the nature of the state, but rather over its very existence. In 
such a situation, reformist agendas to improve equity and 
diversity can become confused with revolutionary agendas 
to fundamentally re-arrange constitutional authority.
Some of the above tensions can be seen in the way that 
peace-building processes, designed to address the contest 
become bound up in that very contest. Controversy over 
the differential funding and resources allocated to each 
side of the divided community provides one stark reflection 
of this. In a situation where there are socio-economic 
inequalities, parity of treatment is not the same thing 
as uniformity of treatment. The side in more social need 
needs more compensatory resources. Yet, non-uniformity 
of resource allocation will invite claims of partisanship by 
the side receiving less. 
Such considerations demonstrate the complexity of 
peace-building in deeply divided societies. Within such a 
vexatious context, a distinctive contribution that can be 
made by a proactive form of planning is the privileging of 
shared and safe places for inter-communal dialogue and 
intra-communal choices and dissent. Division involves not 
only political and cultural options beyond the traditional 
divide, but also the extension of scope for peaceful 
democratic difference and dispute within each main 
tradition. One model of this can be a form of planning that 
deliberately facilitates a multiplicity, hybridity and fluidity 
of identity, within a framework of common civic belonging, 
however fragile the latter may be in a contested society. 
Many of these dilemmas can be seen in the planning and 
development of Belfast, which captures a clear spatial 
imprint of the layers of contested history. 
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The new Titanic building sitting within the old shipyard landscape.
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Belfast: The Changing City
A century ago, Belfast was in many respects a global 
city, but one debilitated internally by a parochial 
contest around ethno-national identity between its two 
main communities: Protestant (Unionist with Britain) 
and Catholic (Nationalist with the rest of Ireland). 
Demographically, it peaked in the mid-twentieth century, 
only to shrink dramatically in the subsequent fifty years, 
and to ‘flatline’ in the last ten. Accompanying this decline 
has been a significant re-composition of the religious 
make-up of its residents, and the combined impact of this 
population loss and change poses a formidable challenge 
for a sustainable urbanism in Northern Ireland’s capital. 
In the 1960s, government reports implicitly acknowledged 
the inadequacy of existing forms of state intervention, 
based around subsidy of old industry, to achieve essential 
economic modernisation (Hall, 1962; Wilson, 1965). 
The Matthew report (1963) specifically recommended 
industrial dispersal from the Belfast Urban Area to a 
Greater Belfast and beyond to new ‘key’ and ‘growth’ 
centres that could be attractive to the investment of 
multinational capital. To encourage this demagnetisation 
of investment and population in Belfast itself, and requisite 
labour mobility, a stop line on Belfast’s further expansion 
was proposed, together with new town developments that 
would ‘satellite’ around the city, and the comprehensive 
physical redevelopment of housing and road networks 
within the city. These studies culminated in the 1969 
Belfast Urban Plan, which set the framework for this 
strategy. Apart from lower density new build housing, land 
in the inner city was to be designated for major elevated 
motorways and new commercial development, as it was 
anticipated that a sizeable share of the more skilled inner 
city population would ‘decant’ to suburbs and New Towns. 
At one level, the plan met with success. Multinational 
companies did arrive, and helped diversify an economic 
base that had become too narrow in terms of regional 
specialisation. But, they were not interested in occupying 
the old industrial spaces in the core city. For instance, firms 
producing the new artificial fibres were not locating in the 
old urban mills that once weaved the linen. Rather, they 
sought the single-storey factories that accommodated new 
mass assembly intensive production, and these were more 
economically built in the Greenfield sites beyond the urban 
centre. Through the seventies and eighties, the economic 
impact of this strategy in a new globalising context was 
marked. In the Belfast Urban Area, manufacturing still 
accounted for one third of jobs in 1971, but a decade later, 
it was just below a quarter, and the role of the multinational 
companies in that production declined as they contracted 
and retreated as part of their global corporate restructuring 
in that period. The first wave of Belfast’s industrialisation 
lasted 150 years. But, the second wave, largely centred on 
a strategy of attracting inward investment, lasted more like 
fifteen. 
This process of economic restructuring directly affected 
Belfast’s traditional role as major economic power base 
of Northern Ireland, a process that was reflected in major 
changes in the socio-spatial structure of the Belfast region. 
Major ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors led to a significant urban-
rural migration, especially in the seventies and eighties. 
New investment, employment, and housing were locating 
beyond the wider suburbs and into New Towns, such as 
Antrim and Craigavon, in the wider city-region.
‘Push’ factors included: deindustrialisation and massive 
housing redevelopment that was spatially concentrated 
in the most deprived communities of the urban core. The 
social impact of this haemorrhaging of the city’s economic 
and social base was felt especially in the inner city areas of 
Belfast, where deindustrialisation meant that the traditional 
employment bases were eroded and unemployment and 
poverty became more prevalent. The exodus of people 
with continued employment to the new satellite towns left 
behind impoverished communities unable to escape their 
social position. It were these deprived inner city areas 
where a combination of social insecurity and traditional 
inter community rivalries provided the circumstances for 
the deterioration of relations into the full scale violence 
associated with the Troubles, which in turn provided 
further stimulus for people to migrate from the city.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the core city’s population was 
reduced by a third, with its inner city population declining 
by over half (55%), while the population of the wider 
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city-region increased by 39%. The population share of 
the core city of Belfast, relative to its wider urban area, 
has continuously reduced from 90.2% in 1926 to 55.9% in 
2011. Furthermore, in 1951, Belfast had 32% share of the 
regional population. However, by 2011, this had dropped 
to half that at 15.5%. The city itself has seen a significant 
population decline from its peak in 1951 (444,000) to 
2011 (280,962), representing a 37% decline. This pattern 
of shrinking core city, being followed since the 1970s by a 
shrinking urban area, persists to the present.
Belfast’s Urban Revival
The manufacturing collapse in the 1970s, and an emerging 
new international division of labour, led some observers to 
proclaim the inevitability of post-industrialism for much of 
the global north. Growth in services seemed to offer a life-
line to vulnerable urban centres, since many were more 
labour-intensive than modern manufacturing, and still 
relied on logistical convenience to main settlement centres. 
Moreover, a strategy that concentrated on Downtown and 
Waterfront could help to spatially concentrate the physical 
transformation and visibly support a re-branding of the 
city, and provide a counter-attraction to the appeal of out-
of-town shopping. 
Implementation of major reshaping of social space 
coincided with the onset of the political violence, thereby 
complicating the renewal process, by contributing to 
population shifts into segregated territory for greater 
security, and related urban blight. By the late seventies, 
Figure 6: Image of Belfast city centre proposed by 1969 Belfast Transportation Plan.
Source: 1969 Belfast Transportation Plan.  R. Travers Morgan & Partners (1969)
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community protest at the comprehensive redevelopment, 
the enduring violent conflict, and starker economic times 
and fiscal retrenchment following the oil crisis and world 
recession, all combined to induce a re-scaling of some of 
the proposals. Nevertheless, the broad strategy persisted, 
but  in a region where the tradition of proactive planning was 
weak. The main legislation supporting the transformation 
--- the 1944 Planning (Interim Development) Act -- had 
not delivered an expertise in strategic planning, and 
proliferation of local government in a small region had not 
helped to co-ordinate Belfast’s development in its regional 
context (Birrell and Murie, 1980).
In a divided city like Belfast, there were particular putative 
benefits. Its city centre had suffered the ravages of an 
intensive bombing campaign by the Provisional IRA 
during the seventies and into the eighties. Its proposed 
rehabilitation seemed to offer proper recompense. Since 
75% of the region’s population was within a 30 mile radius 
of Belfast’s city centre, concentrated effort in its renaissance 
seemed to be economically sensible. In addition, these new 
Downtown developments could generate new employment 
opportunities in a neutral and safe environment for those 
unemployed who were deterred by a ‘chill factor’ from 
seeking work in more partisan city geographies.     
The 1989 Belfast Urban Plan marked a significant departure. 
It was intended to identify and satisfy land development 
needs of the then most active sectors of a fragile local 
economy. In particular, this included retailing, leisure, 
and tourism. A city economy, once based on industrial 
production, was formally acknowledged as one that would 
be largely based on services. Essentially, the 1989 Plan was 
concerned to reclaim the city as a central location for the 
region’s investment in a post-industrial economy:
 
The City Centre plays a major role in the economy 
of the Urban Area and of the region beyond and 
the image it presents can reflect upon that  much 
wider area....Current economic trends suggest that 
the best development opportunities are in shops, 
offices, and leisure facilities.  The City Centre is well 
placed, due to its size and its scope for expansion, to 
take advantage of this trend.... (DoE (NI) 1990, 13)
Accordingly, the main focus was on resuscitating the Central 
Business District with retail and office expansion, and 
extending its commercial catchment by opening the city to 
its river by the prestigious waterfront Laganside scheme, 
on the basis that ‘improvements to the central area and 
the Lagan will play a major role in the regeneration and 
attraction of investment to the urban area as a whole’ (Ibid., 
p.17). As in other cities facing the ravages of industrial and 
population decline, this strategy seemed to make sense to 
many key urban stakeholders.
So, whereas the 1969 Belfast Urban Plan deliberately 
tried to de-populate Belfast, its successor two 
decades later felt compelled to emphasise a ‘strategy 
of developing a strong City Centre and a revitalised 
Inner City coupled with the retention of population 
within the urban area....’ (Ibid., p. 16).
At one level, this strategy has been remarkably successful. 
The transportation/communication infrastructure has seen 
substantial investment; the city core and riverside have 
enjoyed major redevelopment, including landmarks like 
the Victoria Centre, the MAC, and the Titanic building; and 
a vibrant nightlife and tourist culture have been successfully 
promoted. For the first time in decades, population of the 
City Council area increased between the 2001 and 2011 
Censuses, even if migration was a significant factor. 
This was reflected in the headline measure of economic 
growth (Gross Value Added per Head GVA), in which 
Belfast steadily out-performed the rest of Northern Ireland. 
Between 1997 and 2011, the GVA for the Belfast NUTS 111 
area (equivalent to the City Council area) almost doubled, 
compared to just over 60% for the UK as a whole, and 
was substantially greater than any other Northern Ireland 
NUTS111 area. Indeed, by 2011, the Belfast GVA in money 
terms was more than twice as high as any other Northern 
Ireland area (ONS, 2013).
It is questionable, however, whether the benefits of 
the city’s productivity are appropriately shared with its 
population, since Gross Disposable Household Income per 
head remained consistently below that of Outer Belfast 
and the East of Northern Ireland NUTS 111 areas (ONS 
2013). In short, the benefits of its economic growth were 
disproportionately shared with those living outside the 
city – understandable given that the number regularly 
travelling to work in Belfast from outside is almost equal 
to its working age population (Belfast City Council, 2015).
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Moreover, there is evidence that the driver of growth in 
Belfast has been mainly public spending. In the latest Cities 
Outlook (Centre for Cities 2015), Belfast was compared 
with 63 other UK cities. It performed badly (in the worst 
10) on indicators like business start ups, patent registration, 
private/public job ratios and the percentage of the working 
age population without formal qualifications – hardly 
evidence of a thriving private sector. Moreover, on the 
Inequality Indicator (the difference between highest and 
lowest Job Seeker Allowance rates), it exhibited the highest 
level of all 64 cities.
The relative generosity of public spending in Northern 
Ireland has been well documented, though headline 
differences in spending per head amongst the UK nations 
don’t take account of the region’s greater rurality, its 
higher morbidity rates, greater levels of social housing, and 
the fact that some of its brightest students go on to work 
elsewhere, thus contributing to other regional economies. 
The point here is not to debate fairness, but to emphasise 
the fragility of a public spending-dependent city in an era 
in which austerity has become the norm. If the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (Green Budget, 2015) is correct in predicting 
that the plans announced in the 2015 Budget would reduce 
the public sector to around 35% of National Income, the 
impact on Northern Ireland as a whole, and Belfast in 
particular, could be severe, since spending increases in the 
region are benchmarked to those in England and Wales. 
In reports commissioned by OFMDFM, the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (2013) had already predicted that in 
Northern Ireland, relative poverty for children would 
increase to 29.7% and for working age adults to 25.3% by 
2020. Work commissioned by NICVA (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2013) suggested that amongst the then 26 district 
councils, Belfast would have the third highest income loss 
per head, resulting from Welfare Reform. These changes 
would have disproportionate impact on particular groups 
living in particular parts of the city. The implications for 
anti-poverty measures (a requirement in the new local 
authority Community Plans) and, indeed, for community 
relations, most likely will not be positive.
Changing the Balance
Alongside the rapid changes in the appearance of Belfast’s 
urban environment in the decades since the 1960s, the 
social composition of its populace has altered significantly. 
The most notable of these demographic changes is the 
gradual increase in the proportion of the city’s Catholic 
community, a process that can be traced back through 
history as far back the late 18th century, when rural-urban 
migration of Irish peasants appeased Belfast’s growing 
demand for cheap labour for the expanding linen industry. 
Although the Protestant population has traditionally 
constituted a majority in the city, a number of factors has 
contributed to the rise to greater prominence of the Catholic 
community since the 1970s. These include: a higher birth 
rate among the Catholic population; the ageing of the 
Protestant population; and a disproportionate emigration 
of the Protestant population to surrounding suburban and 
satellite towns around Belfast and further afield, to Great 
Britain. 
In the early 1990s, the number of Catholics had surpassed 
the number of people adhering to the three traditional 
Protestant denominations in the core city of Belfast, a 
milestone that is partly a result of increasing levels of 
secularism and the formation of an array of alternative 
Christian denominations. However, when taking community 
background as indicator (a Census variable since 2001), 
which is often considered to be a more realistic measure 
of the extent of the two communities because it includes 
people that don’t consider themselves to be religious but 
still part of a community, it becomes clear that:
the city of Belfast - which once had a make-up of two 
thirds Protestant, one third Catholic - is now seeing 
a move to a 50/50 balance of the two traditional 
communities. The same census also shows that 
the Catholic community dominates the younger 
age groups, thereby indicating that the Catholic 
community is likely to constitute a majority in 
the city of Belfast in the future. At the same time, 
however, most suburban towns around Belfast are 
predominantly Protestant, giving rise to a growing 




Figure 7:  Breakdown of Northern Irish 
population by religion. 
Source: 2001 and 2011 censuses. 
Figure 8:  Population growth between 2001 and 2011 by community background in the Greater Belfast area. 
Source: 2001 and 2011 censuses. 
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The changes in demographic balance of the city are 
clearly reflected in the political make-up of the city’s 
local government. The traditional dominance of Unionist 
parties over the city’s affairs has been eroded over the last 
number of elections by the gradual growth of a nationalist 
bloc, alongside an increase in more neutral parties, such 
as the Alliance Party, now able to influence the balance of 
power. Although political differences are not uncommon 
within both the Unionist and Nationalist blocs, perceived 
stalemate in political power means that governance of the 
city has become more complicated, and that both blocs are 
tempted to tap in and exaggerate differences between the 
two communities in order to garnish maximum political 
support. This capacity for mutually assured impasse has 
brought further challenge for processes of reconciliation.
At the same time, however, the traditional political 
orientation of the two main communities seems to be 
less prevalent, and opinions about major political issues 
more diverse, making it more difficult to base politics on 
the traditional divides. For example, when asked about 
the issue of national identity, the general public seems to 
choose from a much wider range of options than the ‘Irish’ 
and ‘British’ options, with both these options attracting a 
relatively modest reply. Similarly, the numerical support 
for Irish unification seems to be much less than the size 
of the Catholic community, which makes up its traditional 
support base. Both examples indicate that it has become 
much more difficult to correlate public opinion on major 
issues to the traditional sectarian divide. 
Alongside these internal changes to the two main 
communities, there have also been external processes 
prevalent since the signing of the peace deal in 1998 that 
have impacted significantly on the demographic structure 
of the city. One such process is the influx of a large number 
of immigrants that don’t belong to either one of the main 
communities (approximately 10,000 immigrants between 
2001 and 2011). Analysis of the 2011 census data reveals 
that in Belfast (at Super Output Area level) the correlation 
coefficient between the percentage reporting religion or 
religion brought up in as none, and the percentage with 
a country of birth outside the UK or RoI is 0.79 out of 1 
(1 indicating a causal relation). Although these immigrants 
are far from ‘empty shells’ in terms of cultural backgrounds, 
their unfamiliarity with the conflict and their relative 
neutral stance towards sectarian division means they often 
contribute to a ‘softening’ of sectarian geographies. In 
addition, the census data also seem to indicate that most of 
these immigrants are relatively well educated and between 
the ages of 20 and 40, an indication that suggests that 
immigrants contribute to a more vibrant and economically 
healthy population base. Significantly, without the influx of 
immigrants, the city would have experienced a fall in its 
population.
Although it is difficult to extract the implications of these 
immigrants for the fragile political landscape of the city, 
especially since there is no separate political representation 
of the migrant communities, the addition of a new set 
of social networks and political allegiances adds to the 
complexity of the current social and political groups within 
the city – if only because longer-term migrants are able to 
vote. 
As a result, the likely continuation of 
these demographic tendencies in the 
future bolsters the notion that the city is 
increasingly made up of minorities that are 
less and less bound to the traditional social 
and political divides and adds weight  to the 
cry for political engagement across these 
self-inflicted differences.
Figure 9:  Individual perception on National Identity.
Source: 2011 Census 
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Geographical Units for Spatial Analysis
The units most suitable for the purpose of analysis of Belfast are Super Output Areas (SOAs) with populations between 1,500 
and 2,500 - roughly one third the size of a typical Belfast ward, large enough to contain a reasonably sized population, but 
small enough to reflect separation. There were 150 SOAs in Belfast in 2001 and 2011. However, it is very difficult to capture 
separation adequately, as the two enlarged areas illustrate. When mapping Community Background data on Small Area 
level, neighbourhoods that appear ‘mixed’ on SOA level can be shown to be highly segregated on a street-by-street basis.
Figure 10: Map of Belfast showing community background by Super Output Area and Small Area (frames). Source: Census 2011.
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New housing beside old divisions: the Alexandra Park ‘peace-wall’,  Belfast.
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Belfast: A Shared City?
Over the past 45 years, tension and inter-community 
conflict in Belfast created enclaves dominated by one 
or other ethno-nationalist identity, where people felt a 
greater sense of security, thus fortifying and entrenching 
patterns of residential segregation. Over the longer period, 
in Belfast’s more peaceful times, such patterns tended to 
soften, though retaining large areas predominantly of one 
community or the other (East or West Belfast) and at least 
one patchwork quilt of micro, segregated communities 
(North Belfast). However, Ian et al. (2013) argue that over 
the period 1971 – 2001 the city of Belfast undoubtedly 
became more Catholic, but it also lost considerable 
population, particularly from the Protestant community. 
Suggestions, however, that segregation continued 
relentlessly are, in their view, an exaggeration. 
For those interested in urban contest, a key issue is whether 
the first decade of the 21st Century saw a reduction in 
the city’s overall pattern of segregation as a result of the 
‘Peace Process’ or whether the embedding of segregation, 
accompanied by ongoing low-level community violence, 
became a ‘fixed’ characteristic of the urban landscape. The 
frequently commented growth in the number of ‘peace 
lines’ hints at little change. Yet, for Northern Ireland as a 
whole, Shuttleworth & Lloyd (2013) conclude from their 
analysis of Census data that residential segregation actually 
decreased in the period between 2001 and 2011. 
But, has this ‘moving together’ been a discernible 
feature of Belfast in the last decade, particularly 
in those sectors of the city where political violence 
was concentrated?  If such areas remain unaffected 
by change, the question is really whether two cities 
are emerging: one more diverse, more affluent and 
more peaceful; the other still locked in traditional 
enclaves, prone to violence and whose deprivation 
has been relatively untouched by four decades of 
urban programmes, designed to alleviate poverty.
One indication of changes in residential segregation in 
Belfast during the Peace Process can be found by examining 
some basic demographic figures. Analysis of the 2001 and 
2011 censuses reveals that within the Belfast Urban 
Area, in 2011 there are still almost 280,000 persons living 
in a ward (approximately 6000 persons) that is either 
predominantly Catholic or predominantly Protestant (over 
70% of the population of a single community background). 
This amounts to 56% of its total population. In 2001, these 
numbers were almost 330,000 (67% of total). Despite an 
overall population increase, the number of persons living 
in a ward dominated by one or another community has 
decreased. In 11 out of the 20 wards experiencing the 
largest increase in population in the period 2001-2011, 
neither community background constituted a majority in 
2001. 
While in 2001, there were around 18,000 persons (3.7% 
of the BUA population) living in a ward where neither 
community background constituted a majority, the 
number of persons living in such wards was more than 
60,000 in 2011 (11.9% of BUA population). In total, more 
than 1/5th of the increase in the number of persons from 
a Catholic background within the BUA has occurred in 12 
wards, where neither community background constituted 
a majority in 2011 (out of 119 wards). The same 12 wards 
have seen a relatively modest decline in persons from a 
Protestant background. 
Eight out of 20 BUA wards with the largest population 
increase, over the decade between 2001 and 2011, were 
predominantly Protestant in 2001. All of these wards have 
seen the proportion of the Protestant community fall, with 
four of these wards experiencing quite dramatic falls in 
Protestant population that have resulted in the proportion 
of the Protestant community below 70%. 
These are also the same wards where large increases in 
immigrant population have been recorded. As Shuttleworth 
and Lloyd indicate, if migrants from EU accession countries 
record their religion (Poles being predominantly Catholic), 
this might affect measures of segregation without any 
greater sharing between the two indigeneous communities. 
The fall recorded above in the Protestant community and 
the rise in Catholic Community Background may well be 
partly attributable to the impact of migrants moving into 
Protestant areas. 
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Figure 11: Dissimilarity Indices for Belfast 2001 & 2011.
 Source: Census 2001 & 2011.
The Dissimilarity Index
The formula for the Dissimilarity Index is:
(1/2) SUM |ai /A – bi / B |
Where ‘a’ is the number of the first group in the small area, ‘A’ the total number of that group in the larger unit, ‘b’ the 
number of the second group in the small area and ‘B’ the number of the second group in the larger unit. It can be seen that 
if each small area is inhabited exclusively by one group or the other, the total would be two (or 200 in the notation used) – 
hence the need to half the sum, but if each area contained exactly the same share of each group, the total would be zero. 
Since negative and positive values would cancel each other out when aggregated, absolute values are employed. In short, 





But it’s not clear that such ambiguities can be resolved 
exclusively via the analysis of Census results. There are, 
however, some pointers: first, Census data reveal that 
most wards with the largest rise in immigrant population
between 2001 and 2011 were predominantly Protestant 
in 2001. Second, more thorough quantitative analysis 
shows that those reporting ‘None’ as ‘religion or religion 
brought up in’ are more likely to share space with those of 
Protestant Community Background. 
All of the above is predicated on the assumption that the 
Census variable Religion or Religion Brought Up In accurately 
captures Belfast’s two main communities. If sufficient 
members of one or both were classified differently, the 
results would be compromised. This is important because 
the number recorded as having no religion nor religion 
brought up in, more than doubled between 2001 and 2011 
to 20,784 (about 7.4% of Belfast’s population). 
A first look at the changes presented above seems to 
support the hypothesis that areas that are perceived 
to be ‘mixed’ are the most desirable areas to live in for 
all communities, and that a fair degree of ‘mixing’ is 
occuring in some areas of Belfast. This is consistent with 
the conclusion posed by Shuttleworth & Lloyd that, for 
Northern Ireland as a whole, while accepting that the 
pattern has been affected by immigration and the different 
ways in which people report religion: 
…there does appear to have been a decrease 
in segregation as measured by D (Dissimilarity 
index).  This is the first time that segregation has 
fallen since 1971 but with a longer-term historical 
perspective the results should not be surprising 
(Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2013, p.62).
However, the evidence may also support the 
interpretation that ‘mixed’ wards are merely a 
transition from previously Protestant areas slowly 
transforming into Catholic areas, without too much 
prospect of remaining mixed in the years to come. 
In addition, due to the sometimes fine grained scale 
of sectarian geography, the data risk generating a 
positive picture, while the essence of geographically 
compact enclaves of single persuasion remains 
untouched.
The most commonly used measure of the degree to which 
two groups share space is the Dissimilarity Index. This 
measures the evenness with which two mutually exclusive 
groups are distributed across the geographic units that 
make up a larger geographic entity.  Figure 11 shows  the 
Dissimilarity indices for Belfast calculated on the basis 
of different geographical units of analysis. The degree of 
residential segregation in Belfast declined between 2001 
and 2011 for the city as a whole and for each of its sectors – 
moving together rather than moving apart. It can be seen, 
however, that the North and West sectors have higher 
values than the overall city and markedly higher than for 
East or South. Residential segregation is still remarkably 
high in the North & West of the city and these areas had 
also the most intense exposure to political violence.
At the same time, populations are not distributed across 
space as individuals, but rather as households. It is thus 
possible that changing household sizes may have an 
effect on the value of the dissimilarity index. For that 
reason, indices were calculated for households (using 
the community background of the household reference 
person in 2011, thus assuming that this is common 
across household members). Other than South Belfast, 
the 2011 indices for individuals and households are 
remarkably similar. While it is not clear why this should 
be the exception, in general, this similarity suggests that 
the moving together hypothesis is also supported by the 
household analysis. 
There is, however, one rider to that conclusion – households 
of different sizes appear to have different dissimilarity 
indices. The 2011 Census contains a table giving religion 
or religion brought up in for one person and multi-person 
households respectively. The Index for Catholic/Protestant 
Community Background one person households was 58.3, 
whereas for multi-person households it was 69.9. One 
possible explanation for this divergence assumes that 
one person households are more likely to be in younger 
or older age groups. It’s possible that the extensive 
apartment accommodation (with high occupation rates of 
younger age groups), particularly in inner-city Belfast, is a 
more mixed environment, thus contributing to the lower 
index for one person households. Whereas in the past, 
‘sharing’ has often been associated with socio-economic 
characteristics, it may be that age is an equally important 
variable. More analysis is required.




In acknowledging the sometimes very narrow spatial definition of communities in the Belfast context, and the incompatibility 
of communities with administrative units, it becomes important to supplement census data analysis with other, more 
qualitative forms of analysis. 
Just over half a century ago, these areas were very different from now. Lower Oldpark and the ‘river’ streets that adjoined 
it, were overwhelmingly Protestant; the ‘middle’ Oldpark was made up of the Catholic ‘Bone’ area on the left hand side 
going up from the Crumlin Road, centred around the Sacred Heart church, while on the opposite side of the road was 
the predominantly Protestant ‘Ballybone’, comprising streets such as: Ballynure, Ballycastle, Ballymena etc. All these 
neighbourhoods were working class, with mainly terraced housing in narrow streets. Just up from them was Oldpark Avenue, 
a lower middle class area, leading from the Oldpark to Cliftonville Roads, and religiously mixed in residence. Further up the 
Oldpark was the mainly Protestant Heathfield and contiguous Torrens area, leading further upwards to the more middle 
class Deerpark, Alliance, and Cliftondene areas, stretching up to Ballysillan Road. Though mainly Protestant, these localities 
were becoming more religiously mixed by the 1960s. 
When violence erupted in summer 1969, this landscape started to change significantly. Over the next few years into the 
first half of the 1970s, Protestants moved out of the Ballybone, while those Catholics that had begun to occupy part of the 
‘river streets’ adjoining Lower Oldpark similarly left. Increasing Catholic presence in the wider Bone area came, in part, from 
an influx of people living in areas like Benview and  Silverstream, which up to this had been developing as ‘mixed areas’, 
and which then changed into Protestant districts in the Ballysillan. As violence and tension were worse in the working class 
areas, these saw the major conversions in this period. How far these population shifts were the deliberate result of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ led by intimidation, or the incremental impact of rumour, uncertainty, and unease, leading people to move to 
what they considered as more secure terrain among their ‘own kind’, is debateable. 
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As comprehensive redevelopment of the Bone/Ballybone/Lower Oldpark arrived in the mid-1970s, alongside continued 
intensive violence, this ‘ethnic churning’ increased in pace and scale. Many people started to vacate the Protestant Lower 
Oldpark, so much so that by the early 1980s, whole tracts such as Hillview and Louisa Streets, and adjoining areas, were 
demolished to make way for an Enterprise Zone, stretching from Oldpark to Crumlin Roads, providing a ‘buffer’ wedge 
between the dwindling Protestant Lower Oldpark, and the burgeoning Catholic ‘Greater Bone’, as it was then becoming. 
Around the same time, the Protestant presence first in Heathfield and later in Torrens started to haemorrhage, a process 
that over the next decade of the 1990s, started to take hold in the lower Deerpark/Alliance/Cliftondene areas (Darby and 
Morris, 1974; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). 
Alongside this pattern, spatial mobility, linked to the social mobility of Catholics who had benefitted from improved educational 
opportunity since the 1940s, saw an increasing Catholic presence in the middle class areas such as Cliftonville, Cardigan, 
Deerpark and part of Upper Oldpark. Indeed, what had become ‘mixed’ areas from the 1950s in Upper Oldpark, including 
streets such as Deanby, Dunowen and Dunkeld, all became increasingly Catholic since the mid-1970s. Similar patterns were 
evident in the Cavehill Road, and adjoining areas, such as Salisbury, Chichester, Sunningdale, North Circular,and Castle; and 
on the Antrim Road, leading from the Catholic inner city areas of New Lodge and Newington to the now overwhelmingly 
Catholic middle class areas of Fortwilliam, Somerton, Landsdowne and Downview.  
For a period of 15-20 years up to the late 1980s, this trend manifested itself as improving ‘integration’ in the middle class 
areas of Cliftonville, Cavehill, and Antrim Roads. But, this ‘mixing’ was transitional. By 2000, the general flow was towards 
a predominantly Catholic presence in much of this area, stretching also to the north west to mainly Catholic Ardoyne and 
Ligoneil, in contrast to what remains the mainly Protestant vicinity around the Shore Road. This broad demarcation can 
disguise the more complicated patterns of ‘cheek by jowl’ segregations, such as: Protestant enclave of Glenbryn amidst 
the mainly Catholic Ardoyne; Catholic New Lodge/Newington and Protestant Duncairn/Tiger’s Bay; Protestant lower and 
Catholic upper Limestone; Protestant lower Westland and Catholic upper Westland; mainly Protestant Skegoneill and 
mainly Catholic Glandore. Physical evidence of this divide can be seen in the graffiti, memorials, murals, flags, window metal 
grilles, and painted kerb stones, alongside the many peace walls, including the barrier that splits Alexandra Park since the 
mid-1990s, opened in 2011 by a ‘peace gate’ during the day. Proliferation of surveillance cameras also testifies to the many 
flashpoint ‘interface’ areas between the tribally defined territories. But, there are also less perceptible ‘understandings’ of 
turf, for example between the lower ‘more Catholic’ and upper ‘more Protestant’ tiers of the split-level Waterworks.    
It should be noted that this Catholicisation was accompanied by intensive violence and reprisal attacks in this fought-over 
terrain by Republican and Loyalist militia throughout the ‘Troubles’, with IRA shootings and bombings, including part of its 
‘Bloody Friday’, and Loyalist incidents such as the McGurk’s Bar killings and assassinations in the infamous ‘murder mile’ that 
straddled Cliftonville, Newington, and New Lodge. While sectarian violence has abated, outbreaks of factional tension have 
persisted, in, for example, the gauntlet of harassment faced by girl pupils of Holy Cross primary school in 2001; and enduring 
contentions around marching at Twaddell Avenue.  
The imprint of these tumultuous events, particularly of Protestant contraction, can be seen in closure of state schools, 
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such as Finiston, Skegoneill, Castle High, and Mount Gilbert, and transformation of other once Protestant schools, such as 
Cave Hill, Cliftonville, and Belfast Royal Academy into formal or ‘de facto’ integrated schools. Even more dramatic makeover 
can be witnessed in the closure of Protestant churches in Carlisle Circus, Antrim and Cliftonville Roads, and Duncairn/
Mountcollyer, so that the Moravian church at 424 Oldpark Road, looks now like a lonely outpost of Protestant worship in 
the wider Oldpark/Cliftonville area.
It might be said that these patterns are part of the continual ‘layering’ of cities over time. For instance, Annesley Street, in 
the lower Antrim Road, housed Greenville Hall Synagogue, the once centre of the Belfast Jewish community, now closed. 
Over more recent decades, concentration of Jewish presence in the Somerton Road, and nearby streets such as Lismoyne 
Park, has also experienced retrenchment and retreat. Meanwhile modest levels of immigration are evident in places like 
Thorndale in the lower Antrim Road. While such shifts are endemic to contemporary global urbanism, the acute re-drawing 
of religious geographies in North Belfast, with all the attendant disturbance of ancestral roots, makes a particular impression 
on the divided city, and its prospects for ‘shared’ living. 
The review of Census data suggests that residential s egregation in Belfast decreased in the recent period, while leaving high 
concentrations in at least two areas of the city. Such changes might be characterised as Catholic advance and Protestant 
retreat, though changes in reporting of religion, the spatial impact of new migrant arrival, and potentially the emergence 
of a new ‘apartment stratum’ make the picture even more complicated. Moreover, the North Belfast case study suggests 
that another interpretation of changing area composition may be a process of area transformation from one majority 
background to another.
Figure 12:  Aerial view of Oldpark/Cliftonville/Cavehill/Antrim Roads Case study area.
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Although census data usually take the individual or 
household as the basic unit of analysis, we have to recognise 
that all people adhere to networks of social relations that 
extend beyond the familiarity of the household and the 
extended family ties. Often, such networks are established 
incorporating people that use or have previously used the 
same educational institution, workplace or residential 
area and are informed by shared cultural values. Since 
accessibility of services often dictates patterns of human 
gathering, the built environment plays a crucial role in the 
shaping of communities. However, an increase of mobility 
provided by car transport and the more recent emergence 
of different types of ‘virtual communities’ through social 
media have meant that, depending on resources, the 
traditional link between residential neighbourhood and 
‘community’ has eroded over time. 
In the case of Belfast, the sense of community seems to be 
highly related with shared cultural background. Residential 
segregation based on cultural background means that local 
neighbourhoods, or even separate streets, can thereby act 
as important spatial platforms for supporting community 
senses. In this respect, the geographical unit chosen for 
analysis of census data is important – the bigger the sub-
area, the more it is likely to contain elements of different 
communities – even where they actually live separate 
lives. For example in 2011, 59% of wards were populated 
by those who were 70% or more of a single community 
background. At Super Output Area the percentage rises to 
61% and at Small Area level to 69%. It should be noted that 
self-identified communities still cut across administrative 
spatial units. 
Belfast: An Inclusive City? 
The complications (discussed earlier) in the equality debate 
apply with equal force to Belfast, while also recognising 
that reference to ‘objective evidence’ rarely shifts deeply 
held conviction – ‘facts’ tend to be constructed rather 
than observed and the process is heavily influenced by 
experiences (partial at best) and attitudes (what used to 
be called ideology). Equally, evidence only makes sense 
within a given context – for example, long standing claims 
about unmet Catholic housing need in North Belfast have 
been evidenced within a specific geography; change the 
geography and the claims become less compelling.
Underlying the data on the links between deprivation and 
community background presented in figure 13, is a further 
characteristic -  SOAs of 75% or more of a single community 
background (i.e. residentially segregated) make up almost 
all of the most deprived/poorest quintile. But, the total 
number of residentially segregated SOAs is less than half 
the total in each case. Without wishing to diminish the 
equality issue, the most prominent feature of the table 
is that residentially segregated SOAs are more likely to 
appear in the most, rather than the least, deprived/poor 
quintile. 
Close association between segregation and deprivation 
can be illustrated by examining a group of Belfast wards 
that have consistently appeared in the most deprived 10 
per cent of Northern Ireland’s wards in two decades of 
deprivation research.
Eighteen wards were among the region’s most deprived 
10% in every study and two appeared in three studies. 
A further ward, St Annes, would have been in the most 
deprived group had it not disappeared in boundary 
changes and its population redistributed mainly to Shankill 
and New Lodge. Three quarters of this group of wards had 
populations that were 70% or more of a single Community 
Background. Although this represented a decline from 
nine tenths in 2001, this change was mainly the result of 
increases in the numbers described as ‘Religion or Religion 
Brought Up In, None’. Belfast has thus a group of wards 
(with around 35% of the city population) whose deprivation 
ranking has remained relatively constant across two 
decades and which are highly segregated.
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Figure 14: Tables showing 2012 pupil achievement in North Belfast schools based on A-Level Results (above) and GCSE Results (below). 
Source: Belfast Telegraph 2012 annual examination results for GCSEs and A-Levels for Northern Ireland
Figure 13: Belfast Wards appearing consistently in Regional Deprivation Studies 




























New Lodge 89% CCB
Shaftesbury 47% PCB
Shankill 85% PCB
The Mount 68% PCB





Rank School A-Level FSM
14 Dominican College 86.4% 10.5%
45 St Malachy’s College 74.6% 9.9%
47 Belfast Royal Academy 73.9% 7.0%
100 Little Flower Girls’ School 50.9% 31.9%
107 Hazelwood College 46.2% 39.1%
109 Belfast Model School for Girls 46.0% 40.8%
114 Our Lady of Mercy Girls’ School 43.5% 47.9%
119 Belfast Boys’ Model School 40.0% 42.1%
119 St Patrick’s College 40.0% 40.6%
161 St Gemma’s High School * 69.4%
Rank School GCSE FSM
14 Dominican College 98.6% 10.5%
41 Belfast Royal Academy 94.0% 7.0%
43 St Malachy’s College 93.9% 9.9%
170 Little Flower Girls’ School 25.0% 31.9%
174 Our Lady of Mercy Girls’ School 24.6% 47.9%
178 Hazelwood College 23.4% 39.1%
181 Belfast Boys’ Model School 22.1% 42.1%
185 St Patrick’s College 19.2% 40.6%
192 Belfast Model School for Girls 15.7% 40.8%









Differential performance of Belfast’s segregated school 
system is also important here, particularly well captured 
by recent analysis of pupil achievement in North Belfast 
schools (see figure 14). Belfast’s Grammar schools, whether 
controlled or maintained, perform significantly better 
than secondary schools at GCSEs (sustained through to A’ 
levels) while containing substantially smaller percentages 
of children eligible for free school meals.
The segregated education produced by the Grammar/
Secondary school system also translates into varying 
opportunities for social mixing for pupils attending the 
two types of post-primary education. Since Grammar 
schools are the preferred option for parents to send 
their children to, and this choice is mostly inspired by the 
level of education rather than the cultural orientation 
of  the school, Grammar schools tend to attract a much 
more spatially dispersed pupil population compared to 
Secondary schools (see figure  15). 
To summarise, Belfast does have a disproportionate share of small areas judged to be either highly 
deprived or to have high rates of income poverty. Undoubtedly, wards or SOAs with high population 
percentages of Catholic Community Background appear prominently in the data. Simultaneously, 
however, residentially segregated areas (measured as having their populations above a threshold 
figure of a single community background) appear even more prominently and, indeed, may be a 
better predictor of deprivation than community background.
The intractable persistence of urban poverty, social and religious residential segregation, and related 
territorial contests in places like Twaddell Avenue, confirm the necessity for a different approach. 
Figure 15: School catchment areas for Grammar and Secondary schools in North Belfast.
Source: Belfast Education and Library Board
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Belfast city centre regeneration facilitated by the Department of Social Development: the Victoria Square Centre.
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6.   Traditional Forms of Intervention
To appreciate how much policy has been going round in 
circles on this issue, it is useful to trace some of the recent 
history. Following Boal’s study of socio-spatial patterns of 
deprivation in Belfast in 1976, a new urban compensatory 
programme was launched by the name of Belfast Areas of 
Need (DOENI, 1976). In essence, it offered modest extra 
public funding for the 22 worst-off wards in the city, and 
its remaining relics include a few of our current leisure 
centres. Inherent in some of these early investments 
seemed to be the simplistic notion that if you built leisure 
and community facilities in some of the most disadvantaged 
and troubled areas that this would induce at least some 
of the riotous youth off the streets into more productive 
activity. This faint-hearted initiative was followed by the 
more substantial Belfast Action Team programme (BAT) 
in the early 1980s. At least this time, the ‘geographies’ of 
intervention were drawn wider to include both Protestant 
and Catholic areas into each BAT team locality -- for 
instance, Lower Shankill and Falls; New Lodge and Tiger’s 
Bay, etc. Nevertheless, the scale and type of intervention 
were not proportionate to the problem addressed, and 
the role of community conflict in partly generating and 
sustaining the disadvantage was not competently analysed 
and incorporated into the intervention. 
Meanwhile, the real action in terms of urban regeneration 
was starting to take shape, in terms of rehabilitating 
a rundown city centre that had become victim to the 
Provisional IRA bombing campaign. Reflected in the 
signature building of Castle Court, this emphasis on 
Downtown was then extended to Laganside, an ambitious 
waterfront development, designed to turn the city to 
the river and to optimise the re-valorisation of mature 
industrial spaces and brownfield sites, as dockland 
had moved upstream under new technologies of 
containerisation. The logic of this strategy of facilitating 
the development priorities of the most active sectors of 
an increasingly service-based economy was endorsed in 
the 1989 Belfast Urban Plan, with its emphasis on office 
and retail expansion, and its notable failure to identify the 
dynamics of economic and political change driving the de-
population, de-industrialisation, deepening segregation, 
and durable poverty be-setting the sustainability of many 
communities. 
This concentration on the commercial urban core to the 
relative neglect of the city’s neighbourhoods provoked 
persistent community critique, and prompted a modest 
up-scaling of intervention, under the first Making Belfast 
Work programme in the late 1980s, progressing to its 
second more substantial stage by the mid-1990s. By then, 
it was operating, across the city, five area partnerships -- 
inter-sectoral bodies that were encouraged to engage in 
long-term strategic thinking about the multi-dimensional 
aspects of their areas’ decline and prospective resuscitation. 
As the name of the programme suggested, it was the first 
serious attempt to connect the problems of poverty and 
under-development to the changing urban economy. 
In turn, this was followed by Neighbourhood Renewal 
in the 2000s, and most recently complemented by the 
Social Investment initiative. Alongside these mainstream 
government programmes, there have been myriad 
other schemes such as URBAN, Integrated Operations, 
and POVERTY 1 and 2, funded under the EU; a host of 
community projects funded by IFI, Atlantic Philanthropy, 
Co-operation Ireland, Community Foundation for Northern 
Ireland, and most recently by the Big Lottery. Added 
together, this spending has been considerable. And yet, 
what have been the results? 
In terms of measuring multiple deprivation, we have had a range of indices: Boal in the 1970s; Townsend 
in the 1980s; Robson in the 1990s; and over recent decades, the Noble Index. They all come out much 
the same. Even taking it over the last 20 odd years, the same wards, in almost the same ranking, remain 
stubbornly the most deprived. It could be taken all the way back to the 1970s, and the picture would 
be similar. Even though the populations have changed to some extent in these wards over that period, 
the same places show up persistently as the most disadvantaged, as if poverty was imprinted into their 
very DNA.  So, this calls either for resignation to ‘the poor being always with us’, or for concession that 
urban regeneration has not been working for all. 
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The so-called ‘peacewalls’ across Belfast are probably 
the most visible manifestations of division in the city. 
Indeed many have become the iconic images of sustained 
separation between the ‘two’ communities. Arguably too, 
it is the visibility of these structures that has prompted 
the focused ambition in TBUC (Together Building a United 
Community) – for them to be removed by 2022. And yet, 
when we look at how the spatial environment of Belfast 
has been purposively or unintentionally manipulated, we 
can see barriers of various shapes and forms.  Roads, car 
parks, blighted land, gates, fences, buffer buildings and 
other bulwarks all contribute to sustaining an ethnically 
and socially divided city. 
The physical configuration of Belfast is, in many respects, 
similar to other cities. It nestles in a valley between hills to 
the west and east; it has a starfish arrangement of radial 
roads stretching out from the city centre; and it has a 
commercial core that has expanded along the ‘reclaimed’ 
river (Laganside) and into the former shipyard/docks area 
(Titanic Quarter). However, this urban structure needs 
further analysis and understanding. The layout of the city 
has been planned and designed, at different times during 
its relatively recent history, to meet what we might call 
‘social’ objectives. Again, many of these social objectives 
were common in other cities. Examples here, include: 
the redesign of the city to accommodate the car and the 
redevelopment of nineteenth century inner city housing. 
However, in Belfast many of these planning initiatives were 
undertaken during the period of the conflict, and have, in 
many respects, contributed to a problematic city layout and 
urban structure. In addition, it is now becoming evident that 
many developments in the city were purposively employed 
to create barriers between communities in conflict or to 
manipulate the spatial environment to exclude problematic 
community areas. In North Belfast, for example, two areas 
were deliberately planned as ‘buffer zones’ between 
communities in conflict. The business park on the north 
side of Duncairn Gardens was planned and designed as 
an ‘environmental’ response to a very violent interface 
between the ‘Catholic’ New Lodge area and ‘Protestant’ 
Tiger’s Bay. A decline in the demand for housing in Tiger’s 
Bay helped ‘facilitate’ the process. Around 200 houses, a 
church and other commercial premises were demolished to 
create a site for ‘neutral’ businesses. Similarly, the Hillview 
‘Enterprise Zone’ was planned as another buffer between 
Protestant Oldpark and Catholic Oldpark / Ardoyne. 
While these, and indeed other, initiatives were designed 
with deliberative ‘political’ intent, others, such as the 
many road infrastructure projects continued to pursue the 
modernist vision of a city designed for the car. Of course a 
number of these also brought ‘benefical’ ‘political’ spin offs 
in the form of barriers or buffer zones (see figures 16 & 17). 
However, a core issue that permeated a range of spatial 
reconfigurations was the protection, enhancement and 
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Figure 16: St Barnabas’s Church, 
Duncairn Gardens demolished 
to make way for a Business Park 
buffer zone.                                  
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fortification of the central commercial city. This started 
in the late 1960s /early 1970s with the urban motorway, 
‘downgraded’ to the Westlink and then purposively 
developed in the 1980s as a strategy to demonstrate a 
vibrant commercial core. The decanting of civil servants 
to offices in the centre together with massive subsidies to 
new commercial development (Castle Court) was designed 
to create a retail recovery as well as the symbolism of 
defiance against the IRA bombing campaign.  
This deliberate strategy of creating a protected node of 
commercial activity was further supported by a range of 
developments that reinforced the insularity of the centre. 
These include buildings such as Castle Court that turn their 
back to north and west Belfast; the Gasworks that is sealed 
off from, and disconnected from, the Markets and Lower 
Ormeau and, of course, Laganside and Titanic Quarter, 
which are socially and physically ‘detached’. As important 
though, the commercial viability of the centre depended 
on car commuters; and this, in turn, needed cheap car 
parking and a supportive road network. Interestingly, in 
the original documentations, even the aesthetics of the 
proposed motorway experience were considered: ‘In 
the twilight areas ‘facial cosmetics’ of buildings beside 
the motorway which are left may be necessary so that a 
good front is presented to the motorway’ (Building Design 
Partnership et al, 1968, p18). And of course, to complement 
this, car parking was to become a major feature for the 
new modern city -  ’There will need to be large car parks 
associated with the road to receive the increasing number 
of cars which will visit the city’ (ibid., 1968, p19). 
Of course, the contemporary spatial consequences of 
all of this, is a core city effectively disconnected from 
the surrounding inner city neighbourhoods but highly 
connected for the 100,000+ car commuters who use the 
city every day (Belfast City Council, 2015).
The devastation of the inner city through the remodelling 
of urban space for the car had a major impact on inner 
north Belfast (see figure 19). The historical grid layout 
which connected streets to the main arterial thoroughfares 
and to the centre was largely replaced by the ‘Westlink’ 
and ‘inner box’ roads, surrounded by a sea of fractured 
developments and spaces. All of this affected the general 
mobility of communities and, as importantly, it reinforced 
their isolation, both physically and psychologically, from 
the rest of the city. This breakdown in the structure and 
layout of the inner city and the spatial privilege given to the 
car has had widespread consequence.   
Indeed, it is possible to suggest that there are two distinctive 
patterns of movement within the city. One, referred to as 
‘urban bubbling’ by Atkinson and Flint (2004) captures the 
Figure 17: Location of former                   
St Barnabas’s Church today. 
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way in which the middle classes use the entire city and its 
environment as their neighbourhood. Of course, the key 
to this level of access is the car or ‘the bubble’. Working, 
shopping, pursuing leisure and so on around the city is very 
much the middle class lifestyle. And, as noted above, the 
city has been largely designed, developed and managed to 
facilitate this. 
For working class neighbourhoods, on the other hand, 
movement is largely limited to walking and public 
transport. Local facilities are therefore more important, as 
are safe walking environments that allow access to other 
parts of the city. However, in inner city Belfast there is a 
‘double bind’. 
First, these single identity communities are largely 
territorialised. During ‘the conflict’, these communities 
tended to become very insular and self-reliant. While this 
offered a degree of safety and protection, it also reduced 
contact with the rest of the city and between communities. 
Moreover, new facilities were often located in the heart of 
a community area, and, of course, this inevitably excluded 
their use by ‘others’. Arguably too, the remodelled layout 
of the physical environment during redevelopment in 
the 1970s and 1980s helped to reinforce this insularity. 
The traditional grid street pattern that characterised 
Belfast’s inner city since the nineteenth century offered 
a permeability, which facilitated wider social interactions 
and connections to services and employment. In contrast, 
much inner city redevelopment employed cul-de-sac 
layouts that lowered densities and reduced connectivity 
(figure 19). And in addition, of course, the overall process 
saw the loss of over 55% of the inner city’s population. 
Figure 18: Map of inner Belfast. The dark tones indicate blighted areas of new motorways, Westlink, M2, M3, and inner ring road 
widening with associated major car parks. In yellow the largely intact city core and in brown the inner city neighbourhoods. 
Source: Mark Hackett, Forum for Alternative Belfast.
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Second, it is also important to note that patterns of 
movement in Belfast, particularly in and around the 
segregated residential areas, have a certain peculiarity. An 
ongoing legacy of ‘the Troubles’ is what might be termed an 
‘inbuilt psyche’ of knowing how to traverse the city (Brand, 
2009). The arterial routes, for example, are carefully 
navigated by inner city residents to avoid passing through, 
or by, ‘the other’s’ community territory.  In the north and 
west of the city, the pedestrian spaces along the arterial 
routes are almost exclusively used by one community or 
the other. While this sensitivity to community geography 
is also evident in how communities use public transport, 
it does not overly affect the behaviour of commuting car 
traffic. Of course, the real and psychological constraints of 
territory, and how this plays out in terms of movement and 
access, is made worse by a car dominated environment.
While the comfort of territory has been important for 
communities, particularly during ‘the conflict’, it should 
not distract from the need to open up the city to local 
neighbourhoods and to encourage the development of a 
shared urban environment.  
In the early 1960s, Jane Jacobs was making the same 
point about American cities. She argued that the notion 
of ‘neighbourhood’ was a somewhat sentimental concept 
which was ultimately ‘harmful to city planning’. For her, the 
city is the neighbourhood, offering its citizens ‘wide choice 
and rich opportunities ….. whatever city neighborhoods 
may be, or may not be, and whatever usefulness they may 
have, or may be coaxed into having, their qualities cannot 
work at cross-purposes to thoroughgoing city mobility and 
fluidity of use, without economically weakening the city of 
which they are part’ (Jacobs, 1993, p.152).
Figure 19: Restructuring urban form in Belfast – figure-ground maps of inner north 1960 and 2011. 
Source: Chris Duffy QUB.  
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The Westlink motorway effectively cuts off north and west Belfast from the commercial city centre.
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Connectivity and Exclusion
Belfast city centre together with its extension into inner 
south, Laganside and Titanic Quarter provide a range 
of services and facilities that are at the heart of the 
city’s economy. Indeed, this is recognised in the Belfast 
Metropolitan Area Plan, which states that ‘the promotion 
of Belfast City Centre and the development opportunities 
within Belfast Harbour will support the provision of new job 
opportunities in central locations accessible to all sections 
of the community’ (Department of the Environment, 2004, 
p.20) Moreover, much of the planning and regeneration 
emphasis over the last thirty years has been on these areas 
because they function as neutral, if not shared, spaces. 
However, many of these areas are not socially inclusive and 
are often seen by traditional communities as inaccessible 
and unwelcoming. There is no doubt, that at least in part, 
this is because these ‘neutral’ spaces and events are 
consumption-oriented. Genuine civic spaces that offer 
public amenity are very limited in number and in scope. 
All of this suggests, that, at the very least, facilitating good 
quality and direct access to key areas of the city should 
be a planning and regeneration priority. A North Belfast 
study by Queen’s University students (Queen’s University 
MSc North Belfast Report, 2014) showed that the city 
centre and Titanic Quarter were, potentially, within 5-10 
minutes walking distance of Duncairn Gardens in the 
heart of inner north Belfast. However, the route to the 
city centre is frustrated by road barriers and poor quality 
frontage environments, while the route to Titanic Quarter 
is circuitous by both bus and walking. Titanic Quarter is, 
of course, similarly cut off from the adjacent East Belfast 
neighbourhoods. 
Good urban design practice which seeks to promote 
connectivity and therefore accessibility has not been 
a feature of planning and regeneration in Belfast. 
Rather, single function planning such as roads 
development together with site focused investment 
has largely ignored the broader spatial needs of 
the city. The underpinning assumption is that the 
private market will generate activity and, in turn, 
that activity will bring economic benefit to the city. 
Indeed this appears to be the underlying rationale 
in the current Belfast draft City Centre Regeneration. 
Strategy. 
The problem here for planning is the exclusion this brings. 
Celebrating the value of individual, site particular projects 
sidesteps the civic and collective needs of the city. Such 
needs are so important in a context where exclusive ethnic 
and social space often triumphs over the civic.  Good city 
form and structure are not just about aesthetics. Rather, 
they are about creating a place that everyone can share 
and access. Good design, in this regard, is also about 
creating spaces that have civic value rather than ethnic 
or commercial value. Every major development decision 
contributes to this. A key question for city planners, 
therefore, is how all major development proposals can 
respond to and address the fractured and divided city. More 
than this, prioritising a re-stitching agenda would allow the 
development of a vision for the city that recognises that 
spatial fracture and disconnection help sustain social and 
ethno-religious fracture and disconnection.     
Major regeneration projects such as City Centre, Laganside 
and Titanic Quarter have largely ignored these broader civic 
needs. Rather, they have relied on the neo-liberal theory 
that the market will solve the problems of a divided city 
through the generation of economic benefits that trickle 
down to all communities. However, this scenario implies 
that if new training facilities exist in Titanic Quarter or if 
job opportunities are available in Laganside, then it is up 
to individuals to overcome any access difficulties. In other 
words, the focus is on the individual rather than on any 
collective concerns.     
 
As noted earlier, issues of division take various spatial 
forms. The spatial legacy of the conflict together with 
over forty years of planning and regeneration has 
delivered a city that is fractured, disjointed and poorly 
managed. Importantly too, single identity ethno-religious 
neighbourhoods are being joined increasingly by mixed 
identity social neighbourhoods. While the former are often 
characterised by peace-walls, the latter are often bounded 
by gates and fencing.  As noted elsewhere in this report, 
areas with high levels of deprivation often correspond 
with single identity neighbourhoods. On the other hand, 
the new gated communities correspond with an ethnic mix 
and high levels of educational attainment. A survey of city 
centre apartments conducted by Queen’s University as part 
of a study for the Northern Ireland Community  Relations 
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Figure 20: Reconfigured inner West Belfast – 1960 & 2011, showing how the street grid has been fractured and disrupted. 
Source: Mark Hackett, Forum for Alternative Belfast.
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Council found that the majority of residents of the new 
apartments were not born in Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
they were relatively young, highly educated and transitory; 
and very interestingly, the majority of them didn’t know 
their neighbours or knew only a few (Gaffikin, et al, 2008). 
All this confirms the emergence of new, non-placed based 
communities, but it also suggests that the issue about 
creating and developing shared space and shared services 
is not limited to the traditional divisions. A number of the 
new gated communities sit adjacent to longstanding, single 
identity, working class communities, which are recorded as 
having the highest level of educational under-achievement 
in Northern Ireland. In this context, the issue of division is 
not about ‘peace-walls’ but about the sort of environment 
that the city wants to create. The regulatory planning 
system that has prevailed over the last 40 years, largely 
ignored the ‘traditional’ geography of division and the 
evidence would suggest that it is also side-stepping these 
emerging new divisions.
While acknowledging that dysfunctional city form and 
structure is only one dimension of a deeper set of problems, 
it is, nevertheless, a significant issue. Creating the potential 
for shared space and services requires thoughtful street 
design and layout; it requires good walkable, safe and 
interesting connections. New or revitalised streets offer 
opportunities to locate services that can be accessed 
by both sides of the community and all classes. The so-
called neutrality of the city centre has the potential to 
be expanded along arterial routes and ‘new’ connecting 
streets. The work of the Forum for Alternative Belfast 
largely focuses on this. The Six Links project in inner 
North Belfast together with proposals that emerged from 
the 2011 Summer School for inner south Belfast, offer 
opportunities to both strengthen connections as well as 
expanding shared streets and services (Sterrett et al, 2012). 
This sort of analysis and agenda setting is not peculiar 
to Belfast. At an international level, there is growing 
recognition of the role that ‘infrastructure’ of various sorts 
can play in cementing division.  In the United States, for 
example, Detroit (also known as Motor City) is beginning 
to acknowledge the impact that an extensive network of 
freeways has had on the city. Recent comments by the city’s 
mayor, Mike Duggan, acknowledged that the freeways that 
encircle Metro Detroit have had a negative impact on the 
city and have contributed significantly to Detroit’s steep 
economic decline. In his view, ‘Freeways cut off and isolate 
neighborhoods (and) … we are still trying to recover from 
that.’ (www.grist.org).
Similarly, a major ESRC research project ‘Conflict in Cities 
and the Contested State’ (CinC, 2012), concluded that 
social and political divisions can be ‘exacerbated’ by a 
range of long term physical barriers: 
‘walls, buffer zones, checkpoints, urban enclaves, 
and even large roads, tramways and motorways 
– continue to play a major role in dividing cities… 
Mobility, or lack of it, is often used as a tool of 
conflict. Interventions in the physical environment 
can overtly further the interests of certain groups, 
whilst seemingly well-intentioned and apparently 
benign encroachments on the landscape can create or 
sustain inequalities in ways that are hard to reverse’. 
(Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, 2012, p.1)
A fresh way of looking at planning and regeneration in the 
city is to acknowledge that all planning, regeneration and 
design has social purpose. However, for the most part, this 
is not made explicit or, at least, it is not openly discussed. 
It is important, therefore, to acknowledge firstly, the now 
widely held view that cities are shaped and re-shaped by 
social forces. Any understanding of socio-economic change 
and of the needs of social groups has to be factored into 
the analysis. This includes not only the power of capital, in 
all its forms, but also distinctive political and administrative 
forces that mediate this in places like Belfast. 
Second, some of these distinctive political forces are in 
contest with each other, but also interestingly, are together, 
in conflict with the state. In relation to the former, the 
issue of housing land and territory remains a ‘wicked 
issue’. In relation to the latter, the two communities have 
been co-operating with the Forum for Alternative Belfast 
on common built environment and connectivity issues 
through the Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium (see: 
http://www.charterni.com/projects/belfast-conflict-
resolution-consortium). 
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Figure 21: Design drawings (above) and implementation of Old Market Square in Nottingham. Pedestrianisation of the square and a new 
tramway  were part of the extensive transformation of the public realm. 
Source: www.architonic.com (above) and Ken Sterrett (below).
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Third, there is the ongoing issue of fragmented governance. 
Although the Northern Ireland Assembly is now relatively 
stable, its responsibilities for the built environment are 
spread across at least three government departments, 
each of which is headed-up by opposing political parties. 
Some hope lies in the shift of planning and regeneration 
responsibilities to the new 11 local authorities. Although 
there are no immediate plans to devolve transport or 
housing powers from central government, good spatial 
planning practice together with the new ‘community 
planning’, can allow many challenges raised above to be 
addressed.    
These challenges are, of course, interwoven, and they 
permeate almost all major built environment issues facing 
the city.  Moreover, the damage already done to Belfast’s 
central area and the inner city by roads infrastructure and 
market led planning is substantial and not easily repaired. 
However, this, together with the other infrastructure 
barriers that have effectively cemented divisions, need 
to be given as much political priority as the so-called 
‘peacewalls’. Indeed, there now seems to be clear 
evidence that planning, particularly in Belfast during the 
70s and 80s, was ‘steered in the direction of defensive 
planning by the security forces in order to contain and 
control political violence.’ (Cunningham, 2016, p.6)   All 
this requires a degree of small ‘p’ political pragmatism. 
Uniting conflicting communities around common interests 
such as disconnection from the city centre allows trust to 
build that may in time foster a more productive dialogue 
about the ‘wicked issues’. Similarly, working with Ministers, 
councillors and officials in central and local government on 
individual schemes, such as the York Street Interchange and 
the ‘Six Links’ proposal, demonstrates the value of taking a 
more holistic and integrated approach to the development 
of the city. Jan Gehl makes the significant point that it took 
forty years, using what he calls a ‘gradual approach’, to get 
Copenhagen from a car-dominated to a people-oriented 
city (Gehl, 2008).   
It is important to acknowledge that the market has been 
the dominant instrument for change in Belfast in the recent 
past. Indeed, some commentators have even complimented 
its nonpartisan capacity to shape a more cosmopolitan 
outlook for the city. However, the new apartment building 
around the city, seen by some as creating shared spaces 
in terms of the sectarian geography, is at the same time 
creating a new social geography. Yet, would the city trade 
off more social segregation for less sectarian segregation? 
Would it avoid social housing in its new non-sectarian 
spaces and city centre regeneration, since such housing is 
deemed by some to have an association with high levels 
of segregation? How would such an agenda square with 
declared planning values about creating balanced, socially 
mixed, sustainable communities? 
As noted earlier, the concept of ‘shared space’ is bandied 
about in both political and academic circles and yet 
definitions seem to vary significantly. Some of the current 
debate about multiculturalism and assimilation in the 
context of changing government policies in Europe may 
be useful in this regard. While such debates highlight 
the problems with both approaches, they may also point 
towards the need for greater emphasis on civil society and 
a ‘progressive sense of universal values’ (Malik, 2015). 
This, in turn, suggests that city design should be about the 
facilitation of the ‘civic’ and the ‘interactive’ in space and 
should not be about institutionalising ethnicity in space. 
In other words, the planning, design and layout of the city should purposefully aim to create streets 
and spaces that promote and facilitate interactions that cross social and ethnic boundaries. In terms 
of urban structure, therefore, there is urgent need to recognise, and then deal with, the fragmented 
and disconnected city. Re-stitching the city is not just about creating a more coherent urban form, but 
rather it is about putting in place an urban layout that facilitates equal access to all parts of the city 
for all citizens, irrespective of their social or ethno-religious standing. It is also about creating a city 
that values its civic spaces over its ethnic spaces and that this celebrates the vision of a new Belfast 
that is a city of equals.    
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Case study: Nicosia, Cyprus
In Cyprus, particularly in Nicosia, but also in Famagusta, 
good spatial planning is largely absent. In other words, 
there is little evidence of a planned environment that 
signals a willingness to intervene to ensure functional and 
aesthetic coherence. Rather, market driven development 
seems to have a priority over planned development. This, 
in turn, seems to be reinforced by laws relating to land and 
property ownership that prevent the sort of interventions 
that might celebrate and deliver the ‘public’ and the ‘civic’.
A significant consequence of all of this is the poor quality 
public realm. In Nicosia this is evident in both sides of 
the city. On the Greek side there is a distinct lack of 
well-designed public spaces and very poor pedestrian 
infrastructure. Movement around the city is very 
dependent on the private car and public transport is nearly 
non-existent. Similarly, on the Turkish side poor public 
spaces and almost abandoned parts of the inner city signal 
a laissez-faire approach to planning and development. 
Moreover, the most degraded parts of the city on both 
sides are the areas around the buffer zone. In turn, this 
blight has helped encourage a sprawl pattern in the 
‘outer’ city, again a familiar pattern in cities like Belfast. 
Poor public realm around the buffer zone, together with 
the relatively modest residential presence in the Old City, 
suggests, at least for ‘meanwhile’ use, the opportunity of 
a more ambitious project --- such as a large quality public 
park that is accessible by all Nicosians. 
Figure 22: Poor public realm in Turkish-Cypriot (left) and Greek-Cypriot (right) sides of the city. 
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Urbanism is about plurality, spontaneity, and connectivity. 
Amputated cities like Nicosia are, in these terms, 
fundamentally anti-urban. At present, the bisection of 
the city – which may allow for a ‘purification of space’ 
(Sibley, 1988) that extols the integrity of each side’s quarrel 
– operates in an exclusionist form. As noted by Pullan 
(2013), since these barriers were installed in 1974, violence 
has almost totally vanished. Yet, the cost has been the 
production of ‘two rump cities’ in a form that stunts the 
development of both.  
All of this highlights the need to understand the relationship 
between buffer zones, peace-walls or barriers and the 
wider urban environment. Most significantly perhaps, 
these barriers exist within an urban frame that in itself has 
become dysfunctional ---possibly the former causing the 
latter, or certainly contributing to the latter. Two key points 
emerge from this. First, any spatial analysis of the barrier 
zones needs to be part of a wider urban analysis. The 
work on urban structure analysis and transformation by 
Forum for Alternative Belfast and by Socrates Stratis (see 
acknowledgements) in Famagusta is instructive here. Both 
examine street and pathway networks and the barriers to 
good permeability. The second point relates more to the 
planning system, to its culture and operation. In both parts 
of Cyprus, the planning systems appear to be regulatory 
at best, minimalist at worst. Spatial planning that aims 
to be visionary and transformative is evidently not part 
of the governance culture. While the Nicosia Masterplan 
represented an unofficial attempt to map a future for the 
overall city, little progress has been made over many years. 
This impasse echoes the way great plans can be produced 
in these divisive circumstances, yet remain undelivered. 
If they are bereft of statutory authority and requisite 
resource, they end up as largely rhetoric that serves to 
further disillusion and demoralise.
Interestingly, the Nicosia Master Plan (2004) speaks of the 
buffer zone in the city becoming a ‘glue’ in re-integration, 
and restoration of the vitality, of the Walled City and the 
Core area -- places of symbolic heritage value, shared by 
both communities. As an example of a modest basis for 
inter-community engagement within the buffer zone, 
the H4C (Home for Cooperation) building, opposite the 
signature Ledra Palace Hotel, was opened in 2011 as an 
educational centre. Transforming signifiers of the conflict 
into signifiers of its potential solution finds echo in places 
like the renovated Crumlin Road prison. As in Nicosia, 
choice of such buildings as ‘bridges’ between the two main 
rival sides needs to take account of: prominent location; 
accessibility; transparency; security; flexibility of use; and 
quality design.
As in Jerusalem’s ethno-nationalist segregation, the two 
parts of Nicosia can be read as referencing two distinct 
development cultures. On the Greek side, neo-liberal 
consumption spaces are immediately evident, with global 
corporate brands, and relatively vibrant tourism. The 
urban feel is modern, clean, and government-maintained. 
On the Turkish side, it is less cosmopolitan, more deprived, 
and seemingly more chaotic.  But, this apparent distinction 
underestimates the especially difficult physical and social 
environment faced by inner city Turkish Cypriots, living 
in a particularly scarred landscape, some of which looks 
abandoned and desolate. It highlights the way that urban 
informalism can be sometimes glorified for its resilence 
and ingenuity, when such plaudits may unintentionally 
absolve government neglect of proper civic provision. 
 
In Cyprus, there is very little evidence that spatial 
divisions are being addressed through spatial planning. 
And to some extent, arguably, this represents a broader 
underdevelopment of spatial planning and its potential 
role in helping to facilitate reconciliation and the creation 
of sustainable communities. Indeed, there is a sense 
that government has invested so much political capital in 
addressing the macro problem of division that it neglects 
the basic everyday living issues, such as decent pavements 
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Case study: Jerusalem, Israel
An example of language abuse that afflicts conflict 
resolution is the deliberate labelling of physical security 
barriers between the two main contesting sides in Belfast 
as 'peace walls'. At least, in Jerusalem, the name given 
to these cordons is more candid: the 'Separation Wall'. 
It traverses the city, reinforcing its severance from the 
Palestinian West Bank. Moreover, it helps to accentuate 
the separation of approximately 200000 Palestinians 
in East Jerusalem from the rest of the city. It provides 
another instance of where such 'planning' interventions 
in contested cities can inadvertently subvert formal public 
policy. The Israeli government is committed to retaining 
Jerusalem as one city, indivisible. Yet, their installation of 
the Separation Wall makes a major contribution to keeping 
it divided, and in a stark and ugly way. The International 
Court of Justice, the main judicial agency of the United 
Nations, has emphasised how the route of this Wall 
both ventures into Occupied Palestinian territory and at 
the same time provides within its Closed Area (between 
the Wall and the Green Line) land accommodating some 
80% of settlers living within the Occupied territory. These 
settlements are seen as a breach of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and as such are contrary to international law.
Figure 23: Motorway protected by a high security wall in Jerusalem.
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Such geographies of ethno-national division closely 
correspond to the main social divide in the city. Though 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem come under Israeli authority, 
they face relative neglect in social opportunity and in basic 
services such as refuse collection and infrastructure. This 
makes them very visibly more derelict than their Jewish 
counterpart neighbourhoods, and this very perceptible 
environmental difference accentuates Palestinian 
grievance, while confirming for some Jewish citizens a 
stereotype of Palestinian disregard for proper stewardship 
of their habitat. Such binary senses of built environment 
--- modern and pre-modern in physical appearance and 
capacity -- cement the duality of residential status. This 
feeds into a familiar exchange in contested cities, whereby 
one side claims discrimination, while the other retorts that 
the alleged victims are the authors of their own misfortune. 
In fact, Jerusalem has to be understood beyond simple bi-
communalism. For instance, various ethnic-social-religious 
divisions within the Jewish community show it to be 
layered in a complicated way rather than homogeneous, 
and such stratifications are common in cities that seem 
on the surface to be locked in dual contest. Again, such 
divisions can often find spatial expression in separations 
and segregations.
But, as in Belfast, it does not have a major and obvious 
barricade splintering the city. Jerusalem is fractured by 
roads -- ultimately more permanent than walls in the city 
landscape  -- that act to keep the contesting peoples apart. 
As noted by Pullan (2013, p.29):
 
'Instead of acting to reunify the inner city, Road 1 
functions as a high-speed connection between the 
centre of Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank, while simultaneously maintaining a rift 
through the core of the city, separating Israeli West  
Jerusalem  from Palestinian East Jerusalem'. 
Similar impact can be evident in the route and use of the 
recent light rail system in the city. While holding potential 
for uniting and linking the city, the train is regarded by some 
Palestinians as a speed form of mobility for Jews to better 
access Palestinian suburbs, thereby facilitating opportunity 
for further territorial extension, annexation, and illegal 
settlement, and its route through East Jerusalem as physical 
manifestation of Israeli authority in what they regard as 
their rightful jurisdiction. Moreover, the Damascus Gate 
stop offers direct opening to the Old City, and with it, to 
deeply contested sacred sites, such as Temple Mount and 
the Muslim 'courtyard' beyond the Western Wall, scenes of 
recent clashes between elements of both sides, each keen 
to claim their perceived religious inheritance. At the same 
time, the train does not allow for easy access to Palestinian 
areas, such as the refugee camp of SHUAFAT, behind 
the Separation Wall.  Thus, an impressive new transport 
infrastructure that would be taken in most other cities to 
be an instrument of connectivity is, in a contested city like 
Jerusalem, understood by some in the subjugated group as 
a means of deepening segregation and domination. Again, 
it shows that planning initiatives that may be normally 
construed as progressive in contemporary urbanism, may 
be considered the very opposite in conflicted cities. 
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High quality design was in forefront of Health Estates agenda for new service delivery of Wellbeing and Treatment Centres. 
Image Above:  Carlisle Wellbeing and Treatment Centre.
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There are obvious forms of duplication in a segregated 
society. In Northern Ireland, the Education sector is often 
discussed as a primarily overt segregated system. However, 
less obvious are the services which on the surface present 
as a unified sector, but in fact operate unintentional covert 
segregation because their service delivery is based on the 
geographical boundaries of divided communities. 
The role of the Education sector as a keystone facility within 
communities has been highlighted in this report. However 
alongside this, the Health Sector presents as a vital service 
and building typology within the city’s urban fabric, and 
also one that exhibits similar duplication in service delivery. 
These sectors are of particular significance as they are 
dominant spending outlays from the public purse.    
Overt and Covert Segregation
Review of public sector expenditure on services from 2014-
2015 shows the Health and Education sector responsible 
for £6,793m of public spending (Figure 24). The 2009 – 
2015 statistics continually positions them second and third 
spending outlays after the highest sector of Social Protection 
(HM Treasury, 2015). 
Health is a vital and key service. Therefore, the efficiency of 
its funding and its availability of service are of significance 
to everyone.  For that reason, we must question: does the 
planning of the service, in terms of location and spatial 
distribution, take account of financial efficiency, physical 
accessibility and psychological accessibility to all members 
of the wider community? Belfast contains various types of 
health service provision at numerous sites across the city. 
While the types of services are not in question, the spatial 
planning of the service should be considered within a wider 
strategic framework.  
Within Belfast, there are four primary care hospitals, 
namely Musgrave Park Hospital located on Stockman’s 
Lane, the Royal Victoria Hospital located on the Falls Road, 
the City Hospital located on Lisburn Road and the Mater 
Infirmorum Hospital located on the Crumlin Road. These 
hospitals are supported by outlying Health Care Clinics and 
General Practitioner Practices.  A key part of this supportive 
network is the relatively new building typology of ‘Wellbeing 
and Treatment Centre’. These are centres aimed to house 
multiple and varied services for the public, accommodating 
services traditionally based in hospital sites, alongside the 
‘every day’ services such as GP and dentist practices, all 
within a building which has been purpose built for multi-
function. The centres have been established on a ‘one 
stop approach’ basis and sited so that they, “provide ease 
of access for all since they are located in well established 
hubs of community activity where people go to shop and 
access other services” (www.belfasttrust.hscni.net/contact/
WellbeingTreatmentCentres.htm).
Figure 24: Chart showing public expenditure by Departmental Group for Northern Ireland 2014-2015 (£ Million)  
Data Source: HM Treasury 2015
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The undertaking of this scheme was seen in Belfast in 2005 
with the opening of the first Centre, namely the Arches 
Wellbeing and Treatment centre, sited on the Newtownards 
road in East Belfast. Since its completion, the Trust has 
delivered six further centres, resulting in a total of seven 
sites in North, East, South and West wards of the city at a 
combined cost of approximately £58.9m (Figure 25).  
The design quality of these buildings should be acknowledged 
and commended.  They were completed under the direction 
of Health Estates manager John Cole, who led a directive 
to focus on the design quality of all new Health buildings. 
To facilitate this, they were delivered through a new 
procurement route, which aimed to support design integrity 
and collaborative working practices.  Adequate resourcing to 
support the design process was cited as a reason contributing 
to the projects’ success.  This was supported by insistence 
that the design fee agreed with the appointed design 
team should be fair, to reflect the time and care required 
to achieve a quality design solution.  Alongside this, the 
inclusion of Architects, Engineers and Quantity surveyors, in 
an in-house team, safeguarded the quality and design vision 
for the project, as they worked collaboratively through the 
process with the appointed Architectural practice (Buxton, 
2011).  The quality of the buildings delivered is reflected 
in the numerous design awards the Centres have received. 
This strategy by Health Estates to improve building quality 
should be a model to which other sectors can refer.   Design 
quality is key to improving the overall quality of experience 
in our built environment. Therefore, it should be an ambition 
at the forefront in all sectors: Education, Housing, Leisure, 
Cultural and Commercial.
Figure 25 (above): Diagram showing spatial distribution and contract value of Wellbeing and Treatment Centres delivered by Belfast 
Health and Social Care Trust.  
Data Source: Kennedy Fitzgerald LLP and Todd Architects. 
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While the quality of the building as an individual entity is 
praised, it is the spatial planning of the services which 
will facilitate the ability of these buildings to be fully and 
freely accessible to all members of the public.  The Belfast 
Health Trust emphasize that they aim to create a ‘safe and 
welcoming environment,’ to all users and staff, stating: “The 
Trust will be proactive in challenging sectarianism and racism 
and will promote good relations to ensure access to services 
for everyone” (Belfast Health and Social Care Trust 2014, 
p.122).  A neutral environment can be seen in the internal 
spaces in the centres, all of which have an interior design 
of welcoming contemporary style, in which no emblems or 
symbols of partisan ‘community’ nature are visible.  While 
these inside spaces are the final spatial experience of the 
user, the first experience is the urban context surrounding 
the centre.  It is this context which should be carefully 
considered if the centre is to be accessible for everyone.    
In a divided city, creating new buildings within existing 
community spatial geographies generates the expected 
issues with territory and psychologic accessibility. 
Therefore, the creation of these centres within ‘well 
established community hubs,’ has led to four of the seven 
sites being situated in areas of high religious polarization. 
Only two of the seven sites are within the middle 40% to 
60% ‘mixed’ range, namely Knockbreada and Bradbury 
Wellbeing and Treatment Centres, both of which are located 
in South Belfast.  Three of the seven sites operate in ward 
areas of very high religious polarization, namely Carlisle, 
Shankill and Beech Hall Wellbeing and Treatment Centres, 
all reporting over 80% of one denomination.  These religious 
demographics question the ability for the urban context of 
the site to remain neutral and welcoming, despite efforts 
from the Health Trust to ensure an inclusive internal 
environment.  
Alongside ward demographics, the reasoning for constructing
sites in close proximity should be reviewed. To take an 
example, the Grove Health and Wellbeing Centre located on 
the York Road, is only 1.6 miles from the Carlisle Wellbeing 
and Treatment Centre located on the Antrim Road, which in 
turn is located only 1.7 miles from Shankill Wellbeing and 
Treatment Centre.  Is this the most effective way to deliver 
local services? Or could more ‘shared’ sites be considered to 
reduce building duplication?  To emphasise, this report does 
not question the need for local health service provision, 
only the strategy for basing the provision of services on 
restricted territorial geographies. We consider that the ‘city 
community’ as a wider definition should be at the forefront 
of location decisions.  
The need for careful review of the future spatial planning 
of Health Service buildings takes on new importance as the 
Health Trust progresses with an agenda of local integrated 
care provision, seeing a move of selected hospital services 
to community-based local locations (HSCT, 2011).  The point 
of concern to address is the definition of ‘community.’  What 
department will define this?  Often within the divided city 
context, the definition of ‘community’ offers a limited spatial 
area. Therefore, we consider that it is crucial for the Public 
Service Authority and the Planning Department to address 
this definition in order to have a clear and agreed strategy 
for the critical assessment for locating and integrating new 
sites for all public facilities. 
Figure 26 (right): Images of 
Wellbeing and Treatment 
Centres in Belfast – the 
focus on design quality has 
been well received and 
highly commended.  
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The Belfast City model, developed by the Forum for Alternative Belfast to promote a 
more three dimensional understanding of the city. 
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7.   Alternative way of Planning
lt r ti  w
This section of the report looks at how the issues 
raised in sections one and two can be addressed. It 
starts with further reappraisal of past interventions 
and the lessons that can be drawn from this reflection. 
It then goes on to suggest a new planning model that 
is underpinned by some clearer definitions of spatial 
choices, as well as key terms such as ‘planning’ and 
‘community’. This is followed by an attempt to outline 
ten principles that should guide the development of 
policy and practice. Finally, this section offers some 
practical advice on creating a new, more relevant form 
of development planning, including new approaches 
to dealing with spatial deprivation. 
Addressing the problems of divided Belfast demands 
radical reappraisal of intervention. Many deficiencies 
have debilitated city regeneration efforts. For the 
sake of brevity, some examples will suffice:
1. Policies tend to be based on very 
flimsy evaluation. They move from one 
programme to another, without really testing what 
worked and what didn’t in the previous programme, 
or indeed programmes from elsewhere. In this 
circuitous policy route, the underpinning concepts 
vary over time, giving a delusionary impression of 
innovation and progress: participation becomes 
partnership; poverty becomes social exclusion; 
multiple deprivation becomes multi-dimensionality; 
linkage becomes connectedness; etc. It is almost as if 
because we cannot change the problems, we change 
the names instead. As civil servants come and go, 
institutional amnesia takes hold, and thereby wheels 
are inadvertently re-invented, because no basis exists 
for learning from the past. For instance, as explained 
earlier, five years were spent on a process of intensive 
and comprehensive engagement around re-imagining 
Belfast in a major cross-sectoral City Visioning process 
in the mid-1990s. What happened? The resulting 
concept plan was set aside, for the whole process to 
be started again. 
2. The spatial scale and model of 
intervention keeps changing. No clear 
and consistent decision can be reached about the 
appropriate policy or territorial focus. For instance, 
Making Belfast Work eventually went for big 
geographies in their area partnerships, most of which 
embraced the two main communities, and offered a 
scale and scope that sensible strategies for long-term 
and deep-rooted regeneration demand. Then, along 
comes Neighbourhood Renewal, which retreats back 
into small, and often sectarian-enclaved, areas. The 
former was an organic home-grown intervention, 
while the latter was one simply cloned from the 
English model. No rationale was offered for this 
switch in emphasis.
3. There is tendency to not distinguish 
between development in a place, and 
development of a place. The former tends 
to focus on physical-led development, while the 
latter concentrates on people-centred development, 
enhancing the skills and capacities of the residents. 
Both are needed. But, the latter is the more difficult 
and long-term. Anybody can put up a building. But, 
building community is much tougher. Nurturing 
neighbourliness, friendships, trust, respect, and 
resilience -- this is the ‘soft infrastructure’ that is the 
indispensible scaffolding of sustainable place. A classic 
example of this flawed thinking is found in the plan 
to build a ‘community hub’ in the highly contentious 
and currently vacant space, known as Girdwood, long 
before there is any prospect of an actual community. 
4. There has been little connection 
between the urban programmes for 
deprived areas and the wider city 
regeneration. This lies at the heart of the whole 
predicament. The token response to poverty areas 
embodied in early urban strategies since the 1970s 
gave way to the real serious investment, through 
Urban Development Grant and other significant 
What Can Be Done?
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funding, in the City Centre and Waterfront, balanced a 
little by later programmes in the deprived areas, such as 
Making Belfast Work. But, the overall tendency has been to 
parcel the city into distinctive development zones; parse the 
various publics that are accordingly targeted: commercial 
business people; commuters; the disadvantaged; the 
professional class in anchor institutions, such as universities 
and hospitals; etc; and portion the investment in ways that 
favour the more privileged and powerful. 
In the context of a city already fractured and fragmented 
by socio-spatial polarisations caused by increased social 
inequality and our enduring conflict, this 3P tendency to 
parcel, parse, and portion needs conversion to a 3S policy 
of stitch, scale, and scope: stitching the city together as 
one coherent entity to be planned and developed as a unit, 
as recommended by the Forum for an Alternative Belfast; 
scaling investment proportionately in both funding amount 
and time-frame to the challenge being addressed, while re-
drawing the geographies of ‘local community’ to embrace 
cross-class and inter-denominational populations; and 
scoping the basis of all development strategy to include 
both the social needs and assets in an area, while drawing 
in all funding sources -- public, private, and voluntary-- 
behind a common vision and purpose for the city, so that, 
for instance, philanthropy money is complementing, rather 
than duplicating or substituting for, public money.  
Unfortunately, the latest schemes for the city, such as the 
Belfast Masterplan, are still yielding to the conventional 
‘zoning’ approach, whereby it ear-marks a development 
axis from Queen’s University  through to the city centre and 
the new University of Ulster campus out to the Harbour 
and Titanic quarter. While speaking the language of 
integrated development, anchor institutions, and the role 
of neighbourhood, it is still given to fragmenting the urban 
frame into the digital city, the learning city, the centre city, 
etc., when instead of such multiple cities, there should be 
ONE CITY.
5. Scant concern has been paid to quality. 
Targeting has its virtues. But, one of the problems with the 
culture of targeting is that it tends to focus on the easily 
measurable, thereby reducing most appraisals to tick-box 
audits. There may be quality design invested in the central 
core, though visitors to the new Titanic quarter might 
query that, given much of its bleakness, blandness, and 
disconnectedness. But, whatever quality consideration is 
so invested, it is not rolled out to city neighbourhoods in a 
coherent quality design framework for the whole city.
6. The urban prospectus is not 
underpinned by robust analysis. What 
is happening to the contemporary city derives from 
substantial structural and cultural changes over the last 
half century, including: economic re-structuring; related 
urban-rural shifts; growing social inequality, also reflected 
spatially in greater social segregation; the re-configuration 
of ‘community’ in the context of changing family formations 
and household structures, wider social networking, decline 
of religious observance, immigration, etc. These and other 
societal processes make for new urban complexities that 
are not reducible to old-style planning, based on ‘predict 
and provide’. Put simply, this is a less predictable world. 
7. There has been under-appreciation 
of how rewarding bad behaviour can 
encourage more bad behaviour. Too often, 
there has been inclination to throw money after the 
violence in effort to curb acute outbreaks of disturbance. 
However, well-intended such intercession, allocation of 
investment should never be related to the degree of violent 
feuding, and the multi-layering of such impulsive initiatives 
over existing policy only promotes a confusing array of 
partnerships and plans, when what is really needed is clear, 
consistent, and carefully conceived intervention.  
            
8. Problems with delivery persist. 
Proliferation of plans seems to generate a law of 
diminishing returns. The more we have, the less we seem 
to use. One aspect of this problem is the lack of clarity 
about the hierarchy of authority accorded various plans, 
and how precisely they nest with each other, and how they 
will fit with the proposed Community Plan and Spatial Plan 
process. At least in the case of the latter, there is emphasis 
on building into the plan itself precise delivery mechanisms: 
when it is to happen; what agencies are responsible; where 
the money is coming from; who it is to effect? etc. 
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9. Too often, international consultants 
have been employed at considerable 
expense and to limited effect. Such consultants 
have a tendency to ‘clone’ standard urban regeneration 
strategies, often influenced by neo-liberal orthodoxy, and 
implant them here. Learning these lessons would be a good 
start. But, more is needed. New planning frameworks have 
to bring on board the range of sectors and funding bodies 
that can make a difference to the city, so that all energies 
and resources are working in synergy rather than rivalry. 
That means that the substantial public spend from the 
mainstream departments, such as Education and Health, 
together with the important role of Foundation funders, 
together with the voluntary and community input, are 
brought more cohesively together to work collaboratively 
along a common grain of city development. Moreover, we 
need in City Council, as the body which will hold primary 
authority for much of the planning and regeneration, a 
multi-disciplinary team that traverses the current silos of 
Development, Community Development, Good Relations, 
Leisure and Public Parks, etc. It should be a team that brings 
together planners, architects, urban designers, community 
developers, economic developers, educationalists, conflict 
resolvers, etc. from a formative stage in the planning 
process, recognising themselves as urbanists, working 
together to take forward a visionary, strategic, inclusive, 
and proactive plan, with built-in delivery. 
But, any hope of developing a coherent regeneration 
strategy for Belfast has to address its long-standing 
sectarian division. Too often, planners have tried to 
airbrush this dimension out of their calculation, as 
beyond their remit and competence. Such apparent 
‘neutral’ planning is not impartial. It is nonsense. 
Planning is not some apolitical, technical activity. It 
is meaningless, if it disregards the underlying social 
processes which shape space. In this context, as 
indicated in the earlier narrative, three key processes 
uniquely combined to create Belfast’s current 
patterns of de-population and deep segregation:
 ● First, following the Matthew Plan, 1963, the decision 
was taken to de-magnetise Belfast, in terms of both 
investment and population, and to de-cant many 
former residents to new satellite towns of Antrim and 
Craigavon, as part of an economic modernisation, 
based on the attraction of transnational capital to new 
greenfield-sited industrial estates. This strategy was 
enshrined in the 1969 Belfast Urban Plan.
 ● Second, the other key aspect of this strategy related to 
the comprehensive redevelopment of inner city Belfast 
at the same time, and the lower density housing and 
new roads infrastructure that accompanied this ‘slum 
clearance’ demanded that many former inner city 
residents moved elsewhere.
 ● Third, these intended two major ‘pull’ factors in 
population were unexpectedly supplemented by 
the ‘push’ factor caused by the emerging Troubles 
at exactly the same time, inducing some to leave a 
city that quickly became the primary location for the 
violent conflict. By the same token, many of those 
remaining, particularly in the most troubled areas, 
moved into tighter ghetto communities of their co-
religionists for greater security, accentuating the long-
standing pattern of city segregation.
Given the ‘sprawl’ effect of some of this de-centralisation, 
some 100,000+ commuters come into Belfast every day 
(Belfast City Council, 2015), half of the city’s total resident 
number. It can be asked whether there are many of the 
important aspects of city-region planning, like office 
development, roads infrastructure and city parking, which 
are essentially designed with the commuter interest in 
mind. Many of these commuters take up the most skilled 
jobs in the city, a pattern which on a comparative basis 
with similar cities in Britain produces a high GDP per head. 
So, a city that has been doing quite well economically in 
the recent past is also one where a substantial section of its 
residents is failing to share fully in that success, producing a 
‘tale of two cities’ effect, a social fragmentation augmented 
by the ethno-national division. While there is no simple 
causal relationship between segregation and deprivation, 
there is an interactive relationship. Moreover, the 
continued inter-communal contest in relation to territory 
and identity contributes to the damaging fragmentation 
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Duncairn Centre for Culture and Arts on Antrim Road, Belfast, which has recently been developed by the 174 Trust - an 
example of excellent renovation.
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of the city, and thereby to its under-development. As with 
interventions around deprivation, we have had a series of 
‘good relations’ initiatives over the decades.
Starting in 1969, the newly formed Community Relations 
Commission quickly decided that their ideal intervention 
in contested areas around bridge-building community 
relations was unfeasible, given the intensity of hostilities. 
Instead, they shifted to a strategy of community 
development, working within each community bloc, and 
trusting that the common issues of deprivation that would 
emerge from this focus would in time present opportunities 
for cross-community contact and collaboration. To a 
modest degree, it did. 
But, this critical decision to prioritise single-
identity work ultimately accorded legitimacy to 
such separatism, and the corollary was that the 
integrated development that should have been 
embedded in public investment in these areas 
became aspirational rather than normative. From 
this flawed genesis, a whole structure and culture 
of ‘community development’ formed, inherently 
endorsing the sectarian geographies of many ‘local 
communities’ as an unfortunate inevitability of an 
ethno-nationalist contest, rather than calling it what 
it is: a narrow ghettoization, which locked these areas 
into constricted spaces and visions, and encouraged 
rivalries over allocation of urban resources. While 
this can be wrapped in plausible theories of social 
capital, how ‘bonding capital’ has to be nourished 
as a platform to ‘bridging capital’, and such like, the 
practice is that it reinforces a deformed concept of 
‘community’ in contested cities like Belfast that is 
ultimately supportive of segregation and division. 
Accordingly, as the demography of places like Belfast 
changes to a more 50-50 share between the two traditional 
communities, contests over spaces are likely to intensify 
rather than abate. In such circumstance, we need a set of 
principles to guide the use of, and access to, the city. It cannot 
be proper that any group can claim part of the city as ‘their 
territory’ that other citizens can only access by compliance 
with their approval criteria. Such ‘balkanisation’ denies 
a view of the whole city as everyone’s neighbourhood. 
To work at its best, contemporary urbanism needs to 
be fluid, permeable, accessible – a pluralist place for a 
pluralist people.  However, such principles can only take 
root in a shift from the politics of coercion to the politics 
of persuasion. 
The simple reality is that Unionists cannot rely any 
longer on the authority and sway of a secure majority. 
If they want to retain a UK-based sovereignty, they 
have to reach out beyond their core constituency to 
win the blessing, or at least voluntary acquiescence, 
from a section of the Catholic community. Similarly, 
since they have now signed up to the principle of 
consent, mainstream Republicanism cannot attain 
their goal of a united Ireland without earning the 
endorsement of a section of the current Unionist 
community. 
In this way, a changed political landscape is congruent 
with changing the urban landscape of contested cities like 
Belfast. In this complex context of a divided city, when 
addressing issues of the built environment and cultural 
identity in Belfast, policy has veered between ambivalence 
(McEldowney, Sterrett, and Gaffikin, 2001) to forms of 
planning and regeneration that positively engage around 
issues of contention. In the mid-1990s, urban policy in 
Belfast was marked by multi-sectoral dialogic consultations 
that openly acknowledged the impact of contested space 
(Gaffikin and Sweeney, 1995), and the results were evident 
in the final strategy. This spoke of linking regeneration 
into the peace process, the correspondence between 
deprivation and division, and the need to move away from 
narrow ‘territoriality towards unifying goals, which heal as 
they help renew’ (Making Belfast Work, 1995, p.19). This 
was followed by similar exercises in Belfast city-region 
planning, which addressed the ‘implications of a divided 
society’, including issues such as the ‘peace walls’; the 
sensitivity of allocation of land for housing; and accessibility 
of employment to both sides of the community’ (Gaffikin, 
Morrissey, Mc Eldowney and Sterrett, 1997, p.43). A 
subsequent regional plan process included engagement 
with around 500 community and voluntary organisations, 
during which issues of sectarian division were aired 
(Gaffikin, Mc Eldowney and Sterrett, 2000). The impact of 
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this discourse emerged in the final regional plan, known as 
Shaping Our Future, which recognised: 
“Internally, Northern Ireland is a deeply divided  and 
polarised society. Evidence suggests that community 
divisions have deepened in recent years. This has 
obvious implications for planning, especially when 
rational planning choice is often constrained by a 
strong sense of communal ‘ownership’ of territory”.  
(Department of Regional Development, NI, 2001, p.9)
For instance, at the onset of the current peace process, 
Belfast undertook a major visioning exercise in 1995 
about its long-term future, involving the establishment of 
a representative City Partnership Board, which engaged 
in widespread consultation across the city’s diverse 
constituencies, in a series of workshops, forums and 
seminars, lasting for just over five years. Unlike many 
previous policy and planning processes, the contentious 
issue of division was not sidelined. As expressed in the 
preliminary vision statement, the Board projected ‘a 
city where people are valued more than the territory or 
the ideology that they hold, and where nothing is more 
precious than life itself, a city determined to move beyond 
the habit of hate to discover new ways of creatively living 
with difference’ (Belfast City Partnership Board, June 1998, 
p.3). In similar vein, the final plan (Belfast City Partnership 
Board, 1999, I) spoke of how ‘Belfast will belong to all 
its people. Supporting and respecting each other, all will 
play their part in the life of the city’. Importantly, the 
Board identified a rubric to facilitate the integration of all 
dimensions affecting prosperity, equity and quality. Guided 
by the core messages from its consultations, it adopted the 
concept of a Mutual City, taken to be one that encouraged 
links and collaboration amongst all sections and areas, 
while opening the city up to the wider world. But, after 
all of this protracted effort, and even after successfully 
reaching a broadly consensual conclusion about the way 
forward for the city, implementation of its action proposals 
came unstuck, when it became evident that constituent 
partners were unwilling to set aside their own priorities, 
corporate objectives, or interests in favour of strategic 
collaboration. In part, this impasse was related to the 
distinctive dilemmas faced by deeply divided cities in 
pursuing sustainable urbanism. 
For instance, all cities are being encouraged to plan for 
compact form that promotes sustainability and efficiently 
optimises use of brownfield land. But, in Belfast, much 
brownfield land is in or near Protestant areas, given the 
decline in that community. Yet, new housing supply on 
many of these sites would likely face Catholic occupancy, 
given the higher Catholic need for housing. Such patterns, 
in turn, are likely to be viewed by some Protestant 
communities as territorial encroachment. 
It would help to have an agreed citywide framework, 
within which local negotiations about such re-
definitions of space could be conducted. Just as it 
helped to open up the Northern Ireland conflict to 
a more global reference, so it is useful to ease the 
intensity of very micro conflicts about contested land 
distribution by framing them within an agreed set of 
fair principles. But a real shared city has to embrace 
also the issue of socio-spatial segregation. Recent 
developments in Belfast have risked generating a 
new tale of two cities, with new projects relatively 
bypassing North and West Belfast, which has long 
lacked a vibrant economic base, and remains scarred 
by ‘peace’ walls. A sustained strategic approach to 
the creation of a new development axis for this area 
is intrinsic to any serious objective to build a shared 
city. Alongside this, there is a difficult discussion 
about how the spatial concentrations of multiple 
deprivation can give way to more socially mixed 
communities, without the negative externalities 
associated with gentrification.
A dynamic and differentiated interpretation of ‘space’ 
illustrates the problematic pursuit of shared space in a 
contested city. Is the notion of ‘shared space’ to be taken 
as inherently benign and its alternative of ethnic space to 
be regarded as universally malign? Conversely, is not the 
objective to create more ‘shared space’ in Belfast itself 
disputable? For instance, does it imply that the whole 
city should comprise shared space, whereby success 
would be calibrated in terms of the diminution of ethnic 
space? If a ‘shared city’ means an ‘agreed city’ and the 
latter embodies agreement to disagree, and thereby a 
high degree of separate living in a manner that is mutually 
respectful and non-threatening, that is one thing. But 
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if it means a significant increase in integrated social 
interaction and inter-communal collaboration, rooted in 
values of inclusion, diversity, equity, and interdependence, 
that is a much more ambitious project. How can this be 
accorded spatial form in a city whose sectarian signature 
is a predominantly Catholic/Nationalist West and a 
predominantly Protestant/Unionist East, fragmented from 
each other by both the natural environment of the river, 
and the built environment of major infrastructure? 
No blueprint is available for such an outcome. Rather, it 
is an agenda that needs to be opened up for greater civic 
understanding and debate, and this task is the first thing 
that needs to be deliberately undertaken, supported by an 
investment in civic literacy and capacity. 
A new approach to planning involves not simply a new 
system, but also a set of key principles that provide a 
framework for consistency and conflict resolution. As 
indicated, the idea of a ‘shared’ city has so many meanings 
to different people, in various contexts, that these multiple 
meanings must be framed in one common code that is 
recognisable, and achievable, not only within the planning 
framework but also within a collaborative form of city 
governance. 
Shared Space in Neo-Capitalism
Talk about promoting a shared public realm has to take 
heed of the growing commercialisation and privatisation 
of public space in many cities. Regeneration is sometimes 
a cover for extending the reach of market rather than civic 
determination. For instance, Liverpool One is a massive 
retail/leisure/residential complex, owned by the Duke of 
Westminster’s Grosvenor Estate. Nearby is the revamped 
Central docks, a 60 acre stretch along the Mersey, that will 
come under management control of Peel Holdings. Similar 
developments that are skewed in their appeal to wealthy 
and mobile consumers are to be found in sites, such as 
Birmingham’s Brindley Place, adjacent to a central area 
of the city’s canals. Some critics have remarked how such 
urban recasting can render the distinctive ‘spirit’ of cities 
to be soulless and sanitised, as well as beyond democratic 
 Figure 27: Ill-matched new apartment development alongside traditional communities in Sandy Row, Belfast
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accountability (Townsend, February, 2016). In this regard, 
the prevailing model of urban regeneration, particularly in 
city centres, may be capable of delivering a more neutral 
venue for people as consumers, transcending traditional 
sectarian divides. But, they may do so at a cost of 
deepening the social divide in terms of forfeiting a concept 
of public space, whose currency lies in civic value rather 
than commercial price.  
Experience of urban planning and policy in Belfast in 
recent decades continues to evidence a great deal of time 
and resources being spent devising futures that produce 
little dividend. One aspect of this problem is the lack of 
clarity about the hierarchy of authority accorded to the 
regional plan, the metropolitan plan, the Vision plan, 
the city masterplan, and urban regeneration elsewhere. 
The initiatives undertaken in Belfast derived from earlier 
interventions in Britain. To take an example of one city, 
Liverpool. It has had virtually every intervention, going 
back to the Educational Priority Area scheme in 1968, to 
the Community Development Project in 1969, to Inner 
Area Studies and Inner City Partnerships in the 1970s, 
to the Thatcher agenda of Enterprise Zones and Urban 
Development Corporations in the 1980s, to Major’s Single 
Regeneration Budget in the 1990s, to Blair’s Urban Priority 
Areas and Neighbourhood Renewal, and so on to the 
present. Yet, Liverpool remains a stricken city, according 
to many indicators of health and education performance, 
rates of workless households, etc.
Similarly, many of the urban strategies in Britain themselves 
derive from earlier policies in the USA. So, for instance, 
the War on Poverty there in the mid-sixties cradled a lot 
of these subsequent initiatives. Apparently, Ronald Reagan 
liked to joke that ‘we fought a war against poverty, and 
poverty won’.  But, there has been a radical re-think in 
many American cities in recent decades against continual 
compensatory programmes into the concentrated spaces 
of poverty and race. Instead, cities like Chicago have been 
demolishing their notorious ghettos like Robert Taylor 
Homes and Cabrini Green with the intention of replacing 
these grim complexes with mixed income, mixed race 
communities in quality mixed tenure housing. The policy 
is not without many problems, not least for those former 
residents, now displaced and prevented from returning 
to the new developments. For some, it is not much more 
than another form of gentrification. For others, it is seen 
as providing a new start, combining physical improvement 
with social schemes of support and expected responsibility 
targeted at residents in need (further detail on this initiative 
can be found on page 97). 
Case study: Neve Shalom / Wahat Al Salam, Israel
In persistent conflict zones, such as Israel-Palestine, a city like Jerusalem becomes the microcosm of the central dispute, 
grounding it in myriad examples of separation and hostility. In such a cauldron, some argue that it is useful to step outside 
such discordant zones, and set up elsewhere an alternative way of engaging together, that may prefigure possibilities of more 
integrated living. An example here is Neve Shalom /Wahat Al Salam -- a village 'oasis of peace', established by Israeli-Arab 
peace-makers between Tel Aviv/Jaffa and Jerusalem.  Our study visit there discovered a bi-national community, designed 
to amplify mutual empathy and equality as the basis for peaceful co-existence. But, for all its inventive painstaking effort 
to normalise living across the divide, the village is impacted by external events in the wider region, and by specific Israeli 
government policy. For instance, its Jewish young people are conscripted to the state army, whereas their Palestinian friends 
are not. While it shows the unfeasibility of a completely insulated  'shelter' in a war zone, the concept of  an alternative 
model  of integrated settlement in a deeply divided society, for all its limitations, is worth trying. 
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(Inter)national Examples
A key learning point from our study visits to other divided cities, such as Nicosia, Jerusalem, Mostar, and indeed 
to cities in Britain, such as Bradford and Birmingham, relates to the value of good spatial planning practice. In the 
first instance, what is required is well-established good planning and design, before any consideration of special 
planning to respond to the particular conflict. 
Case study: Bradford, United Kingdom
Bradford has significant spatial divisions largely based on ethnicity and class. The riots in 2001 highlighted racial 
tensions in a city that was becoming increasingly spatially segregated. Since then, a number of planning / urban 
design initiatives have attempted to address the spatial dimensions of division. The Bradford masterplan (2005) 
introduced a ‘world mile’ in an attempt to celebrate the city’s diversity and to counter the increasing insularity 
of spatial communities. More recently, Bradford City Council developed a City Park in the heart of the city as an 
inclusive space. Sometimes known as ‘the great meeting place’, the park has been designed to attract the diverse 
range of city communities. Crucially too, its ongoing management and stewardship are underpinned and driven 
by the ‘ethos of inclusion’.       
Figure 28: Bradford’s City Park. 
Planning for Spatial Reconciliation
83
Belfast City Council - the source of a new planning approach?
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A New Planning in a New Context
As indicated earlier in this report, for planners to be most 
effective in contributing to reconciliation, it is necessary 
for them to examine the political context, within which 
they operate. This involves their appreciation of the way 
traditional political discourse has impeded scope for new 
thinking about how we make space for each other.
In Northern Ireland, dealing with the past has been 
couched pre-eminently in terms of defining ‘legitimate’ 
victims and conceiving of ways to support them that are 
both compassionate and fair. There is, arguably, another 
important dimension to dealing with the past, which 
focuses on the different and contradictory narratives of 
the past four decades espoused by Northern Ireland’s two 
major communities. Any attempt to deal with the past 
must have a prospective dimension, i.e. what would help 
bring closure, heal divisions and change mind-sets right 
across the community and political spectra?
Alongside victims’ work, there is a strong case for 
communities to be encouraged to review their own 
narratives. Grappling with contentious parades or deciding 
who should be awarded the status of victimhood are 
shaped by contesting and almost community-specific 
interpretations of Northern Ireland’s political conflict, and 
rival claims of blame and responsibility. 
Some  suggest that since there are two ‘narratives’ of 
Northern Ireland’s violent history, each side should accept 
the autonomy of the other’s, even if disagreeing with it - 
the solution is to agree to tell both. This approach rightly 
acknowledges that the past is interpreted through many 
lenses - personal experience, individual values, belief 
systems, and what used to be called ideology – so that 
there can be no agreed, consensual version that would be 
shared amongst Northern Ireland’s diverse political actors/
communities. Moving forward involves accepting the 
existence of different, even conflicting, narratives and the 
deep meanings attached to them.
The problem is that the two narratives (probably more than 
two) are not merely different, they intersect, and where 
they intersect are places of violence, physical damage, 
personal injury and death. Those who have been subjected 
to such acts are unlikely to embrace a principle of historical 
relativity. Meanwhile, such narratives determine the 
contesting positions taken on a variety of contemporary 
issues threatening the development of a peaceful and 
prosperous Northern Ireland. For example:
 ● Are Orange or republican parades an unthreatening 
expression of a legitimate heritage and culture or a 
flaunting of triumphalist and menacing intent against 
the other side?
 ● Is celebration of paramilitary dead a respectful 
remembrance of dedicated, principled patriots, or 
deliberate insult to all those they killed, and their 
families, and to all those who saw their campaigns as 
cruel, vain, and anti-democratic?
 ● Amongst the nearly 4,000 fatal victims of political 
violence in Northern Ireland, should the status of ‘real’ 
victimhood be applied only to a subset of the total?
Contesting histories always generate difficult questions for 
the present. When such histories are shoehorned into the 
tiny spaces and miniature populations of Northern Ireland, 
the dilemmas can be all the greater. 
There is little point in trying to establish the ‘primacy’ of an ‘authentic’ history. Criticising the ‘other’s narrative’ 
can merely reinforce it. A different approach is to find the means to encourage people to critically interrogate 
their own narratives and to assess their usefulness for accomplishing what they want in the contemporary 
world. Crudely put, the Unionist/Loyalist narrative is that a peaceful and democratic society was assaulted by 
a violent criminal conspiracy. Even those involved now in power-sharing insist that their former enemies were 
forced to accept democratic methods, if not all together give up on their revolutionary project. Any concerns 
about the way in which Northern Ireland was run in the past are subsumed in outrage about Republican 
violence.  Moreover, for some unionists, sustainable peace can only arrive when nationalists and republicans 
renounce their project – a hopeless form of Unionist wishful thinking. 
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Yet, a key problem of clinging to community-specific 
versions of the past is that they can act as an obstacle 
to either side achieving its own goals. Remaining in the 
comfort of one’s own history is about accepting the status 
of a ‘moral minority’ rather than an ‘intellectual majority’ 
– speaking only to one’s own community rather than trying 
to shape society as a whole. While Northern Ireland has 
been interpreted as having a ‘double minority’ problem, 
more properly this should be conceived as a ‘double 
majority’ problem. Nationalists might have been a minority 
in Northern Ireland, but saw themselves as a majority on 
the island of Ireland. Unionists were not only a majority 
within Northern Ireland, but believed they were part of a 
union-favouring majority within the UK. Since each side 
already had its majority, there was no compelling reason 
to reach beyond the limits of their respective communities. 
The contours of that game were shattered by the Good 
Friday Agreement, followed by the Republic’s referendum, 
a combined voice of both parts of the island which located 
the solution to the sovereignty question firmly on the 
shoulders of the Northern Ireland population. All sides 
to the power-sharing agreement inherently accept that 
sovereignty will only be changed by majority consent 
within Northern Ireland. Thus, for the first time, Unionism 
and Nationalism have both a vested interest in trying to 
mobilise internal majority support for their respective 
positions. 
Given the nature of demographic change (and, indeed, 
relative low turn-out rates in elections in some Protestant 
areas), Unionism no longer holds guarantee of a built-in 
majority. Thus, if the fundamental goal of unionists and 
loyalists is to maintain Northern Ireland’s position within 
the UK, they need to ask if current strategies are conducive 
to that goal. Regarding Irishness, or wanting a united 
Ireland, as being forms of subversion, will not create a 
sustainable majority in favour of UK citizenship. Insisting 
that the sovereignty symbols of the UK are displayed even 
more prominently and permanently than in Britain will not 
bring the undecided over to the Unionist cause. It’s true 
that, in a couple of speeches, Mr Robinson, as First Minister, 
argued for making Unionism a more comfortable home for 
Catholics. But that sentiment doesn’t find expression in 
clearly changed policy and practice.  
Within the outer fringes of Loyalism, the contradictions 
are even more apparent. A rational argument can be made 
that the arterial routes of a city should be open to walk by 
the Orange Order, despite the opposition of those who live 
nearby. If such parades are truly triumphalist and sectarian, 
they should be banned from marching anywhere. The fact 
that local residents seem prepared to accept parading so 
long as it is not contiguous to where they live suggests a 
belief in the right to exercise control over nearby arterial 
traffic. No city could thrive if those moving within and 
through it required a variety of permissions from various 
sets of residents. Thus, Loyalists have an argument that 
needs to be taken seriously. But, to then try to prevent a 
Lord Mayor performing a ceremonial duty in Woodvale 
Park, or to violently attempt to block an anti-internment 
commemorative parade, suggest a partisan concept of the 
right to walk on such routes.
A self-critical look at the Republican narrative would reveal 
similar anomalies. Republicans talk about reaching out 
to the ‘Protestant Working Class’. But, Sinn Fein treats 
Britishness as a form of ‘false consciousness’ (people being 
led up the garden path against their own self-interest by a 
manipulative Unionist leadership). Yet, to get the ‘within-
Northern Ireland’ majority to change the constitutional 
position, republicans have to convince a significant section 
of unionist opinion. Such an agenda would have to confront 
difficult questions, such as: is there a plausible way of 
feeling British within a United Ireland? 
Similarly, the Republican narrative emphasises the undemocratic, discriminatory and violent character of the 
‘Orange State’ that left those desiring change with no other recourse than to take up arms. Opportunities for 
peaceful, democratic reform were unavailable and state violence was proactive and oppressive – a position 
still clung rigidly to by republican dissidents, but largely shared by Sinn Fein’s version of Northern Ireland 
before the peace process of the mid-1990s. From a viewpoint outside these positions, each narrative has only 
a tangential relationship to the past 50 years. However, counter-posing contrary sets of ‘facts’ to either cuts 
little ice, since they are so deeply embedded in the ‘common sense’ of each protagonist community. 
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But, if it doesn’t embrace this challenge of engagement, 
Republicanism is going nowhere. Republicans have 
‘apologised’ for civilian deaths over the past four decades 
but, given the elasticity of their definition of ‘legitimate 
target’, should a more wide-scale apology be offered? 
Indeed, should much of their ‘war’ be considered 
‘sectarian’? Republicanism claims that it wants to go 
beyond the limits of a ‘nationalist bloc’, and to achieve its 
fundamental goals it would certainly have to do so, but it 
has yet to find any practical way of reaching beyond the 
comfort of its own history.
In short, to achieve their own fundamental goals, 
both sides need to embrace what might be called 
‘smart pluralism’ (being pluralist rather than 
majoritarian in pursuit of one’s own interest, rather 
than some vaguely defined ‘ethical good’ for the 
whole society) and what John Gray (1995) calls 
‘agonistic liberalism’ (accepting that one’s own 
values cannot provide a comprehensive account 
of society, and being prepared to seek an ‘uneasy 
equilibrium’ with others’ values). Self-critically 
engaging with one’s own narrative permits the 
engagement between narratives to help resolve 
contemporary issues. 
It’s interesting that British governments (in recent 
times) have taken modest steps in the direction of self-
interrogation – the establishment of the Saville and other 
inquiries; the apology given by David Cameron in the 
House of Commons for Bloody Sunday, and state collusion 
in sectarian killing. Critics claim that such actions do not 
go far enough. But, it would be welcome if local political 
actors took similar first steps. Fostering a process of 
critical self-interrogation would be more productive than 
say establishing a Truth Commission. There are too many 
competing ‘truths’. Attempting to interrogate them to 
unveil the holy grail of ‘fundamental’ truth is unlikely to 
find consensus. 
Despite the activities of dissident republicans, the period 
since 1998 has seen remarkable decline in organised, 
strategic political violence. As the PSNI website indicates, 
Northern Ireland still has lots of disorganised, opportunistic 
pseudo-political violence – various expressions of hate 
crime, including attacks on Catholic churches and Orange 
halls. Associated with this decline of high-level violence, 
the narratives of each side in Northern Ireland have been 
suitably reshaped. 
For Unionists/Loyalists, the war might be over. But, 
a cultural and socio-economic struggle has gained 
momentum. This takes the form of persistent attempts to 
remove or undermine symbols of the Union, politically-
determined objections to the expression of Unionist and 
Orange culture, and a decline in socio-economic position 
of many Protestant communities.
For nationalists/republicans, the Good Friday Agreement 
has not yet delivered socio-economic equality. There 
is little respect for ‘parity of esteem’, and Loyalist and 
Orange organisations refuse to engage meaningfully with 
local Catholic communities about sensible ways of sharing 
space.
In short, even in a decade of low-level political violence 
that is within the living memory of a majority of Northern 
Ireland’s citizens, contradictory narratives continue to 
predominate.
Given that Northern Ireland’s is probably the most 
researched local conflict ever and that the region is 
incredibly data rich, such claims can be tested. To re-
emphasise examples:
 ● A report by the Institute of Irish Studies (QUB 2010) 
indicated that in the previous four years, Loyalist street 
flags outnumbered Republican by at least three to one. 
In these terms, the idea that Loyalist symbols have 
been suppressed is hard to sustain;
 ● The correlation between the percentage of area 
inhabitants who are of Catholic religion/religion 
brought up in (community background) and an 
area’s spatial deprivation score has been positive and 
significant in every regional Multiple Deprivation study 
since 1991 (around 0.4) and has changed little over 
two decades. The correlation with Protestant religion 
is also significant but negative (Robson, 1994 Noble, 
2010, NI Census, 1991, NI Census 2011);
 ● This is also true for the Relative Poverty Measure (2003-
2005) for ‘equivalised’ households. Interestingly, the 
correlation coefficient for ‘unequivalised’ households is 
insignificant, suggesting that demographic differences 
between Catholic and Protestant households help 
explain the disproportionate participation of the 
former in the most deprived category; and
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 ● In contrast, the Labour Force Religion Report 2011 
points to a rapidly changing labour market. Between 
1992 and 2011, the number of Catholics in employment 
increased by 123,000 (63%) compared to a Protestant 
increase of 7,000 (2%), (p.27). In the same period, the 
Protestant share of the unemployed increased by three 
percentage points, while the Catholic share fell by the 
same (p.22). Between 1993 and 2011, the percentage 
of Catholics without qualifications fell from 32 to 14 
percent, compared to 30 to 16 percent for Protestants 
(p.34). Finally, in 2011, the Protestant median hourly 
wage rate was actually lower than the Catholic median 
(p.31).
However, rather than establishing an ‘incontestable’ truth, 
the data allow both sides to cling to narratives of grievance. 
Poorer Protestants feel that the direction of change has 
been inimical, as evidenced by the loss of labour market 
advantage. Catholics continue to predominate in the most 
deprived areas, reaffirming the view that the equality 
agenda has been side-lined. The friction between the 
direction of change and the relative position of the two 
communities is a fruitful bed for claims and counter-claims. 
Moreover, technicalities like equivalence scales mean 
nothing on the streets where the risk of conflict is high. 
Equally, multiple deprivation measures, where half of the 
aggregate score is determined by benefits dependency, 
are seen as being biased in favour of Catholics, whose 
economic inactivity and unemployment rates have 
historically increased the value of deprivation scores for 
the areas in which they predominate. Indeed, differential 
benefits dependency tends to be linked to the wider UK 
discourse about ‘strivers and scroungers’, and this feeds 
into common-sense perceptions in Northern Ireland.
Belfast has been at the heart of such controversy. For 
instance, other local authorities accepted ‘designated 
days’ for flying the Union flag without recourse to violence. 
The Ardoyne March stand-off has rumbled on, punctuated 
by outbreaks of street violence. A key factor is that the 
regional capital now sees Sinn Fein as the largest political 
party on the local council and its councillors (unsurprisingly) 
pursue a republican agenda at every opportunity. Even so, 
the reaction of Unionists and Loyalists seems excessive, 
particularly to those who would prefer a complete absence 
of partisan symbols.
However, another key factor has been the city’s violent 
history – particularly inter-communal violence. Between 
1969 and 1999, 40% of all political violence in Northern 
Ireland took place within the city though its population 
share was mostly below 20%. Within Belfast, twenty wards 
(of a total of 51) accounted for 60% of all conflict-related 
fatalities and almost 70% of all sectarian killing (Morrissey 
& Smyth 2002). In these areas, containing around 5% of 
Northern Ireland’s population, lived a quarter of all those 
with a Northern Ireland address who died in the Troubles. 
The intensity and concentration of political violence in 
these wards were unmatched across the region.
It is no co-incidence that these 20 wards are more 
residentially segregated than the city as a whole – 18 had 
populations made up of at least 70% a single community 
background in 2001, and 15 in 2011. Equally, their socio-
economic position has been worse than the city as a whole 
– all have appeared in the most deprived decile of Northern 
Ireland wards in every regional spatial deprivation study 
since 1991, and in Belfast studies going back to 1971. Across 
a range of indicators (unemployment, economic inactivity, 
reported health, qualification attainment, recorded crime 
and anti-social behaviour) their rates are substantially 
higher than for the rest of the city. Yet, they have also 
been the major beneficiary of almost all spatially targeted 
regeneration, anti-poverty, conflict transformation and 
urban development programmes of the past three decades 
– probably more spent per head than any other similar 
population in Europe. 
There have been some fundamental problems here. Their 
persistent location within the most deprived decile raises 
questions about programme effectiveness While spatial 
targeting requires an accepted set of allocation criteria, 
use of the Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measure 
is seen to favour Catholic over Protestant areas, thereby 
complementing political contest with squabbles over 
resources. It also facilitates a ‘race to the bottom’, whereby 
communities want to be amongst the ‘most deprived’, 
since that is the gateway to urban resources. Meanwhile, 
conflict transformation projects seem unable to develop 
a robust methodology for identifying and evaluating 
outcomes specific to their activities. Consequently, it is 
hard to identify (never mind measure) any kind of cost-
effectiveness. It’s reasonable to ask when so much is 
known and so much has been done, why so little has been 
achieved.
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More recently, more innovative programmes have been 
attempting to grapple with the downside of traditional 
development and conflict transformation initiatives – 
the Social Investment Fund, Delivering Change, and the 
Child Poverty Strategy, all launched in a time of fiscal 
retrenchment and austerity. Others are worth considering 
– the Community Budgets (following from Total Place) 
pilots in Britain have been positively assessed as bringing a 
more fruitful approach to local spending – new ideas about 
local development emphasise investing in community 
assets (rather than just needs) to maximise resilience and 
readiness to grasp opportunity. There remains, however, 
a need for a new approach to conflict transformation 
that is more measurement than process oriented, less 
subordinate to political interests, and completely focused 
on outcome achievement. But, whatever is done, dealing 
with the past particularly means dealing with the specific 
legacies of Belfast.  
The challenge is to find a way not just to encourage 
but to oblige a process of critical self-reflection. In that 
respect, the significance of an ‘authoritative outsider’ is 
paramount. One of the anomalies of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process is that, when things are going well, we want 
to ‘export’ our success, but, when less well, we call on 
others to bail us out. Notwithstanding the peculiarities of 
the Northern Ireland psyche, authoritative (those awarded 
authority to mediate from all sides) outsiders have made 
a crucial contribution – George Mitchell being an obvious 
example. A key lesson from such interventions suggests 
that the stages involve: first setting out principles for 
dealing with the past, and then engaging with key actors 
to seek agreement on these, before specifying this or 
that mechanism. This approach (derived from John Rawls 
1971 method for devising Principles of Justice) attempts 
to separate the principles under which things should be 
organised from the self-interests of those engaged. Thus, 
to summarise, it might be suggested that:
 ● there are a variety of ‘pasts’ constructed and 
interpreted through experience, value systems 
etc. But they cannot be regarded as completely 
autonomous or universally explanatory in a 
small ‘contested’ place, where people still have 
to engage with each other;
 ● criticising the ‘other’s past’ is both inappropriate 
and ineffective – being critical of one’s own past 
is not merely more productive, but awards the 
moral authority to be critical of others;
 ● a good starting point is for people (and 
organisations) to ask themselves (with the 
benefit of hindsight) what they regret most 
about their own actions over the past four 
decades and what they would do differently if 
such an opportunity existed – a focus on what 
was done wrongly, rather than recital of past 
triumphs; and
 ● regarding the present, people should make 
greater effort to be clear about the principles that 
underpin their actions and to ask, in a divided 
society where majoritarianism has failed, what 
are the most productive ways to achieve their 
own goals. 
We may ask whether leadership on such an agenda can 
come from the reconstituted new local governance.
The New Councils
Two linked processes of change are just now underway, 
offering unique opportunity to address division. First, 
as part of reform of public administration, a great deal 
of planning and regeneration responsibility is to be 
transferred to a re-shaped local governance. Second, the 
form of planning itself may be set to change radically. 
The introduction of community planning and spatial 
planning brings prospect of an innovative approach that 
gets beyond ‘land use planning’, to a more comprehensive 
and holistic model, linking the physical with the social, 
economic, environmental and cultural aspects of 
development. Importantly, this new planning approach 
facilitates clearer insight into the spatial needs and impact 
of all other policy sectors, such as health, education, and 
social services. It also allows for a clearer picture of the 
spatial needs and impact of Good Relations policies across 
the whole of governance.
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Spatial typologies can be identified as follows:
Ethnic space: signified and separatist, and stamped as belonging to one specific clan, this terrain is reflected 
most obviously in segregated communities, prone to mutual mistrust, if not hostility. Tribal references and 
associations prevail over ties that bind across the traditional enmity;
Dead space: often, large tracts of land that are subject to deep discord are abandoned indefinitely for delayed 
development until some agreement can be reached about their use. This ‘lost city’ is usually subject to blight 
and neglect. It fragments the urban fabric further, and usually not even given opportunity of ‘meanwhile’ use; 
Neutral space: providing a secure, safe preserve, outside territorial claims by any of the protagonist groups, 
it has the potential for cross-community use and encounter, without prospect of substantial or sustained 
engagement around divisive allegiance;
Shared space: this ensures a safe dialogic arena for proactive and deliberate exchanges across the divide. 
Candidly related to competing interpretation of the roots and expression of the contest, it offers, at once, 
recognition and inclusion of difference. Thereby, forthright, but respectful, challenge can be encouraged -- often 
as agonistic conversation, without assurance of conversion; and
Cosmopolitan space: offering space that is above and beyond the local animosity, this embraces a more global 
contour and perspective. Multiple cultural identities are on display. Diversity is celebrated and interrogated within 
a witness of common humanity. From such cross-pollination, springs new hybridities. It recognises that as humans, 
we are creatures of both being and becoming. We cannot be tied down to one simple designation or affiliation.
However, interviews conducted as part of this research 
highlight the fact that the understanding of concepts 
like ‘community planning’ and ‘spatial planning’ can vary 
widely. Moreover, the new planning model offers a more 
inclusive  and participative process that could help promote 
more ‘bottom-up’ forms of planning and regeneration. 
Evidence from other conflict-ridden societies, afflicted with 
contested space, shows that such planning is best adapted 
to peace-building, and to addressing more candidly 
the divisions reflected in deep spatial segregation of 
communities and services.  In addition, this new approach 
could deal with the awkward issue of ‘community’. At 
present, there are two uses of the term: first, ‘community’ 
as in ‘local neighbourhood’; and second,  ‘community’ as 
in ‘the two main communities: Protestant and Catholic’. 
In deeply divided societies, ‘community’, in the sense 
of local area, can be an exclusive concept, whereby the 
solidarities within an area can be nurtured in part by 
hostility to, and rivalry with, those outside it. A planning 
process, that responds mainly to the preferences of such 
local segregated areas, risks reinforcing the division and 
ghettoisation. By contrast, the idea of ‘community’ in the 
concept of community planning is much broader, and more 
civic rather than ethnic. For instance, in Belfast, such an 
approach encourages all residents to consider the wider 
city as their ‘neighbourhood’, and to look to the mutual 
benefits involved in its city-wide development.  
Policy Choices 
Finally, the emergence of planning as a more inter-
disciplinary profession focussed on place-making, rather 
than land use planning, promotes a holistic view of urban 
development that includes themes like education and 
health. But, policy in these areas is still framed within 
the wider societal divisions, and the ‘choices’ these rifts 
suggest. People living and working amidst division and 
conflict are faced with four broad options:
 ● accept the social engineering that enclaves separate 
communities in sectarian zones marked by exclusivity 
and absolutism, and thereby resign urban development 
to continuous reproduction of segregated territories of 
single identity;
 ● adopt a minimalist ‘live and let live’ approach, that 
acknowledges a tendency for divergent groups to seek 
security in the similar and familiar, thereby managing 
a peaceful co-habitation of the city, in which little real 
inter-cultural engagement across traditional divides is 
facilitated;
 ● endorse a respectful democratic politics of identity and 
belonging, whereby conflicts are addressed candidly 
through principles of equity, and regular processes of 
mature negotiation and reciprocal accommodation; and
 ● develop a more pluralist vision of the city, whereby no 
one culture or ideology has pre-eminence over others, 
and positive interaction across diverse traditions and 
spaces promotes mutual enrichment.
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Re-thinking Space
In turn, these broad policy choices are influenced by how 
we think about space in a divided society. Space, in this 
context, is not understood as an inanimate stage upon 
which the drama of social life is daily unfolded. Rather, it 
is an active agent in the shaping of ever-changing society. 
It is relational. As such, its meaning changes over time 
with varied ownership, designation, and use. Not only is it 
socially made, it also ‘makes’ a key aspect of the social. In 
conflict societies, five main types of space can be specified 
(see above). 
Re-thinking Community
An old understanding of ‘community’ (Redfield, 1947; 
Tonnies, 1957) emphasises a place with a mainly uniform 
culture; where human relations are primary and bonded; 
social status largely ascriptive; and where the population is 
well-settled and largely immobile. This tradition of shared 
cultural affinity and legacy made for intimate and durable 
affiliation to locality and its residents. Those clinging 
wistfully to this view are sometimes dismissed as indulging 
in a romanticised retreat from the complexity and atomism 
of modern urbanism (Halsey, 1974). Certainly, the nostalgic 
craving for ‘community’ as the genial, cherished, and 
familiar, in preference to the remote and removed centres 
of financial power in the new globalism, is explicable. It is 
reflected in contemporary discourse about government 
devolution and the ‘new localism’. It seems that as the 
economic realm drives people to attain scale, scope, and 
shelter, through being part of large multi-national blocs, 
the political domain drives people to seek smaller spheres 
of social connection to optimise civic participation and 
influence. The economic space is getter bigger, as the 
political space is getting smaller, both in terms of geography 
and ideology.
At what level of localism does it become easiest to animate 
civil society and nurture citizen capacity? In an age geared 
to more individual autonomy, personalisation, and self-
actualisation, is the collective impulse enshrined in 
‘community’ a residual legacy of paternalistic welfarism? Is 
‘community’ a ‘trapdoor’ that cages the most marginalised 
publics in ambivalent solidarities such as ‘disadvantaged 
areas’ (Herbert, 2005)?
The apparent human inclination for attachment, meaning, 
and continuity may indeed be met best by human-
scale settlements, whose proximities and daily social 
interactions foster bonding and mutual support. But, the 
‘composite commodity’ that constitutes neighbourhood 
(Galster, 2001), with all its relational complexity, can be 
an ambiguous refuge for those intent on preserving an 
intimate, customised living place in a standardised, mass-
produced globalised society.     
In turn, this spatial typology is linked to six dominant discursive themes in conflict societies:
Identity: the distinctive and often tribal senses of belonging can emphasize enmity to the attachments of their 
                    opposition, as in the maxim: ‘external force creates internal cohesion’;
Equity: contests around equality and discrimination between the contesting groups can cloud more effective  
                 ways of assessing need;
Security: issues of community safety and justice systems are viewed in partisan terms; 
Territory: physical terrain becomes both the actual battlefield and symbolic marker for group dominance or 
survival;
Proprietary: the issue of ownership of place -- whether it be a local neighbourhood or society at large -- 
particularly marks those contested spaces locked into wider sovereignty disputes; and
History: the past is an active spirit, persistently haunting the present and prospect of societies, multi-layered 
with ancestral animosities. Contending narratives of that troubled history remain a crucial component of 
contemporary rivalry, what to observers can be an obsessive fixation with a legacy that can’t be ‘fixed’.
Such ‘themes’ come to ground most clearly in those ‘ethnic spaces’ that experience the most acute form of the 
conflict --- very small local communities -- whereas they might be dealt with best in a context where ‘shared’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’ spaces are extended. But, this seismic shift would entail a new attitude to ‘community’.
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Re-thinking Segregation
Re-thinking what we mean by ‘community’ also leads 
on to re-considering how to address segregation. 
Housing developments that segregate the two dominant 
communities are most evident in the most deprived areas. 
Thus, over 90% of social housing areas are cast into mainly 
single identity communities, a figure that increases to 94% 
in Belfast (Shuttleworth and Lloyd, 2009) Yet, evidence from 
the Life and Times Survey suggests that a clear majority 
(80%) of people would prefer to live in mixed residential 
areas. The gap between this desire and its delivery cannot 
be bridged in the main by communities taking their own 
initiatives. It demands political leadership. Yet, as indicated 
elsewhere, this leadership faces an obvious dilemma. Most 
of the big political parties in Northern Ireland have their 
core constituency anchored in a single identity community. 
So, how can politicians who are tied to sectarian electoral 
arithmetic be the very ones who steer us out of these 
sectarian geographies that underpin their voting base?
Certainly, government agencies like the Housing 
Executive have adopted a proactive strategy to 
progress towards more shared living. Its Community 
Cohesion Strategy 2015-2020 outlines its objectives 
in these terms:
• To play a role in the formation of more stable, 
safer and cohesive neighbourhoods; 
• To partner with other stakeholders in tackling 
the multifaceted and difficult issue of housing 
need in a contested society; 
• To react promptly and competently to the needs 
of those endangered as a consequence of inter-
communal strife; and
• To assist and support mixed housing where this 
is feasible, desirable and safe.
To take this approach forward, it piloted an £1 million 3-year 
Shared Neighbourhood Programme (2008-2011), designed 
to develop areas that accommodate people’s choice 
to shared residential living, irrespective of neighbours’ 
religion or race, in a secure and welcoming environment 
for all. In turn, this led to the Shared Communities 
Programme, which concluded in December 2015, and the 
two initiatives together have developed 50 shared estates 
across Northern Ireland.  From 2006, a total of 11 schemes 
have been advanced in cooperation with 
Housing Associations, adopting Shared Future principles of 
a signed Community Charter, encouraging good relations 
and upholding the right to diversity within the estate.
But, those behind this effort to promote shared living 
recognise the impediments posed by the various means of 
‘territorialising’ areas (Housing Executive, 2016, p. 22):
 
“Political and sectarian displays are prevalent within 
our estates and symbols such as murals, flags, kerb 
painting, bonfires and paramilitary memorials can 
create a significant ‘chill factor’  for visitors to our 
estates. Proactive negotiations  with communities 
and the funding of locally based re-imaging 
initiatives have had significant impact on our single 
identity estates and we work with both sides of the 
community, at the communities pace in order to 
affect change (e.g. Lower Newtownards Rd, Sandy 
Row, Ligoniel, Lower Falls, Milltown, Doury Rd)”. 
In addressing such features, the Housing Executive extols 
the protocol recommended in a report it produced jointly 
with the Inter-Community Network (Inter Community 
Network and Housing Executive, June 2008), a guide that 
acknowledged:
1.    the speed and rate of change will be established           
         by the local community;
2.    the process is reliant on local circumstances; and
3.    this process will demand flexibility and may, from time 
        to time, need review. 
Thus, the vision of this approach affirms the right 
to live in safety, in a tolerant, diverse society where 
cultural differences within and between communities 
are celebrated, appreciated and respected. However, 
it concedes, in effect, the contingency of locality and 
circumstance, and the ultimate arbitration within the ‘local 
community’. As explained elsewhere, we can see great 
difficulty with such concession.
A somewhat different approach -- with which we find 
greater favour -- is adopted in a recent report (Nolan 
and Bryan, 2016). Included in their main findings is that 
the package securing the greatest public support is for: 
(a) the Union flag to be flown on 18 designated days; (b) this 
stipulation to be rolled out across all of Northern Ireland; 
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and (c) this protocol not to derive from Westminster, nor 
from a series of separate negotiations by each council, but 
rather, from agreement amongst the main political parties 
at Stormont. 
In a wider sphere, the authors advocate that flags should 
only be flown on key fixtures such as the Twelfth or Easter 
Rising anniversaries, for duration of two weeks around 
these events. Flags should not be placed outside premises 
delivering public services, such as health centres, hospitals, 
schools, and community halls, nor in community ‘interface’ 
areas. 
While their polling demonstrated that 7 out of 10 people 
approved more regulation of flags in public spaces, the 
authors acknowledge practical difficulties in monitoring 
and implementing legislative-backed regulation, amongst 
which are: would there be licences? who would issue 
them? who would have the ‘authority’ to apply? and, 
what penalties would be imposed for non-compliance? 
Moreover, since flag-flying in the wider public realm is 
part of a more general ‘identity display’ that includes 
painted kerbs, bonfires, and murals, specific legislative-
based intervention may not be as effective as a set of 
guidelines that offer good practice, geared to respectful 
relations.  We would hold some reservation in this regard. 
Evidence of the positive impact legislation has made in the 
area of fair employment shows how it can be important 
in leveraging change. Pressure and persuasion are both 
required. On this basis, we would argue in favour of a 
legislative framework that would provide a consistent and 
enforceable intervention. 
Overall, the Nolan-Bryan report raises the right slant, in our 
view: the need for a standardised approach to ‘official’ flag 
display, legitimated by the regional government. As such, 
it makes an important contribution to the discourse set to 
be generated by the Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture 
and Tradition, set up by the recent Stormont Agreement, 
known as A Fresh Start, and due to be operating from 
March 2016, and to conclude by September 2017. 
As the demography of places like Belfast changes to a more 
50-50 share between the two traditional communities, 
contests over spaces are likely to intensify rather than 
abate. In such circumstance, alongside a legislative 
framework, a set of consistent principles may be useful to 
guide the use of, and access to, the city. 
Fundamentally, a set of planning principles would 
challenge the proposition that any group can claim 
part of the city as ‘their territory’ that other citizens 
can only access by compliance with their approval 
criteria. Such ‘balkanisation’ denies a view of the 
whole city as everyone’s neighbourhood. To work 
at its best, contemporary urbanism needs to be 
fluid, permeable, accessible – a pluralist place for a 
pluralist people.  However, such principles can only 
take root in a shift from the politics of coercion to 
the politics of persuasion. 
There are problems with our current arrangement for 
settling contentious issues like marches. In essence, the 
key criterion used by the Parades Commission is whether 
a particular march is likely to cause significant disturbance 
and violence. Yet, this may invite opponents of a particular 
march to suggest that it will be greeted by such violence. 
In other words, it inadvertently delivers the very threats 
society wants to avoid, and ends up possibly rewarding bad 
behaviour. Moreover, if we concede that groups claiming to 
represent whole areas can determine the conditions under 
which other groups march through ‘their’ area, we are 
effectively agreeing to a balkanisation of cities like Belfast, 
in which territories are seen to be legitimately under the 
control of sectional rather than civic interests. Such control 
of ‘turf’, particularly arterial routes, prevents the kind of 
open, accessible city demanded by successful urbanism.
At the same time, there is a real concern about provocative 
parades triggering aggressive reaction from groups who 
feel insulted and offended. At a general level, of course, to 
be offended is one of the paradoxical rights in a democratic 
society. Arbitrating this competing set of rights involves 
assessment about the nature and intent of organisations, 
and the judgement is for the whole of society. It is not for 
the partisan consideration of any particular interest. If 
marchers and bands behave like those in the recent past 
outside St Patrick’s church in Belfast, deliberately going 
round in circles, while playing provocative tunes, their 
civic entitlement to city space is forfeited by their own 
irresponsible actions. If on the other hand, they behave 
like their brethren in Derry/Londonderry in more recent 
years, a more consensual acceptance of such festival can 
be cultivated.
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Planning Principles in a Divided Society.
The  adoption of a set of planning principles in a charter for a civic society involves dialogue 
about key concepts that dominate this debate, such as rights, needs, and equality. These 
terms can be deployed to advance partisan political objectives, rather than to achieve 
genuine equity and mutual respect. 
The following principles try to outline an approach to the creation of an open, 
magnanimous society, in which we deal with difference through inclusion:   
No one has a right to claim any territory on behalf of a communal 
identity. All of the city should be considered as shared space.
Since the city as a whole is every resident’s neighbourhood, urban 
policy and planning should be concerned to create a pluralist city for 
a pluralist people -- open, connected, and inter-dependent.  
Civic values of equity, diversity, mutuality, and social cohesion 
should take precedence over those ethnic or community values, 
rooted in tribal partisanship. 
Capacity for such interlocking networks and good relations should 
be cultivated as a central mark of genuine community development.
Initiatives concerning peace-lines and contested spaces should be 
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Development of disadvantaged areas requires a collaborative 
and co-ordinated approach involving cross-community local 
groups working with multi-agency teams to achieve deliverable 
outcomes, reviewed by an informed external body. 
Poor physical connectivity among neighbourhoods, and from 
those neighbourhoods to sites of employment, services and 
education, should be addressed as a priority. Road engineers 
need to acknowledge the role that they should play in helping to 
stitch the fragmented city back together again.
New housing developments need to avoid the replication of 
single identity social and/or religious communities and should 
aim to create mixed neighbourhoods, well-linked to wider city 
opportunities.
Such mixed developments, designed to create high-quality diverse 
communities, should become the model to help break down the 
social and sectarian divisions of existing city neighbourhoods.  
Location of key public services is crucial to their accessibility. 
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The principles above are rooted in a re-examination of 
rights and responsibilities in a divided society. The concept 
of inviolable human rights has for long been prominent in 
democratic political discourse, and behind this notion lies 
related ideas of freedom, justice, and good governance. 
The classical liberal position has tended to emphasise an 
individualistic perspective that focuses on entitlement to 
certain social goods -- the right to free speech; to assemble; 
to self-determination and such like (liberty), whereas 
the socialist perspective tends to underscore collectivist 
solidarity as being the basis for the right from -- the right to 
be secure from poverty, homelessness, and social exclusion 
(equality). Alongside these traditions, is a civic/republican 
stance that argues the importance of bridging these 
sometimes contradictory or competing set of rights with 
social empathy, affinity, and reciprocity, rooted in rapport, 
fellowship, and bonds of common purpose (fraternity). 
Such latter attributes are seen as the ‘social glue’ that 
fastens society as it grapples its way through the frequently 
rival priorities of liberty and equality.   
These perspectives have considerable philosophical 
pedigree. For instance in the modern period, Mill (1859) 
argued for optimal freedom of expression that facilitated 
pursuit of ideas to their logical conclusion, regardless of the 
offense, upset, or embarrassment, caused in the process. 
But, even he recognised that this right was qualified by 
consideration of the ‘harm principle’ -- inviting necessary 
exercise of civilized power to preclude detriment to others. 
More recently, some have stretched this stipulation further 
with an ‘offense principle’ -- though Feinberg (1985) has 
conceded the complexity involved in assessing whether a 
particular professed affront can be actually substantiated. 
Accordingly, he has identified an intricate calculus for 
estimating abusive purpose and impact, including: the 
scope, duration and social benefit of the expression; 
the effort required for its evasion; the objective of the 
promoter; the amount of public offended; the depth 
of distraught caused; and the broader consequence for 
wider society. As considerations, these are instructive. 
As composite  computations, they are impracticable. For 
one thing, in a digital age of netizens as well as citizens, 
estimating the ‘reach’ of any alleged slur or vilification 
would be challenging.
Going back to the ‘dark age’ of medieval history, it 
remained common for curbs on communication to be 
based on claims of heresy and blasphemy. Even yet, 
development in democratic thought over the last two 
centuries has continued to temper absolutist forms of free 
expression with certain eligibilities, concerning perjury, 
slander; obscenity; privacy; security; and, in more recent 
times, hate speech. The latter involves whole groups being 
negatively stereo-typed in ways that spur discriminatory or 
hostile behaviour against them. This suggests that there is a 
potentially pernicious ‘creep’ from abhorrent words about 
a group, to inflamed animosity, to incitement to injurious 
action against them. Yet, legal proof of direct causation or 
intent, of this outcome is highly problematic.    
The persistent conundrum consists in the reconciliation of 
these three distinct tenets. Some insist that such resolution 
is unachievable since they are inherently incompatible. 
For instance, they argue that to secure equality demands 
the oppressive power of the big state that ultimately 
diminishes liberty. In these terms, espousal of equality 
is a denial of individual freedom to be different -- richer, 
cleverer, luckier, and such like -- traits that are innate to 
the human condition. Conversely, others propose that to 
protect effective liberty for vulnerable groups, such as the 
destitute or disabled, demands removal of inequalities that 
sustain their disadvantage.
Recourse to other conciliatory terms, such as fairness, 
offers little prospect of escape from these dilemmas. What 
might be more helpful is the concept of responsibility. 
Sometimes, not exercising your right may be the 
responsible thing to do. For instance, in 1999 in the USA, 
the National Rifle Association (NRA) held a rally in Denver, 
nearby to what had been a recent massacre of children by 
gunmen in Columbine school. While it can be maintained 
that the Association had the right to thus assemble, it can 
be said that its timing and location were highly insensitive. 
Freedom, unrestrained by consideration of negative 
impact on others,  can be an abuse. Conversely, civility 
and courtesy, and related generosity to ‘the other’,  can 
be more persuasive advocates of a position than ramming 
home one’s ‘right’.
Rights and Responsibilities: Sense, Sentiment, and Sensibility
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Whatever of these qualifications, principles such 
as the Rule of Law, and equality before the law, are 
central to arbitration of conflicting claims about 
rights. In Northern Ireland, if a citizen takes a paint 
brush to the public realm, such as cable wall or 
kerbstone, such misconduct can be considered illegal 
criminal damage, subject to potential prosecution. 
Yet, sectarian interests can repeatedly deface the 
built and natural environment with partisan political 
depictions, with apparent impunity. Response to this 
transgression involves no more than common sense 
and civic sensibility. For instance, it is absurd for a 
community to protest about its health deprivation 
if, at the same time, an organisation, claiming to 
act on its behalf, piles old tyres on a bonfire, with 
hazardous carcinogenic consequence.  
Parades, bonfires, murals, public display of flags, and 
such like, occur in space, and have impact on future use 
of space. Thus, they are of significance to planners. Again, 
it shows that disciplines that examine such behaviours -- 
psychology, philosophy, law, sociology -- are relevant to 
planning curriculum and training. To address these issues, 
planners have to work with others, including people in the 
justice system, to help resolve the conflicts around such 
contentious conduct.
In different regard, planners encounter claims and 
counter-claims about housing rights and equality. 
Given the demographic sensitivities and electoral 
impacts, the issue of housing remains central 
to a conflict about territory and identity. But, 
two aspects of this have to be distinctly drawn. 
People categorised in housing need have a right to 
affordable accommodation. But, they do not have 
a right to determine the particular location of that 
housing. Commonly, voices from within each of the 
main traditions speak of their community’s housing 
need, and seek to get that need met in proximity 
to, if not contiguity with, their existing community. 
Concession to that claim would unintentionally 
reproduce sectarian geographies, and could become 
complicit in a process whereby each bloc tries to 
extend its spatial sphere of influence in unremitting 
rivalry for territorial dominance.
 
In such a way, housing policy becomes less about its 
important features -- such as attending to genuine 
need, quality design, mixed tenure, and socially 
diverse residence --- and more about reinforcing 
segregation and separatism. 
For planners, this pattern is tied into the administrative 
spatial units, used to estimate in part social housing delivery 
and management. If designated ‘Housing Districts’ are 
overwhelmingly of one religious/political persuasion, it may 
skew the way ‘waiting list’ data show up a preponderance 
of need on one side of the community divide in that locale. 
Whereas, if the geography for assessing such housing 
requirement is extended, the results for differential need 
may prove to be different, perhaps showing a more even 
split between the two main traditions.   
But again, these disputes are tied in with contesting 
definitions of equality. The on-going ‘Rights Camp’, in 
Ardoyne’s Twadell interface, adopts terms like ‘rights’ 
and ‘equality’ that have been long associated with their 
political opponents, and uses them to present a picture of 
Protestants being suppressed and treated unfairly, relative 
to Catholics, in a drip-drip erosion of their British identity. 
But, in this endeavour, they conflate unionism with 
Protestantism and Loyalism -- the PUL identity, which is a 
sectarian exclusion of any potential Catholic adherents to 
a unionist politics. On the other side, equality is presented 
by Sinn Fein President, Mr Adams, as a ‘Trojan horse’ to 
wider republican objectives, or as expressed by another 
leading republican:
“We want to build sustainable economic growth 
across the island. We intend to achieve this by tackling 
inequality, and that means ending partition. We 
cannot deliver an equal society when partition ensures 
that Ireland is unequal” (Alex Maskey, 2015, p.4)
This view tends to suggest that equality within Northern 
Ireland is inherently unobtainable, since the equality 
objective has to be seen in an all-Ireland frame, thereby 
claiming ‘equality’ as a preserve of a particular political 
cause that is subject to dispute in the island. A viable form 
of planning has to challenge these partisan interpretations 
of key concepts underpinning a real shared society.
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Changing Chicago and its Ghettos
As the third most populous US urban centre with 2.8mn 
people in the city and 9mn in the metropolitan area, Chicago 
stands out in many respects: its modernist skyscraper built 
environment; the genesis of a distinctive urban sociology 
that addressed the impact of ethnic diversity, and with 
forms of community activism exemplified in Alinsky’s 
concepts of ‘people power’. Moreover, its tradition of 
ambitious and comprehensive city-building that exudes 
urban optimism has been rooted in Burnham’s pioneering 
1909 Plan of Chicago, with its expansive grid development 
and major infrastructural and ‘public space’ projects.   
However, following its notable growth from the early 
20th century, Chicago experienced typical post-war de-
centralisation, with centrifugal forms of suburbanisation 
and manufacturing job re-location, and later by the 1970s, 
de-industrialisation. 
In more recent times, downtown Chicago has been 
significantly remade. Grand public projects, particularly 
along the lakefront from Navy Pier through to the half 
billion dollar Millennium Park to the Field Museum and 
Soldier Field and round to an expanded McCormick Place, 
have all carried a daring signature of new city capacity for 
recreation, culture, heritage, and tourism. Advocates of 
this inventive and magnet urbanism emphasise its essential 
democratic and levelling character, with free public arenas 
such as Millennium Park, with its distinctive architecture, 
public art, and urban landscaping transforming a largely 
derelict site into Chicago’s version of New York’s Central 
Park. Accompanying these dramatic urban statements 
have been strategic programmes of environmental 
improvement, including significant tree and flower 
planting, to ‘green’ and beautify the central city. 
But such dramatic re-shaping of the city has its sceptics, 
who emphasise that behind the re-cast urban façade lie 
persistent realities of social and racial discrimination, 
evident in problem social housing and under-achieving 
public schools. Indeed, a different reading of this 
spectacular change sees greater delineation between 
prosperous areas stretching from the Gold Coast in the 
north to the gentrified parts of Michigan Avenue in the 
south and concentrated spaces of deprivation and race in 
places like the city’s Southside, home to a high share of 
Chicago’s African Americans. 
The racial divide is not black and white. It is now 36 percent 
black; 31 percent white; and 28 percent Hispanic, with 
the remaining 5 percent largely Asian. The most poverty-
intensive neighbourhoods are disproportionately inhabited 
by racial and ethnic groups. Chicago has been long infamous 
for its forbidding public housing. As expressed by Popkin 
(2010, p.44):
“Decades of failed federal policies, managerial 
incompetence, financial malfeasance, and basic 
neglect had left its developments in an advanced state 
of decay. Conditions inside the developments were 
appalling, with crime and violence overwhelming and 
gang dominance nearly absolute”.
Having tried in vain to make positive impact on this 
embedded poverty through various modestly-funded 
urban compensatory programmes since the War on Poverty 
era of the mid-60s, the city government in the last two 
decades decided on a radically different tack. Since 1999, 
Chicago has adopted the Plan for Transformation to tackle 
its distressed public housing, including targets to demolish 
all 53 high rise buildings, comprising almost 21,000 of the 
city’s 39,000 units of public housing. In their place, the 
Housing Authority planned to create 25000 housing units 
in mostly mixed-income developments, and by the end 
of 2009, the plan was on course to have revitalized 71.7 
percent of this target, with total completion expected 
within the following decade. Importantly, the objective was 
not merely to alter the image and use of public housing, 
with more efficient occupancy rates, rent collection, 
and maintenance of property values. While purportedly 
offering enhanced housing opportunity for low-income 
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Figure 29: Cabrini Green before (above) and after redevelopment. 
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families, this was connected to a goal to move ‘dependent’ 
families from welfare to work, with linked workforce 
development and related services, and additional supports 
such as counselling and guidance in accessing services like 
child day-care. 
The comprehensive strategy has included a ‘compliance’ 
scheme for former tenants of demolished projects, as they 
now have to earn ‘eligibility’ for allocation to the improved 
replacement units by meeting the ‘work requirement’. 
Generally, working age adults have to be in job training, 
education, and/or regular employment for a minimum 
of 15 hours per week in the first eighteen months, and 
subsequently for 20 hours per week. Other criteria embrace 
evidence of law-abiding behaviour and absence of, or 
therapy for, drug addiction. Thus, the citizen ‘right’ to good 
affordable housing, regardless of income, is supplanted by 
a ‘responsibility’ to show worthiness for social housing, via 
a rehabilitated capacity to co-habit neighbourhoods with 
those of higher income.  
With demolition, and lower density social housing 
designed to fit in with mixed-tenured quality development 
schemes, some former residents have been displaced, and 
given subsidy by way of vouchers to access the wider rental 
market. Yet alongside this major dislocation, the idea of 
‘building community’ in mixed-income developments 
contains four appealing dimensions: (1) positive social 
relationships among residents across incomes; (2) creation 
of safe, inclusive, and diverse community, supported by 
quality housing and amenities; (3) encouragement for 
raising individual aspiration, access to opportunity, socio-
economic well-being, and civic responsibility; and (4) scope 
for reducing prejudiced and racist attitudes and behaviour 
among residents. 
Interestingly, in much of the policy documents outlining 
these agendas, very little direct reference is made to 
race per se. Instead, the term ‘mixed income’ is used as 
a proxy, showing a familiar failing in public policy in these 
regards to address candidly the divisions that under-pin 
the pattern of segregation. Subsequent assessment of 
these deliberate strategies for residential integration raises 
scepticism about progress, particularly in regard to creating 
a sustained diverse sociability (Chaskin, Joseph, and Khare, 
2009).  Meanwhile, the effort to deconcentrate poverty 
and desegregate racial groupings, under the framework of 
mixed-income settlements, may further shrink the stock of 
affordable rental accommodation.
Thus, the Chicago initiative can be seen to be 
‘transformative’, given its innovative and radical character. 
But, the social costs of its informal ‘eviction’ of some 
poor residents, its emphasis on marketising these former 
blighted areas, and the limited progress of its social 
engineering for better relations among diverse residents 
raise difficult questions that relate to a long-standing 
challenge of how to regenerate without gentrifying out 
the ethnic character and presence of sizeable sections of 
the deprived. In Chicago’s example, mixed communities 
can still ‘hide’ continued segregation within. This dilemma 
poses ambivalence about a viable strategy. Doing the 
same failing things repeatedly is a futile option. But, 
embarking on place-making that is genuinely concerned 
about development in a place as well as development of a 
place requires investment in patient community capacity-
building as well as in physical renewal, particularly in areas 
that have endured intensive inter-generational poverty. 
Such reservation suggests that in cities deeply divided on 
social, ethnic, or ethno-national lines, housing strategy 
designed to promote greater integration has to pay heed 
to possible inadvertent impact such as: a reduction of 
public housing stock; potential raised rent levels for 
remaining tenants; land valorisation that can accentuate 
the displacement aspects of gentrification; the sacrificing 
of viable community infrastructure and solidarities that 
can attend massive demolition programmes; the way that 
dispersing the poor into other fragile neighbourhoods can 
be a ‘tipping point’ that jeopardises the survival of those 
areas; the contested concept of ‘proper’ neighbourhood 
behavioural standards; and the reluctance to address the 
issue of race and division more directly. 
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The following outlines a new framework for local 
development, and the particular priorities that derive from 
that. Then, in exploring how such a new approach would 
impact on particular development schemes, it proceeds to 
examine the important role of anchor institutions in this 
new model, finally examining how all of this would assist in 
developing an innovative response to urban policy, such as 
anti-deprivation strategies.  
Local Development Planning
The development plan is a key component of what was 
described in the introduction as ‘broad planning’. In the 
context of new legislation each of the new local authorities 
is likely to produce its own Local Development Plan (LDP). 
But what might a new development planning process look 
like and how would it respond to the range of challenges 
identified in this research? A number of points can be made 
in this regard. Although these largely relate to Belfast City 
Council, they are transferable to the other 10 new local 
authorities.
A New Conception of Planning
As noted before, there needs to be a paradigm shift away 
from the minimalist, largely non-interventionist land-
use planning to a form of spatial planning that captures 
and gives expression to the development of place. The 
concept of place is key to good planning, but place is about 
the experience of everyday life and cannot be properly 
addressed by a regulatory land-use system. Everyday life 
is experienced three-dimensionally: it is about the quality 
of the streets and spaces we traverse day and daily; it 
is about our health, but not just where we put health 
facilities, but also how we design and develop the city to 
encourage walking and cycling; it is about education and 
the role that spatial planning can play in facilitating the 
development of schools and learning centres that respond 
to the challenges of greater sharing and integration, as well 
as the unacceptable high levels of under-achievement; 
it is about work and access to work, and how we can 
reduce the dependence on car commuting and provide 
good connections that are walkable and are particularly 
accessible for disadvantaged communities; and, of course, 
the experience of everyday life includes how we use and 
enjoy our leisure time - outdoor spaces and the public 
realm generally are crucial here. Again, quality, access and 
management are key components of this.   
Significantly too, and in light of this research, we need to 
ask about what sort of places we want our cities and towns 
to be. What are our aspirations?  If TBUC and other local 
and regional ambitions are to be realised, then there is a 
broad aspiration for creating a more shared and integrated 
society. The key question for planning is about how this is 
captured and given expression in the new development 
plans and in other complementary local regeneration 
initiatives.  A plan designed to respond to these challenges 
would look very different to the traditional development 
plans that have been produced in the past in Northern 
Ireland.   
What Changes in Development Plan 
Preparation are Needed?  
Traditional planning practice undertakes research as part 
of the development plan and policy making process. This is 
mostly a technocratic process that involves the examination 
of land-use trends and future needs for categories such 
as population and households, offices and retailing, car-
parking and traffic. However, to achieve the above, a very 
different research agenda is required. This requires other 
layers of analysis including: spatial analysis of the changing 
patterns of ethno-religious and social geography; urban 
design analysis such as the structure and form of the city 
and the quality of access and connection, as well as the 
barriers; and the distribution of key services such as health, 
education and open space facilities. All of this needs to be 
strongly underpinned by meaningful public consultations 
that connect planning to everyday life and to people’s 
aspirations for their town or city.
This research has also shown that for many communities, 
particularly deprived communities, traditional planning has 
been an irrelevance. As with much of the wider population, 
planning is simply understood as the regulation of planning 
applications. A new planning, and one that embraces the 
notion of creating place, needs to consider how it can be 
relevant to local communities. This, in turn, prompts the 
question of how the neighbourhood can relate to the town 
or city. In the context of the development of a city plan, for 
example, what role can the neighbourhood play? 
How Can a New Planning Model be Developed?
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Again, this research would suggest that in relation 
to territorial geographies, be they ethno-religious or 
social, that single identity, small scale neighbourhood 
planning and regeneration should be avoided. 
Otherwise, there is the possibility, albeit unintended, 
of reinforcing exclusivity and territory. If we want to 
create an open and connected city, that is, as Jane 
Jacobs suggested, everyone’s neighbourhood, then 
we have to think carefully about the geography 
of local initiative and how local aspirations can be 
linked to city aspirations. What this might mean in 
practice is that the aims of the city plan are captured 
and given expression at local level. For example, if 
one aim of the Local Development Plan and/or City 
Community Plan is to create a shared environment, 
then the challenge locally is how to manifest this 
through local actions and initiatives. 
A changed approach to the research and content of 
development plans consequently requires, as noted 
earlier, multidisciplinary teams with the appropriate skills 
and understanding of issues that planning hasn’t tackled 
before. While mainstream planners have a focus on 
‘appropriate’ spatial patterning, others can bring other 
layers of understanding and analysis that can enrich the 
process and outcomes. Urban designers are particularly 
important because they bring skills in the examination 
of the structure, form and connectivity of places. If 
we want to create more shared and connected places 
then this dimension of analysis is crucial. Critically too, 
we need health and education experts to feed into our 
understanding of the role that spatial development can play 
in meeting health and education objectives. And of course, 
we need economists who can offer the development plan 
process an analysis of the economic impact of different 
spatial solutions. Moreover, in order to generate local 
community interest and involvement in a new Planning, 
then community development experts should also be part 
of the team.
A More Co-ordinated Approach to 
Planning and Regeneration?
This action-research project has confirmed the view, held by 
many, that the lack of co-ordination between government 
department and agencies has had a detrimental impact 
on good planning and regeneration. The shift of some 
responsibilities to the new eleven local authorities offers 
the possibility of dealing with this, at least in part. A 
number of key services such as housing, education, health 
and transport will remain the responsibility of central 
(Stormont) government. However, spatial planning as 
a local government responsibility can become the key 
mechanism for better co-ordination. 
An example here is the rather un-coordinated range of 
major developments scheduled for inner north Belfast. 
These include the University of Ulster campus, a number of 
student housing schemes, the York Street Interchange, City 
Quays development and Royal Exchange. Responsibilities 
for these extend across various Government Departments 
including Regional Development, Social Development, 
Employment and Learning, Environment and Culture, Arts 
and Leisure. An overall plan is required for this area in order 
to maximise the outcomes, particularly the synergetic 
outcomes for local neighbourhoods and, of course, for 
the city as a whole. City Council should take responsibility 
for this. It needs to assert its authority to achieve better 
planning outcomes for the city. 
In this context, it is important to note that ultimately most 
developments in the city, or indeed in any of the new 
local authorities, will require planning permission. If we 
are moving away from a site by site process of planning 
determination to a more co-ordinated approach which 
emphasises city needs and developer contribution to 
supportive infrastructures, then development management 
(formerly development control) has a crucial role to play. 
 
Linking Community Planning to Spatial 
Planning   
A key innovation in the new planning arrangements at local 
government level, is the statutory link between spatial 
planning and community planning. If, in broad terms, 
community planning is about capturing a long term vision 
for the city and delivering it through co-ordinated service 
deliveries, then how can this be complemented and 
strengthened by spatial planning processes? This question 
needs to be asked at every level of the process, but certainly, 
based on good practice elsewhere, the spatial plan should 
give expression to the main aims of the community plan. 
An example here might be the community plan’s aim 
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to improve and support ‘good relations’ across various 
sectors. A key challenge for the Local Development Plan, 
and indeed any local planning or regeneration scheme, is 
how to capture and give expression to this spatially. At city 
or local authority level, this might suggest that the LDP has 
a specific shared space strategy, for example. 
Another illustration relates back to the previous discussion 
on health. Firstly, it noted the importance of having in-
house design professionals who can ensure the delivery of 
quality buildings and external environments. Such people 
can help translate the ambitions of community planning 
into spatial planning and regeneration outcomes and 
indeed connect spatial planning objectives to better co-
ordinated service delivery. Secondly, given the context of 
a divided city, the spatial location of facilities is crucial if 
we want to encourage safe and comfortable access for all 
communities. This leads to a third point about procurement. 
Identifying appropriate, accessible sites for key facilities 
should not be constrained by ownership issues. It is more 
important to get the right site in the right location than to 
be tied to existing sites in agency ownership. Compulsory 
purchase processes should be used for this purpose. 
Lastly, as noted elsewhere in this report, there is a major 
problem about the definition of community. If we default 
to territorial communities in the context of planning, then 
we are likely to simply reinforce ongoing division, both 
ethno-religious and indeed social. Community planning 
and spatial planning offer opportunities to redefine what 
we mean by community - arguably a definition that will 
broaden the geography to capture the ambition of a more 
united city that bridges divides and dilutes spatial territory. 
If a new approach to planning includes facing the challenges 
of an ethno-religious and socially divided society, then 
opportunities to address these will be most apparent 
in new development areas. In Belfast, for example, the 
long term decline of population in the inner and central 
city has generated new thinking about residential-led 
regeneration initiatives. This presents an opportunity to 
create a new approach to planning and development. First, 
a co-ordinated strategy is required that is underpinned by a 
vision of the sort of inner/central city we want. This would 
be a very different approach to the market-led initiatives 
of the past. Rather, the vision would translate into a broad 
masterplan that includes the sort of infrastructure that a 
‘new’ place needs. Schools, open spaces, health facilities 
and reconfigured walkable streets and spaces would 
provide the visionary frame for private sector investment. 
But more than this, the development of such a new place 
should ensure that this is a ‘mixed’ environment. In other 
words, there would be a mix of old and young; small 
The importance of multi-
disciplinary teams and 
inclusive engagement. 
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households and larger households; Catholic, Protestant 
and others; and of course, social residential as well as 
private residential. 
As noted earlier, a lot can be learned from good practice 
elsewhere. And this is not necessarily just about the 
specific spatial problems identified in this report. Rather, 
good planning practice is a prerequisite for the sort of 
ambitions and interventions advocated here. Crucially, it is 
one that acknowledges the necessity of both co-ordination 
and strong leadership. The successful regeneration of 
Nottingham city centre is testimony to this. Professional and 
bureaucratic separations may offer certain administrative 
efficiencies. However, in order to maximise effective 
interventions to achieve real progress on the ground, 
then issues must be tackled in the round. Decades of 
separate administrations in Northern Ireland undertaking 
separate tasks has delivered: road schemes surrounded 
by vacant, unplanned land; housing regeneration lacking 
wider facilities; commercial regeneration without mixed 
use development and all the ‘unintended consequences’ 
of narrow decision making that is overly focused on 
one dimension of one site. Moreover, there is growing 
evidence from Continental Europe that a more proactive 
and interventionist form of planning can induce developer 
confidence and achieve significant socio-economic 
outcomes (Lord, et al, 2015).
To address these kind of deficiencies, the ‘new planning’ can:
• acknowledge more openly the big issue of the sectarian spatial divide, and how it is sometimes augmented 
by physical infrastructure. This includes: analysis of changing patterns of segregation; the negative impacts 
of peace walls; and issues of accessibility and linkage, hindered by impermeable estates and road schemes, 
and the impact of all these spatial features on the functioning of an integrated society;
• overcome and address the deficiencies of past practices which separated a range of key planning 
functions such as roads, housing and regeneration. Critically, in terms of this research, roads planning and 
management needs to be integrated into the broader planning process given its crucial role in helping 
to create well connected places characterised by shared civic spaces including streets. Although the new 
Councils have limited powers, the planning function can exercise a significant degree of control over other 
functions in order to achieve more integrated outcomes;
• consider the city/wider town area as the ‘neighbourhood’, for the purpose of an ‘administrative unit’, 
whereby analysis of need, functioning, etc., and related intervention, are  undertaken at a wider geography, 
since deeply divided societies can produce too much divisive localism in relation to resource allocation, 
especially with regard to social housing;
• set strategic objectives and delivery targets to remove interfaces, reduce segregation, and promote shared 
neighbourhoods, as precisely stated priorities for the plan strategy;
• appraise the social sustainability of locating new single-identity, social housing-only schemes, in areas 
already afflicted with multiple deprivation, and how such ghettoisation impacts on the spatial concentration 
of poverty;
• in the Local Policies Plan, focus new public amenities in locations that are accessible to all communities, 
especially those near interface locations;
• in the Local Policies Plan, adopt policy flexibility in interface locations to allow for temporary uses in ways 
that ‘normalise’ what otherwise would be dead ‘no man’s lands’, and also to facilitate re-use of vacant 
buildings and unused sites;
• re-humanise the city by creating more passive city centre spaces, calming traffic and improving walkability 
and cycling facilities; and
• deploy vesting powers for regeneration agendas to counter limits of ‘ad-hocery’.
The question is how would this approach to planning impact on specific development proposals, particularly 
in sensitive locations, such as Girdwood in North Belfast, and how would it engage serious civic stakeholders in 
a new approach to development, including new ways to tackle persistent problems like poverty. The following 
three examples sketch a way forward in this endeavour.
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When the Ministry of Defence vacated Girdwood 
Barracks, an important site adjoining the Crumlin Road 
prison in North Belfast, its future development was 
destined to be subject to protracted and contentious 
negotiation. Just over 15 years ago, some of this 
report’s authors were commissioned to draw up a 
development brief for the Crumlin Road Prison, and 
their consultations with a range of local stakeholders, 
across the community divide, demonstrated the 
feasibility of a consensual approach to developing 
the facility as a social/educational/cultural centre, a 
proposal which subsequently came to pass. The core 
disagreement centred on the possibility of any new 
housing around the site, and indicated the highly 
sensitive issue of new housing; its relative allocation 
to each side of the community; and the electoral 
implication of a resultant demographic change in 
the locality. Furthermore, the study emphasised 
the importance of using all the potential of this site 
and related facilities such as the Courthouse, and 
the immediate arterial routes, to regenerate North 
Belfast in ways that connected it into the wider city. 
In the intervening period up to recently, proposals for 
Girdwood were to go back and forward, in what 
was effectively an impasse, due to the lack of 
cross-community  agreement. For instance, in 
2007, the North Belfast Community Action Unit 
(NBCAU), an agency within the Department of Social 
Development, set up an Advisory Panel to examine 
future development of the Barracks site. It concluded 
that the vision should be for an international quality 
development, which offered inclusive and mixed use, 
with access by both communities, and one that paid 
regard to values of equality, diversity, and a shared 
society. Despite widespread subsequent consultations, 
agreed decision about what precise form this should 
take proved elusive. By 2011, Department of Social 
Development Minister, Mr Attwood, made proposals 
for 200 houses, only for there to be a decision by his 
successor, Mr McCausland, not to so proceed, on 
the basis that the proposal was in conflict with an 
objective to achieve shared space. 
1: Example of a ‘Different Girdwood’
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This contrast reflected views associated with each 
side of the community: the mainly Catholic argument 
for more housing to meet need, and the mainly 
Protestant concern that more housing, most of which 
would likely accommodate Catholics, might impact 
negatively on Protestant areas like Lower Oldpark, 
and take away the possibility of more neutral or 
shared space, and thereby threaten to ignite new 
flashpoints around this locale. Other voices, such as 
the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, argued that 
meeting housing need should not rely on a single 
site, but rather that the site’s development should 
be framed within a more comprehensive strategy 
for the wider area.  Also, the agency had previously 
emphasised that any new housing should be mixed 
tenure.
Essentially, these different perspectives reflected 
a tension within Section 75 of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998, which speaks of the duty to promote 
equality, while at the same time having regard to the 
desirability of promoting good relations, though it is 
understood by the Equality Commission that pursuit 
of the latter objective should not validate failure to 
comply with the primary duty of delivering equality. 
It shows how concepts such as ‘equality’ and ‘shared 
future’ can be taken up by each community as a 
convenient leverage for their own advocacy. In this 
case, broadly speaking, the Protestant side could 
argue that pursuit of ‘equality’, that effectively 
favoured a greater Catholic presence on the site, 
was contrary to promotion of good relations and a 
shared future. By contrast, the Catholic side could 
argue that sustainable good relations depended upon 
implementation of equality. 
Figure 30: Belfast City Council proposal for the Girdwood area prepared by Michael Whitley Architects. 
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Controversy, expressed in these indivisible terms, 
promotes a zero-sum outcome of deadlock and delay. 
Moreover, it can be speculated that attaining political 
agreement about a site like Girdwood can be drawn 
into a ‘trade-off’ deal about other sensitive sites, like 
the Maze/Long Kesh -- making for a bigger game at 
stake.
Most recently, the development scheme for the site 
includes housing that is near New Lodge, and is likely 
to be Catholic, and housing near Lower Oldpark, likely 
to be Protestant, with a Community Hub in between, 
funded by the Belfast City Council and European 
PEACE 3 money. At this stage, the housing will be 
mainly, if not totally, social housing. Without under-
estimating the difficulty of achieving cross-community 
agreement, this scheme is set to pose great challenge 
for a shared future. The housing reproduces the social 
and sectarian geographies of class and ethnic space in 
the city, while the Community Hub has no common 
‘community’, and is likely in the foreseeable future to 
act more as a buffer zone between each side. What 
a disappointing outcome this is for such a crucial 
location, a significant lost opportunity that exposes 
the shallowness of rhetoric about shared futures.
Our critique here is not to under-estimate the 
sterling work undertaken by North Talks Too --- 
a cross-interface partnership, embracing Lower 
Shankill, Lower Oldpark, and Lower Cliftonville. 
This initiative seeks to enable ‘residents and young 
people to develop an understanding of neighbouring 
communities, helping to improve relations and 
respect; and reduce conflict and tension’ (North Talks 
Too, (undated) Peace building on the Frontline, p. 3). 
Working with the Belfast City Council and relevant 
government agencies and voluntary groups, they are 
in the process of developing a Shared Space Action 
Plan for Girdwood, based on the need for local 
residents to share the socio-economic dividend of 
Girdwood’s regeneration. From their recent residents’ 
survey, they have found that over 80% of those 
questioned approve of the Community Hub as a space 
to be shared and managed by both communities. In 
taking this vision forward, detached youth workers in 
the area have been developing a Youth Forum, as the 
basis for involving young people in this enterprise. 
Such local campaigning can potentially transform the 
amenities in the area for sustained cross-community 
engagement and collaboration.
The development framework proposed here offers 
prospect of greater ambition than settling for such 
familiar ‘balkanisation’. The principles, values, and 
priorities underpinning it would emphasise the 
following precepts:
• needs analysis would be in bigger geographies that 
avoid looking to one site as a solution to meeting 
existing local accommodation requirement;
• compliance with good planning that embeds 
diversity, mixed-use, mixed tenure, and good 
relations, would avoid the reproduction of 
sectarian enclaves;
• situating the development in a comprehensive 
scheme that addresses its ‘fit’ with the rest of 
the city, underlined by the value of quality design 
of international merit, would make for more 
inspirational vision, offering greater coherence 
and inclusion;
• appreciating the site’s history and symbolism, 
would bring in more concern about conservation 
and restoration. The ‘spine’ of the development 
--- Cliftonpark Avenue, and the once grid street 
pattern adjoining it, such as Roe, Avonbeg, 
Annalee, streets -- use to be, back in the 1960s, 
mixed income and mixed religion in residence. 
Even a ‘back to the future’ perspective would have 
recognised the realistic ambition of re-creating 
this character, and the pre-figurative ‘push’ this 
would have given to developing a more shared 
city;
• transparent engagement with local stakeholders 
and wider civic interests would offer greater 
protection from decisions becoming political 
‘trade-offs’, concerned with electoral geographies, 
rather than good place-making.
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Universities are high profile, resource-rich urban 
institutions, enjoying social status, and benefiting from 
the institutional continuity that facilitates forward 
strategic planning. Unlike many other forms of economic 
investment, they are more ‘rooted’ to place. To their local 
urban-regions, they can provide civic leadership, together 
with significant economic multipliers in terms of their 
consumption and employment. Moreover, their role in 
the local property market can be significant. For instance, 
in Belfast, in terms of real estate value and share of listed 
buildings, Queen’s University ranks high among the top 
property holders in the city. Moreover, Ulster University 
is significantly increasing its campus on the north side of 
the city centre, giving potential for a ‘university corridor’ 
between the two institutions. 
Use of their applied research can help to clarify and to 
redress social problems, while their role in knowledge, 
skills and technology transfer can support capacity-
building and self-help within the community. In the shift 
to the integrated development of spatial planning, their 
cross-disciplinary perspectives can penetrate the linked 
dimensions of sustainable local development. 
Comparative policy analysis can illustrate on an 
internationally comparative basis the good practice that 
has been most transformative. Moreover, academy can 
support the urban networking that underpins effective 
social capital, and, particularly in the case of contested 
societies, it can provide a safe dialogic space for difficult 
discourses between protagonists, with university 
facilitation where appropriate. The scholarship that links 
teaching to community needs enriches the student learning 
experience, in the same way that student community 
service also provides participants with a ‘real life’ learning 
arena that connects theory to practice.
2: Optimizing Anchor Urban Institutions --- the Example of the 
University: not only IN the city, but OF the city
Within a now more marketised context, public policy prioritises three goals for the university sector that do 
not always sit comfortably together: raise academic standards; improve equality of access across the social 
classes; and extend the global reach and reputation of research. This search for both excellence and equity can 
lead to some contentious resource decisions. In a wider sphere, increased emphasis attached to the sector’s 
role in advancing the UK’s competitiveness in the new globalised economy could demote other potential 
agendas for the academy, such as working with under-developed communities to promote greater social 
equity and inclusion.
Universities increasingly attempt to be global in their 
purpose and profile because they recognise the imperative 
to be internationally competitive. In essence, they are 
competing with each other for staff; resources to attain 
state-of-the-art facility and technology; research grants; 
market-based and patented spin-offs; and, finally, 
international students, particularly post-graduates, who 
provide the most lucrative fees. But, this keenness to be 
global in focus has tended to imply that the local is no 
longer an appropriate arena for world-class research. This 
shift in agenda has to be set against the university’s typical 
three main tasks: teaching, research and service to the 
community. Often the latter has been residualised, relative 
to the core status of the other two, and the three have 
tended to function separately rather than supportively. 
Certainly, in recent times, there has been a re-awakening 
about the pertinence and potential of academy for society, 
and of the reciprocal benefits involved in links between the 
two. For instance, the increased attention paid to research 
impact is part of this shift.
Moving from Stereotype to Partnership
The strengths and weaknesses within both campus and 
community can prompt each side to stereotype the other, 
leading to a dialogue of the deaf between ‘the remote 
ivory tower’ and ‘the ever demanding ever complaining 
community’. US experience suggests that beyond such 
misunderstandings, partnerships can be built between the 
two interests:
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 ● mutual understanding of the respective ‘worlds’ of 
community development and academia requires 
continuous investment and sensitivity; 
 ● differences in interest, culture, class and power need 
to be openly acknowledged;
 ● productive division of responsibility between partners 
that may, for instance, separate roles in academic 
research and community advocacy, can be helpful. 
But, this should not deny the integrity of participatory 
action-research, which involves a total integration of 
both partners in the process; 
 ● institutional support and ‘imprimaturs’ from the 
leadership of both partners are required for a long-
term strategic alliance;
 ● progress in the relationship demands patient processes 
of capacity-building within both partners; and
 ● overall, a written protocol between the two sides 
is useful ––– laying out in clear detail the mutual 
obligations and supports, so that ambiguities and 
confusion do not confound the relationship. 
Engaged Urban Universities 
As indicated earlier, in the 21st century, there are many 
pressures on universities to rethink their mission. In 
considering what this new role might be, it is instructive 
to re-visit the three models of academy that have 
predominated to date:
1. the ‘ivory tower’ model of detachment from the wider 
society is no longer tenable. This ‘Platonic’ concept of 
elitist and contemplative learning sites the university as 
‘a place apart’. 
2. the ‘service’ model sees a modest role for the 
university in encouraging staff to respond voluntarily 
to requests from deprived communities for assistance 
and expertise. In this approach, the power, status and 
discretion rest exclusively with the institution. 
3. the ‘outreach’ model has the academy as more 
proactive in extending itself into city and community. 
Indeed, often it will set up ‘offices of extension’ to 
coordinate the delivery of such expertise. But, the 
‘outreach’ perspective risks being paternalistic and 
restrictive, assuming that the dynamic is between a 
brimful ‘jug’ of knowledge and grateful empty ‘mugs’ 
of relative ignorance. 
Queen’s University Belfast - moving to an engaged institution?
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The radical alternative to these standard models is that of 
the ‘engaged’ university, one that seeks an equitable and 
mutually supportive relationship between academy and 
wider community. In essence, this model seeks to transform 
the relationship between the two in the production and 
application of knowledge. Traditional and simplistic 
dichotomies between the ‘experiential’ knowledge of 
community and ‘formal’ knowledge of the academy are 
dissolved, as both parties explore a new synthesis of 
how collaboratively they can compose, exchange and 
use knowledge. Indeed, in the complex environments 
that constitute contemporary city-regions, this process 
acknowledges the synergy between traditional and non-
traditional sites of knowledge. Institutional outreach to 
the community and city is complemented by civic in-reach 
to the academy. A protocol between the two enshrines 
commitment to a long-term strategic partnership, involving 
not only the minority of staff already attached to such 
work, but rather the very core of the university. 
But, behind these kinds of explorations and 
arrangements, evidence from practice elsewhere, 
such as the US experience outlined earlier, suggests 
that the following platform is needed:
1. the ‘imprimatur’ from the university 
authorities to endorse and support this mission.
2. corresponding systems of recognition and 
reward that give staff incentive to participate.
3. the appropriate structures to facilitate inter-
disciplinary collaboration –– perhaps, a distinctive 
Institute charged with clustering staff for periods 
of secondment for such research projects, and 
resolving any dilemmas around attributions for the 
Research Assessment Exercise.
4.  long-term partnerships / memoranda of 
understanding between the institution as a whole 
and leading community and civic agencies.   
Encountering the Reservations
Given the financial and globalising imperatives faced by 
universities at present, these ideas will probably encounter 
scepticism and resistance. It may appear that universities 
face hard choices. For instance, they can take comfort in 
their traditions or embrace the risks of change. But, given 
that change is all around –– the shift to new economy; 
the re-invention of governance; the re-alignment of 
welfare towards mixed funding and provision; and the 
transformation of community –– it would be foolhardy of 
the university to seek insulation from this general dynamic. 
So, there is no respite in ‘enclave’. Indeed, the apparent 
choice as to whether to operate behind academic walls, or 
whether to be open for engagement is, in fact, an illusory 
choice. 
Related to this, given the myriad new sites of research, 
information, and learning, there is no real choice about 
whether to be involved in exclusive or inclusive forms of 
knowledge creation and distribution. Only the latter will 
produce a credible epistemology in the contemporary 
period.  Similarly, other apparent choices on offer ––– 
for instance, between the local and global research 
agendas ––– are not, in fact, so dichotomous. Good local 
research, rooted in a problem-solving methodology, with 
appropriate international comparative, has global worth 
and transferability. In short, an urban institution like 
a university, does not enhance its global ambitions by 
abandoning the local ‘urban’ component, as if it was some 
kind of virtual campus. Rather, seen from this perspective, 
the city-region is its major asset, its international 
recognition and ‘calling card’. Yet, academy and city can 
be both partners and protagonists, and this ambivalence 
is evident in recent discourses in the US around the theme 
of ‘the university as an urban developer’.
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As indicated earlier, Spatial Deprivation studies in Belfast 
have been undertaken for almost four decades (see for 
example: Belfast Areas of Special Social Need, 2007) and 
all have shown certain places immersed in permanent 
deprivation. Indeed, in all regional deprivation research 
between 1994 and 2010 (1994, 2001, 2005 and 2010), 
around 40% of its wards (about 35% of its population) have 
been consistently in Northern Ireland’s most deprived 
decile, even though the city contains only 17% of the 
regional population. Moreover, the expansion of the city 
into its 2014 format will only continue the problem since it 
will include some of the most deprived Super Output Areas 
currently beyond its boundary. This consistent appearance 
amongst the region’s most deprived spaces has survived 
successive rounds of urban initiatives  and special 
programmes, suggesting, at least, the need to complement 
such with something radical and tailored specifically to the 
particular needs of Belfast.
A City Anti-Poverty Strategy
The Belfast City Council has been concerned with this 
problem for some time, having commissioned a Belfast 
Poverty Study in 2008 and holding, in January 2014, a 
Poverty Forum that attracted almost 200 participants. 
Tackling poverty undoubtedly features in the preparation of 
the city’s Community Plan. There is, however, an urgency in 
addressing the issue, particularly since work commissioned 
from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (OFMDFM, 2013 and 
TBUC, 2013) suggests that fiscal austerity and welfare 
reform will impact most severely on the growing numbers 
of those with lowest incomes falling into poverty. Other 
research from NICVA (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013) points 
to the particular vulnerability of the city to welfare 
reform, estimating a loss of £840 per working age adult. 
The size of this figure has been challenged, but even the 
low estimate (about £450) would have dramatic income 
impact. Admittedly, welfare reform was deadlocked  in 
the Assembly and certainly, there are important regional 
initiatives (The Social Investment Fund, Delivering Social 
Change and the Child Poverty Strategy), but the history 
of deprivation in Belfast suggests that, unless poor 
households and deprived areas are the focus of additional 
effort, a problem of considerable intensity and duration 
will remain.
The new shape of public administration in Northern 
Ireland gives the Council a dramatic opportunity to re-
imagine the city as a competitive, inclusive and cohesive 
place. In that vision, tackling poverty and deprivation 
has as great a priority as economic development or good 
relations. Moreover, the assumption of more powers 
and responsibilities (Tackling Disadvantage, Physical 
Regeneration and Community Development) are entirely 
congruent with this new urban role. It would thus be timely 
if the Council indicated its commitment by putting out a 
Belfast Anti-Poverty Manifesto.
In good part, the prospect of Belfast transforming its 
approach to issues of regeneration and deprivation 
depends on the City Council’s mobilisation and integration 
of civic capacity to this core objective. In times of fiscal 
restraint, getting the most out of this greatly under-tapped 
social capital is imperative. Examples of such systematic 
effort include:
 ● adopting a creative and proactive approach to 
planning, that abandons the minimalist model, which 
concentrates on what is legally mandated or economic 
development that accords with corporate priorities, 
and instead locates planning within broader social 
policy;
 ● undertaking a profound and urgent commitment 
to move from a managerial to a transformational 
approach to social inclusion and cohesion, that 
prioritises poverty reduction. Data on poverty should 
be part of all survey analysis in plan-making, and social 
outcomes and equality impact assessments should be 
integral to plan evaluation;
 ● following a ‘total place’ or ‘whole place’ strategy -- a 
ONE CITY --- approach, as outlined elsewhere in this 
report;
 ● linking these outcomes to related objectives about 
the healthy city and environmental quality; designing 
mixed communities -- in other words, mixed tenured, 
mixed-use, balanced communities of choice, where 
residents select rather than are compelled to live; 
addressing educational inequality; and pioneering 
initiatives around participative governance;
3:  Addressing Spatial Deprivation
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 ● developing an explicit link between specific 
development projects and their ‘community benefit’ 
or ‘planning gain’;
 ● ensuring that its research and evaluation team tracks 
and assesses the distributional impact of all its main 
spending, and that of regional government in Belfast, 
particularly focussing on health, education, and 
income inequalities;
 ● explicitly linking housing with employment and 
training opportunity, with appropriate design, access, 
and transport, while minimising infrastructural and 
other physical barriers;
 ● promoting corporate social responsibility in the city, 
through annual awards, that offer publicity for good 
private sector practice; linking any grants/contracts 
to ethical and environmentally sound corporate 
behaviour, including, at minimum, paying the living 
wage; 
 ● working in concert with critical friends, such as 
City Reparo and PLACE, offering expertise in urban 
planning and design, beyond the scope of expensive 
international consultancies that often ‘clone’ a 
standardised renewal agenda, framed in clichéd neo-
liberal assumptions about market-led rescue from 
dependency and decline, expressed in a script whose 
familiarity is only matched by its banality;
 ● developing a 10 year memorandum of understanding 
with its local universities, whereby a strategic agenda 
is agreed about how the considerable resource of 
the ‘built environment’ scholarship in architecture, 
planning, design, and engineering is synergised with 
other relevant disciplines, such as medicine, social 
policy, education, creative arts, conflict resolution, 
etc., and marshalled to offer an independent critical 
voice to the City Council’s development and good 
relations programmes; and
 ● while addressing the ‘big issues’ of economic viability 
and social fairness, not ignoring the everyday niggles 
that blight the lives of citizens: poor street lighting; 
litter; dog mess; derelict areas; lack of choice in local 
retailing in deprived areas, often dominated by tanning 
salons, fast food outlets, hair-dressing, charity shops, 
betting shops, pubs, etc; and deficiencies in accessible 
and affordable public transport.   
First Steps towards an Anti-Poverty 
Strategy 
In the first instance, such a project has to start with 
recognised parameters: the tight fiscal environment; the 
futility of reproducing (or working against) existing regional 
initiatives; the necessity to work collaboratively with 
partners, for example in education or health. Despite such 
limitations, the Council can take important first steps that 
would be almost cost free and would not jeopardise future 
partnership relationships. For example:
 ● the Council could guarantee the priority of poverty 
reduction in the city by setting out an Anti-Poverty 
Manifesto. In the first instance, this need be no more 
than proposing a set of principles for a Belfast Anti-
Poverty strategy. Local authority anti-poverty strategies 
have been numerous in the rest of the UK and have 
been comprehensively documented (see, for example, 
the work of The Townsend Centre for International 
Poverty Research at the University of Bristol). It would 
not be arduous to draw on these strategies to shape a 
set of principles specific to Belfast;
 ● the Council could utilise its own research capacity and 
the good will of interested academics and organisations 
in the community and voluntary sector to monitor 
patterns of deprivation and poverty within the city. In 
addition, Northern Ireland is one of the most data-rich 
places in the world and there is ample material to draw 
from the NISRA, OFMDFM and DSD websites. Equally, 
there is a need to monitor and evaluate what is already 
being done to assess what has had most impact within 
the city;
 ● the Council could begin a conversation with possible, 
interested partners about what a Belfast Anti-Poverty 
Strategy might look like. The Community Planning 
framework makes this eminently possible; and
 ● finally, the Council could look at its own services and 
its own employment to see how it could best minimise 
poverty risk for those it serves and those it employs.
In 2015, a new Belfast will come into being with a 
population of 333,000 (about 50% greater than the second 
most populous of the new 11 councils). Current data sets 
suggest that around a third of this population will live in 
areas designated severely deprived. This represents not 
just a moral dilemma for the city, but a practical obstacle 
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to the city achieving its full potential – its most deprived 
spaces are dramatically more segregated than the city as a 
whole and have been the most prominent sites for political 
violence over the past 40 years. 
The city has the opportunity to overcome this legacy, but 
doing so requires an explicit commitment and a readiness 
to begin the process with urgency, diligence, and strategic 
thinking. Unless interventions for ‘deprived areas’ are an 
inherent part of an overall urban regeneration strategy, 
which itself is embedded in a reconciliation strategy, then 
the same problems in the same places are likely to persist. 
Of course, the formidable challenge of addressing inequality 
and poverty in the coming period, in the context of resource 
constraint in terms of public spending, European funding, 
and ‘foundation’ funding, has to be acknowledged for 
Northern Ireland as a whole. Over the last four decades in 
the UK, spending on specific ‘urban programmes’ to tackle 
deprivation has always been modest, relative to total public 
expenditure, whose volume growth has been significantly 
declining in recent times. From very substantial increases 
in the 1998-2004 period, the decline has accelerated in the 
recent period, as can be seen in Figure 30. In the case of 
Northern Ireland, this has gone from 40% to 1.6%. Within 
these broad data, the figures for spending per head give 
a more detailed picture of the dynamic over the recent 
period.
As can be seen over this period, Northern Ireland 
consistently receives higher levels of public spending than 
the UK average (between a quarter to a fifth, see figure 29), 
due to the Barnett formula, differential need, and special 
security circumstance. Moreover, its expenditure growth 
in the most recent ‘austere’ times (2009-2013), though 
very modest at 1.6%, is higher than elsewhere in the 
UK. Nevertheless, together with reduced spending from 
Europe, and support funds such as Atlantic Philanthropy, 
the current funding environment is a testing one for 
redistributive programmes addressing various forms of 
social deprivation. Added to this fiscal consideration, is the 
trend for greater urban competition coming from the BRIC 
countries and the global south in general.
Figure 31:   % Changes to Public 
Expenditure by UK Country: 1998-
2013
Source: Harding and Nevin, et al 2015
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Figure 32:  Per Capita Expenditure 
by UK Country; 2004-2012 (UK = 1)
Source: Abstracted from Harding 
and Nevin, et al (August 2015, 21)
In thinking through a different approach to issues of 
urban deprivation and neighbourhood dereliction, and 
related problems such as educational under-attainment, 
it is useful to distil the key broad patterns of intervention 
over the last 60 years: (a) the development of a ‘fordist’ 
post-war welfare state; related comprehensive urban 
redevelopment and creation of new towns, up to late 
sixties; (b) the’ rediscovery’ of poverty; persistent 
inequality of educational outcomes; and greater use of 
de-centralised regeneration programmes, up to the late 
seventies; (c) major economic restructuring accelerated by 
the 1973 ‘oil crisis’; related de-industrialisation; continued 
compensatory intervention in the most deprived 
communities; alongside greater marketisation of the public 
‘realm’; and greater de-regulation, including in land and 
property markets; with socio-spatial polarisation, including 
emergence of a so-called ‘underclass’,  from the eighties 
through to ‘noughties’; and (d) the retrenchment aftermath 
of the financial and fiscal crisis, with greater emphasis on 
‘from welfare to work’ agendas and economic ‘austerity’ 
measures designed to redress the deficit and debt, in part 
through a smaller state and ‘bigger society’. 
Amidst all these shifts -- and certainly from the 
late seventies, there have been common threads 
in the policy language: the need for more ‘joined 
up’ and ‘smart’ governance; the synergic role of 
inter-sectoral partnership; the priority of education 
in the transition to a knowledge economy; the 
greater scale and scope offered by agglomeration 
economics, such as found in larger metropolitan 
and regional networks; increasing imperative of 
low carbon development; the importance of socio-
spatial connectivity; and so on. But, as with the data 
on public expenditure, it raises questions about 
effective progressive policy:
1. If great success has not been achieved in tackling 
multiple deprivation in periods such as 1998-2004, 
when public investment was at its height, what are 
the realistic prospects of doing so, now that it is 
substantially reduced?
2. Is it likely that Northern Ireland can make a compelling 
case for substantial extra UK resources, when even 
recent figures show that it continues to be already 
favoured?
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3. Can the region continue indefinitely to make a case 
for special treatment as one ‘coming out of conflict’, 
or does this increasingly sound to others as indulgent 
pleading, particularly in current circumstance of 
persistent if sporadic violence and institutional failure 
in governance?
4. In a more general policy context, if research has shown, 
for at least 40 years, the benefit of connectedness, 
joined-up governance, integrated development, etc. 
why would the public not be forgiven for believing 
that this language, now central to the new planning 
framework, is just more rhetoric, with no record of 
serious implementation?
Such considerations suggest that tackling poverty, and 
related problems such as educational inequality, demand 
hard choices, rather than merely more soft language. So, to 
take some obvious practical examples in Belfast:
a. can the proliferation of hospitals (including four in 
Belfast alone) be justified, if the central goal is a  health 
service, based on quality rather than quantity?
b. in a small region of 1.8 million people, can provision 
for teacher training in Queen’s University, University of 
Ulster, Stranmillis College, and St. Mary’s be justified? 
When an attempt is made to rationalise such provision, 
can government, committed to effective use of public 
resources, submit to resistance to merge St Mary’s and 
Stranmillis College on the basis of protecting a local 
institution in West Belfast?
c. given the major problem of education under-attainment 
in North Belfast, does it make sense in tackling this 
problem to fund three primary schools within yards 
of each other on the Cliftonville Road --   Cliftonville 
Integrated Primary; a Catholic Boy’s Primary, and now 
a new Irish Language medium school --- instead of 
devoting resources more effectively to the over-riding 
issue of under-achievement?
d.  in the case of local arts/culture centres, is it preferable 
to have an increasing number of these -- for instance, 
in a small area of inner North Belfast, Crumlin Road 
prison; Girdwood Community Hub, Duncairn Arts 
Centre; and renovated St. Kevin’s Hall -- rather than a 
substantial amenity that can be generously resourced, 
and accessed by all traditions?
In general, proliferation and duplication of provision 
are incompatible with efficient and effective 
resource allocation in the current and foreseeable 
public spending environment. In some cases, it 
tends to genuflect to our self-imposed separatism 
and parochialism, rather than pay due attention to 
good service provision for all, particularly the most 
socially deprived.     
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Figure 33: Maps showing distribution and duplication of schools across North Belfast (upper diagram) and cluster of 
three primary schools off the Cliftonville Road, Belfast (lower diagram).
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None of this is to under-estimate the difficult choices 
involved at local levels, where institutions, such as schools, 
are considered significant physical manifestations of viable 
community. For instance, recently the Belfast Education and 
Library Board intended to close the long-standing Malvern 
Primary in the Lower Shankill as part of its rationalisation of 
primary education provision. Following a local campaign of 
resistance to this proposal, the Education Minister reversed 
this intention, permitting a school of relatively low pupil 
numbers and financial deficit to remain open. At one level, 
this represents success for local parental and community 
interests to maintain a school that means a lot to them. 
At another level, this decision has to be considered in a 
wider context of the Greater Shankill being designated a 
Children and Young People’s Action Zone, which is targeting 
improvement in educational outcomes for the area’s 
students, supported by resources from modest funds, such 
as the Building Successful Communities Programme. Would 
children in the Greater Shankill benefit more educationally in 
the long-term from school amalgamation that  concentrated 
resources for effective tackling of the important issue of 
educational under-attainment? 
Such questions arise, even if provision of a unified school 
system, that could accommodate all children learning 
together, is not considered an intermediate prospect. Yet, 
a key part of this civic engagement around the future of 
our education system is missing at present. For instance, 
under financial pressure to rationalise school provision, 
the Department of Education, Northern Ireland, has been 
undertaking ‘an area planning’ process to elicit the most 
effective co-ordination and efficient use of its school plant. 
But, this exercise has tended to focus on the thoughts of 
existing education lobbies --- like Education Boards, the 
Catholic Maintained Schools Commission, and the Integrated 
Sector -- which, in itself, is all well and good. 
But, where is the voice of parents and other civic interests 
in this debate?       
One way to address unnecessary duplication is to achieve more shared housing.  But such achievement is 
compromised by any group marking territory as its own. 
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8.   Final Thoughts
Already in Northern Ireland, there are quiet but effective steps being trod daily towards a better way of sharing space. 
The mixed-religion Delaware housing development at the Limestone Road interface and related cross-community work in 
that difficult vicinity, the Black Mountain Shared Space Project, etc. all offer insight into how this agenda can be advanced 
in practical terms in both the built and natural environment. It is proper to recognise the myriad initiatives to promote 
shared space. One such recent proposal is for a ‘Youth Hub’  - a pop-up space in Belfast city centre, organised by Belfast 
Council’s Youth Forum in February/March 2016, and designed to identify and provide dedicated ‘youth friendly’ sites and 
services. The Belfast Youth Forum’s Shared Space Pilot Project is set to be based in the T13 activity bus at an assortment 
of city centre sites for five Thursday evenings and Saturday afternoons over this period, starting at Writer’s Square, 
opposite St Anne’s Cathedral. Activities to be provided on and around the bus include: a BMX course; Parkour; Urban Art; 
Fashion Design, DJ Skills; Chill Out Zone and Scooters. Response from young people to this ‘pilot’ provision will inform 
the City Centre Regeneration Strategy and the Belfast Agenda about how common youth services across the city can be 
accommodated in a ‘shared’ environment. 
Like much else in Northern Ireland, celebrating positive steps towards new ways of doing things, cannot be a substitute 
for facing up to the difficulties in effecting change. For example, the central mechanism for achieving co-ordination in 
urban programmes has been the principle of partnership. Yet, a comprehensive review of the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Programme (2014) found many defects in the practical operation of partnership. Thus, while the need for the co-ordination 
and integration of all urban interventions has been amply demonstrated, the mechanisms for doing so remain flawed 
because of bureaucratic inertia and the absence of really shared agendas – ‘joined-up government’ has become little 
more than an empty mantra.
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Changing Northern Ireland requires a civic will that pushes the political will to make things happen. The record has, at 
best, been patchy. On one hand, we boast about the achievements of the ‘peace process’; on the other, every obstacle 
requires both the interventions of external actors (the British and Irish governments and more marginally these days 
the US) and the demand for more money. When the going really gets tough, we pass the responsibility to someone else 
(welfare reform) or use constitutional protocols designed to protect minority rights to overturn Assembly votes designed 
to give rights to a minority (gay marriage).
This is important not merely because it actually impedes the transition from the place Northern Ireland was three decades 
ago, but because a public spending region with a poor record in productivity is having to face up to the remodelling and 
reduction of the British state to its smallest scale in half a century. Paradoxically, in a globalised world, the determinants 
of success are being increasingly deconcentrated to regional level. Regions that can adapt and thrive amid such change are 
(as endless studies have shown) characterised by truly collaborative governance and high levels of productivity. Despite 
our infinite capacity for ‘boosterism’ around industrial development, tourism etc., Northern Ireland is not actually well 
placed to survive in this environment. Eventually, our claim to special preference will depreciate, exacerbated by our 
inability to really address division or recognise that internal problems have to be solved by internal actors.
Development is about the relationship of people, place, and power. The power of those with vested interest in social 
and sectarian division needs to be challenged. In a society dominated by two major political blocs that rely heavily on 
appeal to sectarian geographies, this means that civic leadership is at a premium in helping to clarify the meaning, and 
deliver the outcome, of a shared society, beyond current partisan interpretation. People involved in planning, design, 
architecture, and development can make a distinctive contribution to this objective.
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In thinking about how the changes proposed in this report may find traction, we have to acknowledge the difficult political 
environment that still pertains – both globally and locally.
Again, current tumult around what is labelled as ‘militant Islam’ offers some scope of comparison with other sovereignty 
conflicts, though such comparison can be over-stretched. Explanation for why a section of young Muslims is ready 
for suicide, while a much larger group is ready to offer cover and logistical support, tends to point to greater poverty, 
higher unemployment, and less opportunity among this ‘disaffected’ group, along with  the failure of EU states to adopt 
integrative policies in the false name of ‘multiculturalism’. Such rationalization about limitations of social equity and 
cohesion tends to miss the point that if the sovereignty of the Divine is absolute and uncompromisable, integration 
into any form of secular diversity is impossible. Simply put, from a particular interpretation of Islamist theology, only 
a Caliphate can express the Divine in the material world, hence the attraction of ISIS. Such moral certitude places itself 
outside the realm of rational political discourse.
In this society, faithful and infidel are depicted in much less fundamentalist religious terms. Nevertheless, ethical priority 
is invoked. For instance, in the cohesion/integration debate in Northern Ireland, the Equity/Diversity/Interdependence 
framework for co-operative engagement is essentially a moral exhortation. To facilitate its adoption, a funding support 
model is advocated, one that inhibits groups being incentivised to pursue self-interest without committing to some form 
of collaboration. Largely, this hasn’t worked because in a ‘top down’ governance, (limited) collaboration at the top does 
not necessitate substantive engagement on the ground. Besides, any such model may be impossible in an environment 
of contested (or, in our case conditional) sovereignty, whose historical narratives still permit the eulogising of groups who 
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have used violence to enact their grievances while perfectly democratic alternatives existed. Hailing such ‘heroes’ of the 
past as martyrs allows for their re-incarnation as role models of the present.
Integration of diverse religious/ethnic/political groups only makes sense in an environment where there is not only 
tolerance of diversity but also acceptance of the surrounding system of governance, the rule of law etc. Yet, when the 
Deputy First Minister seems incapable of using the term ‘Northern Ireland’ to describe the entity of which he is the 
second most senior political figure (followed by the rest of Sinn Fein and many in the SDLP), some doubt the viability in 
this place of any process that can lead us out of sectarian blocs and ‘bring people together’. In this view, only when the 
sovereignty issue is set in stone one way or another, can we talk of productive inter-communal engagement.
On the other hand, some others will argue the importance of not conflating national and state identities, insisting that 
it is feasible to accord all of civic society a sense of belonging, without everyone having to conform to a uniform state 
identity. Indeed, the Good Friday Agreement recognises both Irish and British identities. The inference can be taken that 
it is possible to achieve social cohesion without people being compelled to affiliate to the Northern Ireland state identity. 
But, for others, this creates an ambivalence of citizenship that makes ‘building a society together’ highly problematic.
This reservation finds echo in many of the wider conflicts of our time. Pessimistic reading of the volatile and violent world 
in which we live is that we are being driven back to a Hobbesian state where protection is the absolute value and where 
notions like human rights, privacy etc. are seen as being either less relevant or downright obstructive. If that perspective 
takes hold, Northern Ireland has a very modest  ‘space’ in which to find new ways to change our ways.
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